Foucault Documentary: Beyond Good and Evil (1993)

http://critical-theory.com/foucault-documentary

Ergo: New Open Philosophy Journal

http://www.ergophiljournal.org/

Bill Watterson on values and integrity

http://zenpencils.com/comic/128-bill-watterson-a-cartoonists-advice

A western romantic ideal that critiques a capitalist social ethos and glorifies the detached nuclear family while presuming the insurance of fiscal security for its possibility.

W.E.I.R.D.

"Are atheists more intelligent?"

Dr. Matthew Guest from Durham University, currently visiting fellow at Victoria University in British Columbia, breaks down a meta-analysis study regarding the relationship between atheism and intelligence.

*Update: Just found an article from the Psychology department at Edinburgh University that corroborates what Dr. Guest is saying here in the podcast. The article by Lewis, Ritchie, and Bates (2011) that examines the relationship between intelligence and religiosity is here in pdf format. and the abstract I'll copy-paste:

Abstract
High levels of religiosity have been linked to lower levels of intelligence in a number of recent studies. These results have generated both controversy and theoretical interest. Here in a large sample of US adults we address several issues that restricted the generalizaibility of these previous results. We measured six dimensions of religiosity (rather than just one or two), along with a multi-scale instrument to assess general intelligence. We also controlled for the influence of the personality trait openness on facets of religious belief and practice. The results indicated that lower intelligence is most strongly associated with higher levels of fundamentalism, but also modestly predicts central components of religiosity such as a sense of religious identification and private religious practice. Secondly, we found that a higher level of openness - often assumed to lead to lower religiosity - is weakly associated with reduced fundamentalism but with increased religious mindfulness, private religious practice, religious support, and spirituality. These new results provide a framework for understanding the links between reasoning and faith.    

The History of the Devil

(2009)



Much better than I anticipated.

Templeton Foundation. Gods in Mind: The Science of Religious Cognition

The Templeton Foundation has launched a new funding competition. 

Copied from their website, which is linked below:
Definitions
Religious cognition is defined for the purposes of this competition as the cognitive processes and representational states involved in knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, behaviors, and experience relating to gods and other supernatural agents. As with other types of social cognition, cognitive representations of gods contain multiple types of content. For example, a person’s representation of God could include such information as (a) beliefs about God’s existence or non-existence, (b) beliefs about non-anthropomorphic attributes (e.g., omnipresence, invisibility, immortality), (c) attributions of psychological characteristics (e.g., compassion, fairness, distance, harshness), (d) attributions of feelings and emotions (e.g., God’s emotions toward me; my emotions toward God), (e) relational schemas (e.g., attachment to God), (f) attributional frameworks for understanding God’s causal involvement and motives in relation to different events (e.g., whether a prayer was answered, why a good or bad event occurred), (g) relational scripts (e.g., patterns of interpersonal interaction with supernatural agents), and (h) contrasts between doctrinal (propositional) and experiential (affect-laden) representations regarding all of the preceding. Ordinary social cognitive processes are also relevant to the way in which people think about supernatural agents. Just as one example, the salience of any given content probably varies according to mood, motivation, and context.

Scope
The present funding competition targets 10 specific strands of research on the representation of supernatural agents. These can be grouped into three general approaches: universal constraints and features of religious cognition (1, 2), individual differences in the content and processing of religious cognition (3 – 8), and broader conceptual and methodological issues (9, 10). A priority for this competition is to integrate theory and findings across these strands. Typical research questions within each of these strands are as follows:

1. Developmental psychology: How do mental representations of gods typically develop and change over the life cycle? What cognitive features (e.g., theory of mind) constrain such representations? 
2. Cognitive science of religion: How do people represent the non-anthropomorphic attributes of supernatural agents? Why do people believe or not believe in agents with such properties? 
3. Sociology and cultural anthropology: How do culturally dominant ideas about gods influence supernatural agent representations at the individual level? How does language influence representations of gods?
4. Personality and social psychology: How do individuals represent the character or personality of God? In what way are representations of gods cognitively similar or different to representations of people?
5. Clinical psychology: What cognitive processes are involved when people use God as a positive or negative coping resource? Why do people get angry at God and how can it be resolved? 
6. Psychodynamic psychology/object relations: What influence do children’s understandings of their parents have upon their representations of God?
7. Attachment: How and why can God function as an attachment figure? Under what circumstances does attachment to God correspond with or compensate for early attachment figures?
8. Attribution: How and when do people account for events in terms of the actions of a supernatural agent? What attributional processes are involved in everyday experience of God? When is prayer perceived as having been answered?
9. Multilevel models of cognition and emotion: How do distinctions between (a) propositional, “head-level”, explicit, or rational cognition and (b) implicational, “heart-level”, implicit, or experiential cognition apply to religious cognition? Which multilevel models of cognition and emotion are the most useful for the study of religious cognition?
10. Measurement: How can the cognitive processes and representational states involved in religious cognition best be measured?

More here:
http://www.templeton.org/what-we-fund/funding-competitions/gods-in-minds-the-science-of-religious-cognition

Civil Religion in America by Robert Bellah

Here: http://www.robertbellah.com/articles_5.htm

I find Bellah's argument very interesting. He's not really talking about an implied religion of the masses but an implicitly constructed religion, independent from but heavily influenced by, Christianity within the modalities of governance at the interface of government and people. Christianity is not invoked but 'God' is continuously used to imply several things as well as justify several things. An implicit and constructed religion to represent values and morals as well as a method of justification for what government does, which Bellah rightly predicts will cause future problems in its interpretation. 46 years after Bellah's essay and the death of the sociologist, we continue to witness the consequences of that discourse today on the religion front of the U.S. i.e. "Is america a christian nation?" 

Eagle Valor, Chicken Mind by Robinson Jeffers

EAGLE VALOR, CHICKEN MIND
by Robinson Jeffers (1887-1962) 

Unhappy country, what wings you have! Even here,
Nothing important to protect, and ocean-far from the nearest enemy,
                        what a cloud
Of bombers amazes the coast mountain, what a hornet-swarm of fighters,
And day and night the guns practicing.
Unhappy, eagle wings and beak, chicken brain,
Weep (it is frequent in human affairs), weep for the terrible magnificence
                        of the means.
The ridiculous incompetence of the reasons, the bloody and shabby
Pathos of the result.

http://www.ccjp.org/poetry.php

Deborah 13: Servant of God

Deborah 13: Servant of God. from llamalamp on Vimeo.

http://vimeo.com/22891716#

Jesus Camp

Jesus Camp - legendado pt_BR from Livres Pensadores on Vimeo.


And...one of the kids represented in this documentary, Levi, was interviewed 5 years later here:

Religion, Science & Art: Glorifying European Structures

http://www.archdaily.com/411167/video-nightvision-luke-shepard/

John Searle on Consciousness

Ludwig Feuerbach on Religion

From the Guardian's 'Radical thinkers' series.

*On Singer's 'The Ethics of Belief'

In his essay, 'The Ethics of Belief', Singer raises the isue of religious epistemology accepted on unquestioning faith, the problem of evil, and leadership. Singer thereby questions the 'ethics' of having a belief without voluntary deliberation and thought. While this can be ignored at a lay level, it raises some issues for persons of power and leadership.

Singer's subject of question is former U.S. president, George W. Bush.

Bush is widely known to be a born-again Christian and cites "Jesus" to be his favorite philosopher. Undoubtedly, the mythical Jesus rather than the historical Jesus. Singer begins with Bush's light-bulb moment as he walked a beach in Maine with famous televangelist Billy Graham. Bush decides to "recommit my heart to Jesus Christ" and fully accepts Jesus as the son of God and that "God sent his son to die" for sinners like George Bush.

Citing various examples of 'evil' i.e. aids, violence, war, poverty, disasters etc. etc. that is rife with what many philosophers of religion call 'the problem of evil'.

He then notes the problem of disparity in religious epistemology. They can't all be right. Christians believe only Christians go to heaven. Muslims only believe Muslims go to heaven. Non-Christian religions don't think Jesus was the son of God, etc. etc. It can't possibly be all equally valid, a parity of religious epistemic diversity cannot be sustained. Or so Singer's tone suggests.

Singer ends with a question about leadership and critical thinking: Can a man who accepts ideas without critically thinking about them appropriately be a president, let alone the president of what is arguably the most powerful country in the world? While it is one thing to discuss blind acceptance and the formation of belief without critical thought in a cashier at the local supermarket, it is quite another thing to discuss the same conditions in a man who is in a leadership position like the President of the United States.

Personally, the more interesting question is the issue of religion in powerful leadership positions. But to comment very briefly on the 'problem of evil' and 'religious epistemology', I find the discussion a bit narrow. The 'problem of evil' has historically been a white Christian debate. Not that the discussion of whether human nature is innately good or innately evil, is strictly western - this debate has been a classic in Confucian meditations as well - but rather that the 'problem of evil' has been framed in the context of a Christian God and 'evil' considered as all the "bad things" happening in the world including natural disasters and war. Much of the debate lays out characteristics of God and how it can accommodate all the bad shit in the world. I think this is inherently ethnocentric, Christo-centric, and in a way epitomizes a western logic that draws its tradition back to the "birth of (western) philosophy" with the pre-socratics, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. All portrayed as white folk in ancient Greece. The geneology of "logic" I suppose.

Within this context, the discussion is valid and relevant. Afterall, there are millions upon millions of Christians all around the world now. But comparing the consequences of God's characteristics and the "problem of evil" narrows that theological discussion. Any valid attempt to discuss this should incorporate a "wholeism" view (mentioned by Dennet, which I commented before) and consider a broader scope for the 'problem of evil'. And yes, this is somewhat apologetic but in my opinion I think this is only fair. Personally, I have no place in this discussion. I don't think the problem of "evil" is a theological question and discussion but a social, therefore psychological, question and discussion. The existence of God is irrelevant for any serious consideration of  socio-political influences that shape the conditions for some crazy-ass shit around the world. What is an ifinitely more interesting question is the use of 'God'-discourse to mobilize and justify certain efforts and the political capital it gains. But this is another discussion and noted in Robert Bellah's 'Civil Religion in America'.    

The issue of religious epistemological parity amongst diverse views, is also not very important to me either. The diversity of religious epistemology is going to persist. And the funny thing about it is that science is lumped into this discussion as one among many "religious" epistemologies. But let's leave that alone for now. Because I definitely don't think epsitemology grounded on science is the same as a religious epistemology. But like I said, as long as religions remain to exist the diversity will also continue to exist. Religious epistemologies, in my view, are also cosmologies and a form of metaphysics. Not an accurate metaphysics to scientific standards but a metaphysics that is real and meaningful to many people. I find this contention of which religious epistemology is right and which is wrong, utterly useless. Fun for a domain of thought and philosophizing but completely useless insofar as its implications and possibilities for actual influence on the lives of people. I am committed to allowing religious epistemological diversity and allowing their parity as sources of meaning; existential wells from which people can get their hydration to quench any spiritual thirst. I don't care and it's all good. Apples and oranges. So I have no real stake in this discussion of religious epistemology, its diversity, and any debate about parity other than the pragmatic consequences and influences such epistemology may have on the social conditions and psychology of persons.

The interesting question is leadership. Can we have a non-critical man of his faith stand to act as a leader for a country? The presumption here is that such a leader will be non-critical of the myriad of issues that concern a leader of a country.

On one hand, it is perfectly plausible for such a man to be a leader, if he is critical about the work he does. And I would argue that this is fully possible. There are scientists who present valid work in their field but turn into something else on religion. This is also the case for economists and bankers. Just citing the examples in Utah, there are organizations like Zions bank whose leadership is largley comprised of Mormons. Does their LDS theology influence they way they look at numbers? Perhaps, but they run the business of banking well and know the mechanisms that tend to govern markets. In other words, people can perfectly compartmentalize forms of rationality as it is relevant to context and the paradigm in which they are working. If the methods and the numbers of a banker were presented to them in religiously saturated discourse this may effect the way they approach and go about doing what they do. Nevertheless, because the language is separate, the method of discourse and the sentiments attached to that discourse will be different from the sentiments attached to a theological discourse.

What becomes problematic, aptly pointed out by Singer, is the issue of determining policies that govern healthcare, marriage, poverty, foreign policy, and things that relate to particular values that resonate with a particular theological leaning (which can in fact serve both conservative and liberal parties in their own respective agendas).

In this arena of making policy decisions and legislative amendments, should they be informed by religious discourse? This gives further gravity to the debate about religion and public discourse, among others, between Charles Taylor and Jurgen Habermas. Taylor argues that religious terminology can be used and Habermas argues that it cannot. Here, on this particular issue, I am inclined to agree with Habermas. A democratic and diverse society should not utilize religious terminology in their arguments. A democratic and diverse society is a society for all people living in that society; not just the majority but the minorities and the marginalized as well. Using terminology that is familiar to the majority only further marginalizes and segregates the populace on the issues at hand but also divides them on sentiment that may be attached to a particular religious term. The use of religious terminology and its interpretation is problematic. Not only does the acceptance of religious language in the legislative sphere problematize law for interpretation but its ambiguity lends to bias.

Religious terminology and reasons are fine for and within religious communities. And they have a legitimate place to agree or disagree with the law. However, their disagreement should not bar the services and liberties afforded by living in that country to all people. In other words, we should avoid an imperialist morality of right and wrong. If religious communities do not want to participate that is fine. Just as religious communities can stand against the consumption of certain goods and not practice in the consumption of those goods, they do not have to participate in the option that is available to all. Options should be available. Some religions prohibit alcohol, some prohibit coffee. But does this mean that the state should make it illegal? I'll be damned the day they outlaw coffee. Laws should be governed on the morality of duty and aspiration for all as opposed to a law for the dominant culture.  

 

Hegel and Nietzsche: 'Death of God'

"For Nietzsche the idea of the death of God stood for the nihilistic process of the evisceration of all values in modernity, a process to which his doctrine of "eternal recurrence" was meant to respond. But this is paired with Chapter 10 on the less well-known Hegelian version of the idea that "God is dead". This initial pairing of Nietzsche and Hegel vis-à-vis their approaches to religion in the time of a collapse of a certain kind of religion, a form of Christianity built on a "legal-penal-juridical" picture of the world in which God is cast as a type of transcendent monarch, allows a comparison of the way they each responded to the "death of God" phenomenon by going back to  ancient tragic consciousness. Nietzsche uses this in a critical dismissal of Christianity, but Hegel uses it as a basis from which to reconstruct a new liberal and yet "tragic" version of Christianity."

From Paul Redding's review of Robert Williams' Tragedy, Recognition, and the Death of God: Studies in Hegel and Nietzsche

 

Hume on Taste

an interview with Michael Martin at philosophy bites

xkcd

For the full animated movie 'Time', go here:
http://www.wired.com/underwire/2013/08/xkcd-time-comic/?mbid=social10400444