Friday, November 27, 2015
*A few thoughts on 'Emancipatory Politics'
Recently Stephen Feuchtwang and Alpa Shah edited a volume entitled Emancipatory Politics: A Critique (2015), which you can download (for free) here.
At present, there is a seminar discussion on the text over at the Open Anthropology Cooperative but I thought I'd first entertain a few preliminary thoughts here and watch that space as it unfolds before deciding whether or not I want to, or even feel capable of joining that conversation (I am no political anthropologist or an economic anthropologist but rather trained in the study of religion with a philosophy, psychology, and anthropology background). Moreover, I don't want to leave any long-winded posts in that forum as I write out my thoughts.
So first, a definition and some themes that are laid out in that volume. By 'emancipatory politics,' Feuchtwang and Shah mean:
At present, there is a seminar discussion on the text over at the Open Anthropology Cooperative but I thought I'd first entertain a few preliminary thoughts here and watch that space as it unfolds before deciding whether or not I want to, or even feel capable of joining that conversation (I am no political anthropologist or an economic anthropologist but rather trained in the study of religion with a philosophy, psychology, and anthropology background). Moreover, I don't want to leave any long-winded posts in that forum as I write out my thoughts.
So first, a definition and some themes that are laid out in that volume. By 'emancipatory politics,' Feuchtwang and Shah mean:
"political activities that aim to end exploitation and enhance participatory democracy through which leadership can be held to account on a daily as well as periodic basis, in the workplace and beyond".
The three, inter-related, themes identified are:
1. The tension between mass organization and the party in charge of the armed force. Democratic centralism may lead to an inflexible inability to accommodate local conditions.2. This raises the question of the relationship between democracy and emancipatory politics. The party sometimes becomes unaccountable to the people it claims to serve.3. Analysis of the classes, issues and alliances involved in the struggle for emancipation is essential.
The Marxist-Leninist and Maoist movements discussed in these texts are of much intrigue and at the heart of each movement is the fight against capitalist-imperialist structures within their respective countries. This edited volume begins with the premise that violence is sometimes necessary; armed revolt as a means to end violence and oppression against the people.
However, given the next step I'll be taking as a post-doc, I want to think about these revolutionary movements in a different way. That is, are revolutionary movements not fighting against the misuse of money’s transformative power such that people are subject to oppression and violence? Is it not a fight against economic hegemony and discrimination that perpetuates the struggle?
However, given the next step I'll be taking as a post-doc, I want to think about these revolutionary movements in a different way. That is, are revolutionary movements not fighting against the misuse of money’s transformative power such that people are subject to oppression and violence? Is it not a fight against economic hegemony and discrimination that perpetuates the struggle?
Within this framework, I want to pick out three issues that will be of relevance to the three inter-related themes discussed above: (1) the role of
money in this discussion of ‘emancipatory politics’ as a form sustaining
revolutionary movements and the dominant structures they are fighting against;
(2) whether it is still plausible to discuss these case studies in isolation
without considering foreign influence and international relations; and (3) the
political task of scholars as persons who are invariably a part of ‘world
society’ (as the historian Howard Zinn says, “you can’t be neutral on a moving
train”).
To
expand a bit further, with regard to the first, I
understand that the focal point of the volume was on the political end of
things but in many ways it is difficult to take the role of money out of this
discussion. For example, in a study by Gilens & Page (2014), they show that
economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have
substantial impact on US govt. policy while the impact of average citizens and
mass-based interest groups are minimal. In cruder terms, money has a greater
influence than the people in US legislation. Democracy doesn’t dictate the
terms but rather the money involved in politics holds the greater persuasive
power.
In this sense, I wonder if ‘democracy’ continues to hold analytical utility and descriptive accuracy in the discussion of emancipatory politics or even politics in general. Is ‘democracy’ not a normative ideal of political philosophy rather than a descriptive practice of government and its relationship to the people? This begs the question whether there ever was (and this may simply be my own ignorance) a ‘democracy’ that we can meaningfully speak of that was successfully held accountable by the people without impunity.
In this sense, I wonder if ‘democracy’ continues to hold analytical utility and descriptive accuracy in the discussion of emancipatory politics or even politics in general. Is ‘democracy’ not a normative ideal of political philosophy rather than a descriptive practice of government and its relationship to the people? This begs the question whether there ever was (and this may simply be my own ignorance) a ‘democracy’ that we can meaningfully speak of that was successfully held accountable by the people without impunity.
In
terms of the second, I’m thinking specifically about the economic interests of
colonial countries, the ties between them, and their relationship to previously
colonized countries. Can we talk about an emancipatory politics without
discussing these international networks? In South Korea, trade agreements
between Australia and the U.S. enabled the importation of rice which are priced
lower than the rice from local farmers. You can imagine the consequences. If I
recall correctly, this also occurred in India. I don’t think there is one
country in the world that is economically isolated in terms of trade (even
North Korea, arguably the most isolated country in the world).
Lastly,
before reaching the point of violence and the discussion of Fanon and
Arendt (in the volume), I am keen to introduce Foucault’s proposal. In a discussion with
Chomsky (1971 debate), Foucault argued that political power is also exerted by
institutions that seem to be independent of the prevailing political powers. He
states “the university and the whole education system is supposed to distribute
knowledge, we know that the educational system maintains the power in the hands
of a certain social class” and excludes other social classes from this power. I
think many disciplines - more notably philosophy departments – and the student
protests in South Africa are confronting the issue of social class and
political power within universities. This is applicable not only with regard to
the academy but also local governments, the army, police, hospitals, judicial
systems, etc. Foucault then concludes by stating that the “real political task”
is “to criticize the workings of institutions, that appear to be both neutral
and independent; to criticize and attack them in such a manner that political
violence has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked,
so that one can fight against them.” If these seemingly neutral and independent
institutions are not addressed – I would also add that if we do not critique
the ‘culture’ of power (the exchange of favors, the management of money, where they receive money, who they give money to and for what ends, and how deals are struck) within these neutral and independent institutions as
well as governments – “there is a risk that they reconstitute themselves.”
While the use of violence and the sacrifice of people for the solidification of sovereignty is indeed an important discussion, I wonder if this doesn't jump the gun before thinking more critically about why persons are taking up arms, the structures that perpetuate those conditions, and how to change those conditions either through structural reform or abolishing them. What would a economy and government that is truly for the people and held accountable by the people look like? How do we install a system that can provide a meanignful work economy (that doesn't concentrate wealth, which invariably leads to corruption, and doesn't advocate a hoarding of money), and provide non-discriminate healthcare, food, housing, and education for the people?
Thus far, people all around the world have been, to some extent, effective in mobilizing against injustice and discontent with government. However, there has been a lack of engagement with method after the overthrow of corrupt and ineffective government. I think this is where the concern between "democracy" and 'emancipatory politics' comes in by which the demands advocated by the uprising/revolution are thwarted by a political culture of "electoral politics." This was decidedly the case in South Korea and much more recently in Egypt (I write about it here and here). After the overthrow of Mubarak, they engaged in elections which proved a return to the same culture of governance and the demands of the revolution are unmet.
The 4.19 uprising in Korea, which brought down the first president/dictator Rhee (who was renounced by the Korean Provisional Government during the colonial era but placed in power by the U.S.; a presidency characterized by mass killings, corruption, hoarding money, and rigged elections), only placed another politician (Heo Jeong), as caretaker, of the same political camp and incompetent to move government. This was also the case for Chang Myeon, another prime minister who took the reins for a minute, as well as Yun Bo-Sun (the second President), and before a democratic system for the people could take over the 'anti-communist' dictatorship of Rhee, the military stepped in and took over government under Park Chung-hee (father of the current South Korean President). Each of these figures (Heo, Chang, Yun, and Park) continued to participate in a culture of politics that engaged with the U.S. and ignored the people. Violence against the people and armed counter-violence by the people persisted throughout this era and indeed continued under Park who would run the country from 1962 to 1979 when he was assasinated (My parents immigrated to the US in 1984 and our family would embark on a journey oscillating between the two countries, living intermittently for several years in one country and then the other).
One of the key components to the early years of South Korea was the use of pro-Japanese colonial figures in politics and police. In other words, the remnants of Japanese colonialism were still present which undermined the development of a truly Korean government on its own terms. Moreover, the rich capitalists who would spearhead the jaebol class were practically granted impunity for their roles in corruption and collusion for the sake of economic development. The trade-off, in retrospect, is South Korea's great economic development (which no one can dispute) at the consequence of a greater disparity of income across the Korean people. Inheritance is the greatest transmitter of wealth and we are now seeing the consequences of a senior class in poverty and an increased rate of suicide among them. Given the emphasis and respect for the elderly in Korean society, this is a damn shame. Our grandparents and grandmothers should not be living in poverty nor should they be committing suicide because of their self-perceived burden on society and their children. This is, arguably, the gravest offense for a highly Confucian country like Korea. But I digress. What I am arguing here is the re-constitution of a 'culture of power' and the use of money to perpetuate those systems.
Revolt and uprising are only the beginning points. The real task is the question of what happens after bringing down those in political power such that the same forms of oppression do not re-constitute themselves. This edited volume is asking those questions and I appreciate it all the more for it. Something that I would like to see more is a discussion of money in politics and how do we change the transformative power of money towards the well-being of all people and the eradication of oppressive structures?
While the use of violence and the sacrifice of people for the solidification of sovereignty is indeed an important discussion, I wonder if this doesn't jump the gun before thinking more critically about why persons are taking up arms, the structures that perpetuate those conditions, and how to change those conditions either through structural reform or abolishing them. What would a economy and government that is truly for the people and held accountable by the people look like? How do we install a system that can provide a meanignful work economy (that doesn't concentrate wealth, which invariably leads to corruption, and doesn't advocate a hoarding of money), and provide non-discriminate healthcare, food, housing, and education for the people?
Thus far, people all around the world have been, to some extent, effective in mobilizing against injustice and discontent with government. However, there has been a lack of engagement with method after the overthrow of corrupt and ineffective government. I think this is where the concern between "democracy" and 'emancipatory politics' comes in by which the demands advocated by the uprising/revolution are thwarted by a political culture of "electoral politics." This was decidedly the case in South Korea and much more recently in Egypt (I write about it here and here). After the overthrow of Mubarak, they engaged in elections which proved a return to the same culture of governance and the demands of the revolution are unmet.
The 4.19 uprising in Korea, which brought down the first president/dictator Rhee (who was renounced by the Korean Provisional Government during the colonial era but placed in power by the U.S.; a presidency characterized by mass killings, corruption, hoarding money, and rigged elections), only placed another politician (Heo Jeong), as caretaker, of the same political camp and incompetent to move government. This was also the case for Chang Myeon, another prime minister who took the reins for a minute, as well as Yun Bo-Sun (the second President), and before a democratic system for the people could take over the 'anti-communist' dictatorship of Rhee, the military stepped in and took over government under Park Chung-hee (father of the current South Korean President). Each of these figures (Heo, Chang, Yun, and Park) continued to participate in a culture of politics that engaged with the U.S. and ignored the people. Violence against the people and armed counter-violence by the people persisted throughout this era and indeed continued under Park who would run the country from 1962 to 1979 when he was assasinated (My parents immigrated to the US in 1984 and our family would embark on a journey oscillating between the two countries, living intermittently for several years in one country and then the other).
One of the key components to the early years of South Korea was the use of pro-Japanese colonial figures in politics and police. In other words, the remnants of Japanese colonialism were still present which undermined the development of a truly Korean government on its own terms. Moreover, the rich capitalists who would spearhead the jaebol class were practically granted impunity for their roles in corruption and collusion for the sake of economic development. The trade-off, in retrospect, is South Korea's great economic development (which no one can dispute) at the consequence of a greater disparity of income across the Korean people. Inheritance is the greatest transmitter of wealth and we are now seeing the consequences of a senior class in poverty and an increased rate of suicide among them. Given the emphasis and respect for the elderly in Korean society, this is a damn shame. Our grandparents and grandmothers should not be living in poverty nor should they be committing suicide because of their self-perceived burden on society and their children. This is, arguably, the gravest offense for a highly Confucian country like Korea. But I digress. What I am arguing here is the re-constitution of a 'culture of power' and the use of money to perpetuate those systems.
Revolt and uprising are only the beginning points. The real task is the question of what happens after bringing down those in political power such that the same forms of oppression do not re-constitute themselves. This edited volume is asking those questions and I appreciate it all the more for it. Something that I would like to see more is a discussion of money in politics and how do we change the transformative power of money towards the well-being of all people and the eradication of oppressive structures?
*Weber on Salvation
After leading several seminars on Weber's view of salvation (Ch. 10 of The Sociology of Religion trans Ephraim Fischoff. Intro by Parsons), I figured I'd summarize it here and make a few interspersed comments.
In a brief nutshell, in this chapter, Weber aims to distinguish between ritualistic religions that don't contribute to ethical behavior and religions that do contribute to ethics; all of which is done within the purview of salvation.
First, he argues that salvation is an individual endeavor. One path to salvation is through "purely ritual activities and ceremonies: "ritualistic salvation." He states that this form of religion, which stresses the development of a particular "ephemeral subjective state" and experience, holds the effect of ex opere operato (from the work worked; emphasizing the efficacy of the ritual itself, i.e. salvation is obtained by participation): "Their typical intention is the accomplishment, by the sheer sacredness of their manipulations, of redemption from grace and the distribution of sacramental grace." Once the ritual has passed, however, Weber claims that there is a "negligible effect on behavior." He places "the Hindu and others in the Orient" and "the majority of non-Christian ancient mystery cults" into this category of "pure ritualism" (certainly problematic, to say the least). Moreover, he argues that animism focuses on this-world or 'immanence' and use the inducement of 'ecstasy' as an "instrument of salvation or self-deification." Again, for Weber, this has little to no positive effect on everyday ethical behavior. This carries several implications for the discussion of conversion and the role of religious experiences (although I don't think it contributes anything new to that discussion, at least where it stands now).
By contrast, Weber distinguishes "pure ritualism" from Christian faiths which qualifies the efficacy of the sacrament "to bring salvation" only to those who are "ethically purified in the sight of god," which are associated with moral codes of behavior; prescriptive rules. We begin to see how Weber is setting up his view of religious "rationalization" and "systematization."
One way by which ritual can exert an ethical effect is through education and the systematization of moral codes or a "body of law." A systematization of "good works" that can take one of two forms: an emphasis on individual actions (Weber includes: Zoroastrianism, Hinduisim, Judaism, and Roman Catholicism and the "oriental Christian churches") or an emphasis on a "underlying ethical total personality." In the case of the latter, he goes on to describe this as an "ethic of inwardness," which is developed either as a product of education - "through a training of goodness" - or as a product of "a divine gift" (but this is problematic, given the nature/nurture debate - we can wonder to what extent we can even talk about 'nature' as we are necessarily born within a specific historical, cultural, and social context). In either case, the prescribed views of "religious good works" become "instruments of self-perfection," self-deification, a process of "sanctification."
This process of rationalization, a methodological account toward salvation, is codified in ethics; to "become his [god's] instrument or to be spiritually suffused by him." This method and rationalization in effect combats the "average habitus of the human body and the everyday world as those are given by nature." The negation of this-world, in yearning for salvation, induces the ethical behavior for this world. In other words, the end motivates the means to achieve the end.
While Weber highlights "method" over "religious experience" regarding their effect on everyday behavior, his protestant upbringing can't help but include a specific experience, an emergent "subjective condition" - the assurance of grace - that has a significant impact on consciousness and becomes a "foundation for the conduct of life." It renounces "irrational" behaviors of nature, not only from the view point of hygiene (we can branch into Freud here if we wanted) but also "sensual pleasures" which do not lead to salvation.
Rationality, for Weber, in the context of religion, is therefore intimately tied to salvation and ethical behavior, which is also to say that 'rationality' is connected and beholden to prescriptive codes of behavior and methods of thought provided/mandated by the systematized path to salvation of religious traditions (in response to much of this we could bring in Nietzsche's critique of power and morality as well as Marx's critique of social conditions that motivate religious thought, as well as post-colonial critiques in Weber's thought).
In a brief nutshell, in this chapter, Weber aims to distinguish between ritualistic religions that don't contribute to ethical behavior and religions that do contribute to ethics; all of which is done within the purview of salvation.
First, he argues that salvation is an individual endeavor. One path to salvation is through "purely ritual activities and ceremonies: "ritualistic salvation." He states that this form of religion, which stresses the development of a particular "ephemeral subjective state" and experience, holds the effect of ex opere operato (from the work worked; emphasizing the efficacy of the ritual itself, i.e. salvation is obtained by participation): "Their typical intention is the accomplishment, by the sheer sacredness of their manipulations, of redemption from grace and the distribution of sacramental grace." Once the ritual has passed, however, Weber claims that there is a "negligible effect on behavior." He places "the Hindu and others in the Orient" and "the majority of non-Christian ancient mystery cults" into this category of "pure ritualism" (certainly problematic, to say the least). Moreover, he argues that animism focuses on this-world or 'immanence' and use the inducement of 'ecstasy' as an "instrument of salvation or self-deification." Again, for Weber, this has little to no positive effect on everyday ethical behavior. This carries several implications for the discussion of conversion and the role of religious experiences (although I don't think it contributes anything new to that discussion, at least where it stands now).
By contrast, Weber distinguishes "pure ritualism" from Christian faiths which qualifies the efficacy of the sacrament "to bring salvation" only to those who are "ethically purified in the sight of god," which are associated with moral codes of behavior; prescriptive rules. We begin to see how Weber is setting up his view of religious "rationalization" and "systematization."
One way by which ritual can exert an ethical effect is through education and the systematization of moral codes or a "body of law." A systematization of "good works" that can take one of two forms: an emphasis on individual actions (Weber includes: Zoroastrianism, Hinduisim, Judaism, and Roman Catholicism and the "oriental Christian churches") or an emphasis on a "underlying ethical total personality." In the case of the latter, he goes on to describe this as an "ethic of inwardness," which is developed either as a product of education - "through a training of goodness" - or as a product of "a divine gift" (but this is problematic, given the nature/nurture debate - we can wonder to what extent we can even talk about 'nature' as we are necessarily born within a specific historical, cultural, and social context). In either case, the prescribed views of "religious good works" become "instruments of self-perfection," self-deification, a process of "sanctification."
This process of rationalization, a methodological account toward salvation, is codified in ethics; to "become his [god's] instrument or to be spiritually suffused by him." This method and rationalization in effect combats the "average habitus of the human body and the everyday world as those are given by nature." The negation of this-world, in yearning for salvation, induces the ethical behavior for this world. In other words, the end motivates the means to achieve the end.
While Weber highlights "method" over "religious experience" regarding their effect on everyday behavior, his protestant upbringing can't help but include a specific experience, an emergent "subjective condition" - the assurance of grace - that has a significant impact on consciousness and becomes a "foundation for the conduct of life." It renounces "irrational" behaviors of nature, not only from the view point of hygiene (we can branch into Freud here if we wanted) but also "sensual pleasures" which do not lead to salvation.
Rationality, for Weber, in the context of religion, is therefore intimately tied to salvation and ethical behavior, which is also to say that 'rationality' is connected and beholden to prescriptive codes of behavior and methods of thought provided/mandated by the systematized path to salvation of religious traditions (in response to much of this we could bring in Nietzsche's critique of power and morality as well as Marx's critique of social conditions that motivate religious thought, as well as post-colonial critiques in Weber's thought).
Thursday, November 12, 2015
Sunday, November 1, 2015
Cultural Identity
"Cultural identities come from somewhere, have histories. But like everything which is historical, they undergo constant transformation. Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, they are subject to the continuous 'play' of history, culture and power. Far from being grounded in mere 'recovery' of the past, which is waiting to be found, and which when found, will secure our sense of ourselves into eternity, identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past."
-Stuart Hall, 1990
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