Friday, November 27, 2015

*A few thoughts on 'Emancipatory Politics'

Recently Stephen Feuchtwang and Alpa Shah edited a volume entitled Emancipatory Politics: A Critique (2015), which you can download (for free) here.

At present, there is a seminar discussion on the text over at the Open Anthropology Cooperative but I thought I'd first entertain a few preliminary thoughts here and watch that space as it unfolds before deciding whether or not I want to, or even feel capable of joining that conversation (I am no political anthropologist or an economic anthropologist but rather trained in the study of religion with a philosophy, psychology, and anthropology background). Moreover, I don't want to leave any long-winded posts in that forum as I write out my thoughts.  


So first, a definition and some themes that are laid out in that volume. By 'emancipatory politics,' Feuchtwang and Shah mean:  
"political activities that aim to end exploitation and enhance participatory democracy through which leadership can be held to account on a daily as well as periodic basis, in the workplace and beyond".
The three, inter-related, themes identified are:
1. The tension between mass organization and the party in charge of the armed force. Democratic centralism may lead to an inflexible inability to accommodate local conditions.

2. This raises the question of the relationship between democracy and emancipatory politics. The party sometimes becomes unaccountable to the people it claims to serve. 

3. Analysis of the classes, issues and alliances involved in the struggle for emancipation is essential. 
The Marxist-Leninist and Maoist movements discussed in these texts are of much intrigue and at the heart of each movement is the fight against capitalist-imperialist structures within their respective countries. This edited volume begins with the premise that violence is sometimes necessary; armed revolt as a means to end violence and oppression against the people.

However, given the next step I'll be taking as a post-doc, I want to think about these revolutionary movements in a different way. That is, are revolutionary movements not fighting against the misuse of money’s transformative power such that people are subject to oppression and violence? Is it not a fight against economic hegemony and discrimination that perpetuates the struggle?

Within this framework, I want to pick out three issues that will be of relevance to the three inter-related themes discussed above: (1) the role of money in this discussion of ‘emancipatory politics’ as a form sustaining revolutionary movements and the dominant structures they are fighting against; (2) whether it is still plausible to discuss these case studies in isolation without considering foreign influence and international relations; and (3) the political task of scholars as persons who are invariably a part of ‘world society’ (as the historian Howard Zinn says, “you can’t be neutral on a moving train”).  

To expand a bit further, with regard to the first, I understand that the focal point of the volume was on the political end of things but in many ways it is difficult to take the role of money out of this discussion. For example, in a study by Gilens & Page (2014), they show that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial impact on US govt. policy while the impact of average citizens and mass-based interest groups are minimal. In cruder terms, money has a greater influence than the people in US legislation. Democracy doesn’t dictate the terms but rather the money involved in politics holds the greater persuasive power.

In this sense, I wonder if ‘democracy’ continues to hold analytical utility and descriptive accuracy in the discussion of emancipatory politics or even politics in general. Is ‘democracy’ not a normative ideal of political philosophy rather than a descriptive practice of government and its relationship to the people? This begs the question whether there ever was (and this may simply be my own ignorance) a ‘democracy’ that we can meaningfully speak of that was successfully held accountable by the people without impunity.

In terms of the second, I’m thinking specifically about the economic interests of colonial countries, the ties between them, and their relationship to previously colonized countries. Can we talk about an emancipatory politics without discussing these international networks? In South Korea, trade agreements between Australia and the U.S. enabled the importation of rice which are priced lower than the rice from local farmers. You can imagine the consequences. If I recall correctly, this also occurred in India. I don’t think there is one country in the world that is economically isolated in terms of trade (even North Korea, arguably the most isolated country in the world).  

Lastly, before reaching the point of violence and the discussion of Fanon and Arendt (in the volume), I am keen to introduce Foucault’s proposal. In a discussion with Chomsky (1971 debate), Foucault argued that political power is also exerted by institutions that seem to be independent of the prevailing political powers. He states “the university and the whole education system is supposed to distribute knowledge, we know that the educational system maintains the power in the hands of a certain social class” and excludes other social classes from this power. I think many disciplines - more notably philosophy departments – and the student protests in South Africa are confronting the issue of social class and political power within universities. This is applicable not only with regard to the academy but also local governments, the army, police, hospitals, judicial systems, etc. Foucault then concludes by stating that the “real political task” is “to criticize the workings of institutions, that appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticize and attack them in such a manner that political violence has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight against them.” If these seemingly neutral and independent institutions are not addressed – I would also add that if we do not critique the ‘culture’ of power (the exchange of favors, the management of money, where they receive money, who they give money to and for what ends, and how deals are struck) within these neutral and independent institutions as well as governments – “there is a risk that they reconstitute themselves.”

 While the use of violence and the sacrifice of people for the solidification of sovereignty is indeed an important discussion, I wonder if this doesn't jump the gun before thinking more critically about why persons are taking up arms, the structures that perpetuate those conditions, and how to change those conditions either through structural reform or abolishing them. What would a economy and government that is truly for the people and held accountable by the people look like? How do we install a system that can provide a meanignful work economy (that doesn't concentrate wealth, which invariably leads to corruption, and doesn't advocate a hoarding of money), and provide non-discriminate healthcare, food, housing, and education for the people?

Thus far, people all around the world have been, to some extent, effective in mobilizing against injustice and discontent with government. However, there has been a lack of engagement with method after the overthrow of corrupt and ineffective government. I think this is where the concern between "democracy" and 'emancipatory politics' comes in by which the demands advocated by the uprising/revolution are thwarted by a political culture of "electoral politics." This was decidedly the case in South Korea and much more recently in Egypt (I write about it here and here). After the overthrow of Mubarak, they engaged in elections which proved a return to the same culture of governance and the demands of the revolution are unmet.

The 4.19 uprising in Korea, which brought down the first president/dictator Rhee (who was renounced by the Korean Provisional Government during the colonial era but placed in power by the U.S.; a presidency characterized by mass killings, corruption, hoarding money, and rigged elections), only placed another politician (Heo Jeong), as caretaker, of the same political camp and incompetent to move government. This was also the case for Chang Myeon, another prime minister who took the reins for a minute, as well as Yun Bo-Sun (the second President), and before a democratic system for the people could take over the 'anti-communist' dictatorship of Rhee, the military stepped in and took over government under Park Chung-hee (father of the current South Korean President). Each of these figures (Heo, Chang, Yun, and Park) continued to participate in a culture of politics that engaged with the U.S. and ignored the people. Violence against the people and armed counter-violence by the people persisted throughout this era and indeed continued under Park who would run the country from 1962 to 1979 when he was assasinated (My parents immigrated to the US in 1984 and our family would embark on a journey oscillating between the two countries, living intermittently for several years in one country and then the other).

One of the key components to the early years of South Korea was the use of pro-Japanese colonial figures in politics and police. In other words, the remnants of Japanese colonialism were still present which undermined the development of a truly Korean government on its own terms. Moreover, the rich capitalists who would spearhead the jaebol class were practically granted impunity for their roles in corruption and collusion for the sake of economic development. The trade-off, in retrospect, is South Korea's great economic development (which no one can dispute) at the consequence of a greater disparity of income across the Korean people. Inheritance is the greatest transmitter of wealth and we are now seeing the consequences of a senior class in poverty and an increased rate of suicide among them. Given the emphasis and respect for the elderly in Korean society, this is a damn shame. Our grandparents and grandmothers should not be living in poverty nor should they be committing suicide because of their self-perceived burden on society and their children. This is, arguably, the gravest offense for a highly Confucian country like Korea. But I digress. What I am arguing here is the re-constitution of a 'culture of power' and the use of money to perpetuate those systems.    

Revolt and uprising are only the beginning points. The real task is the question of what happens after bringing down those in political power such that the same forms of oppression do not re-constitute themselves. This edited volume is asking those questions and I appreciate it all the more for it. Something that I would like to see more is a discussion of money in politics and how do we change the transformative power of money towards the well-being of all people and the eradication of oppressive structures?



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