*The Genetic Fallacy, Religion and the Public Sphere

This is a segment from the radio show 'Philosophy Talk' almost decade ago, in which Prof. Brian Leiter (now at Univ. of Chicago) discusses Nietzsche. I want to highlight the beginning few minutes that discusses the 'genetic fallacy' and how it could be useful to think about the public sphere and religion.

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Prior to this segment they discuss the popularization of Nietzsche's idea of the 'Ubermensch' or 'superman' that fueled a lot of controversy about morality and spurred ideas of moral superiority in some movies as well as the misappropriation of Nietzsche's ideas into Nazi Fascism. We should be clear that Nietzsche was against such fascism and against what he called 'slave morality' or what Freud called 'herd mentality'.

Leiter clarifies that the idea of the ubermensch was only mentioned in 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra'. If you are aware of Nietzsche's work, you will know that he was quite prolific. He did have a strong critique against slave morality - and the pervasive forms of morality promulgated by Christianity. The idea of the 'superman' while, perhaps, what he is best known for it is not his best thinking as a philosopher.

Leiter takes the interpretation that Nietzsche was a 'naturalist' and believed that the dominant forms of popular morality - in Nietzsche's case: Christianity - was not conducive for human flourishing. Nietzsche's most commonly used example, according to Leiter, was Goethe whom he has praised for creative brilliance. So Nietzsche was fundamentally interested in the individual as opposed to the collective and any inference to the collective - for Leiter - would be reading too much into Nietzsche's work simply because Nietzsche didn't present a view for society. His critique was primarily aimed at how the collective morality effected the individual into certain forms of complacency and submission to the master morality of bigger institutions. And Nietzsche was certainly a major critic of Judeo-Christian morality, which he thought was anti-thetical to human flourishing and creativity. Today, this is no longer represented by the institution of the Church but perhaps the institutions of politics and economics and the seams between them that contain the habits/culture of power and discourse. But this dives into another area of discussion. What I want to make note of is the 'genetic fallacy': simply because the origins of X is ill-conceived does not entail that X is true or false. 

Leiter explains:

"The genetic fallacy is the thought that you've shown something about the truth of a belief by showing us something about its origin. And Nietzsche is very keen to say that the origin of a belief is one thing, its truth or value is another."

 Leiter gives the following example:
"if you learn that your beliefs were arrived at the wrong kind of way that ought to make you suspicious about them. If it turns out that I recommend a particular restaurant to you and then it turns out that I'm part owner of the restaurant. That raises a question about whether my recommendation of the great food at this restaurant is really credible." 

 He goes on to say that this is what Nietzsche is doing:
"Look where morality came from, and where it came from isn't so wonderful, maybe you ought to rethink your commitment to it. But that leaves open the question of whether it's really true, whether we ought to accept it and so on."

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 I think this is quite useful (I must admit that I am a big fan of Nietzsche and Hume, and am inclined to agree with Leiter and consider them as "naturalists" although that is also a loaded term). I find it useful particularly when we begin to think about the public sphere and the emerging paradigm of multiple religions within any given society. I do understand that the interpretation of the historical Jesus is important for many in theology but for me it ultimately loses ground in the space of multiple religions. While determining the historicity and what he was preaching or advocating is an important endeavor in and of itself, I think any determination of historicity will not swoon or convince all religions to place Christianity, or whatever religion, over others and give it central importance in how society should be governed. Too many religions claim to have the "Ultimate Truth" and resorting to science does not quell such convictions.

So if science is unable to stand as the moderator of "truth" and we can acknowledge that each religion has its own set of values and beliefs (that may be more akin to Rappaport's 'Ultimate Sacred Postulates' or 'cosmological axioms' - beliefs that cannot be proven or disproven but ratified in ritual, which is also supported by Norenzayan and Atran, Ernesto de Martino's crisis of presence, and other social scientists) then this raises the question of what and how to moderate the public sphere without operating on the perception of favouritism, privilege, colonialism, discrimination, and bias.

Leiter tackles this issue of religion in the public sphere in his book: 'Why Tolerate Religion'. His discussion is primarily within the legal sphere and the privilieges religious institutions have over others. (He gives a talk on this subject here)

On one hand, taking Leiter's reasoning of Nietzsche above, if the origins of contemporary law are dubious shouldn't we rethink our commitment to the law? Especially today, considering the injustice happening in western societies and the veneer of justice that operates so well on the basis of affordability? But this is another area of inquiry and discussion.

The other hand involves the practical concern in societies with multiple religions and demand for mutual respectability without prejudicing one over the other. Nietzsche's contention of re-examining commitment is an individual's project that also coincides with the Kierkegaardian relationship between doubt and faith as well as the Socratic mantra: the unexamined life is not worth living. These projects are indeed for one's own existential examination. On a societal level, one project is the examination of the law as I just mentioned above. The second project is determining the neutral vehicle that can respect the values of multiple religions, as well as those with no religion, that expands the area of civil liberties such that all may practice life in the way they may flourish how they see fit without hindering the flourishing of others. In some ways this is a utilitarian perspective but it has also been framed as 'the morality of aspiration' in the philosophy of law, namely in the discourse on the morality of law. An additional layer to the expansion of civil liberties and definitions of flourishing is the necessity of regulating economics such that wealth is not the dictator of power/government/society or the force that privileges one group over another. There is a danger in promoting the affiliation of one religious group with the accumulation of wealth. This is an overlapping project that is more suited for economists. So the primary question, apart from the technical logistics, is how do we go about constructing a neutral vehicle? Or perhaps a better question yet is, is a neutral vehicle even possible? 

Within this issue of the public sphere, many have presented a dialectic between Christain values and secular values. I think this is a mistaken dialectic. For one, what are "Christian values" and can all the denominations of Christianity agree on a single set of "values'? Secondly, placing everything else as "Secular" undermines other religions. Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, Hinduism, etc. etc. do not necessarily fall into the category of the "secular" within western societies. In this regard, there will be similar issues of reaching consensus. Can all forms of Islam agree on a singular set of "Muslim values"? Can all forms of Buddhism, or any other religion for that matter, agree on a singular set of values?  

Perhaps this is the subproject? For each respective denomination to agree on a set of values? If this is the case, then shouldn't we also prepare for a discourse of how to mediate conflicting values? That is, what happens when Catholic values or Methodist or whatever values conflict with Pure Land Buddhist values or Zen, Tibetan or conflict with Sunni Muslims, or what have you. Does Habermasian discourse allow for this kind of deliberation and mediation? Or does Catholic social thought allow for this kind of mediation? And will a neutral discourse be enough to subvert discourse that perpetuates a particular culture of power; will it quell the tensions between groups within social life? That is, even if we have a neutral discourse will it assist in the day to day discriminations people face on the ground level? This then returns to a question of embodiment, implicit bias, and how religious cultures influence that process. That is, how religions - fully understanding that religion isn't the only source of creating bias but history has certainly provided ample evidence - create biases against women, color, other religions, sexualities, lifestyles and so on.

In a way, this brings us back to Nietzsche. The origins of our impression and perception of religious folk, other religious folk or non-religious persons, may not have began at a positive place. But this does not entail that we cannot value religious persons, or non-religious persons, in society. At the individual level we should not be committing the 'genetic fallacy' about others. The origins or background of an individual does not determine the value or character of that person (echo Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.). Just because one labels one's self as 'Christian' with Christian origins - in this case family upbringing - does not entail that he or she is a good or bad person. Similarly just because some one is of  a particular cultural background or skin color does not entail that he or she is a good or bad person.

The genetic fallacy is used all too often and it relates to a prior post on 'implicit bias', stereotypes, cognitive shortcuts, as well as critiques against essentialism. It further relates to ingroup dynamics, as if somehow declaring affiliation with one group automatically entails that you hold the same values.