More info and charts divided by gender:
Source
Thursday, January 30, 2014
Perspective of Values via Obituaries
Data collected from obituaries in Eugene, Oregon:
"The size of the terms and the thickness of the edges have the same
meaning in this map. The colors this time have a more interesting
meaning. Terms that share their color grouped together in much the same
way that items in a factor analysis group together: they tend to
co-occur with each other and not with other terms. The pink and
light-blue groups are probably too small to interpret, but the others
seem to meaningful. For instance, the green group is centered on humor
and agreeableness. The red group seems to be mostly a matter of
political liberalism. And the dark-blue group seems to be about
commitment to the local community."
More info and charts divided by gender:
Source
More info and charts divided by gender:
Source
Monday, January 27, 2014
Saturday, January 25, 2014
Craig Calhoun - Human Suffering and Humanitarian Response
"Humanitarian emergencies are not simply brute facts, appealing directly
to our emotions or our moral sensibilities. They are one of the
important ways in which perceptions of human life, sympathy for
suffering, and responses to social upheaval have come to be organized in
recent decades. Like nations and business corporations, they are
creatures of social imaginaries, but no less materially influential for
that. They are shaped by a history of changing ideas about the human;
moral responsibility for strangers; structures of chance and causality;
and the imperative and capacity for effective action, even at a
distance. They reflect the context of the modern era generally and more
specific features of the era since the 1970s. And they are embedded in a
complex institutionalisation of responses. This lecture will explore
these difficult issues."
source
source
David Held - Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation is Failing
"This lecture focuses on why international negotiations on pressing
global issues are increasingly stalling in the face of growing
differences among national interests, strident voices of leading and new
emerging powers, and the sheer complexity involved in coming to
agreement on issues that transcend national boundaries. From world trade
negotiations to financial market reform and climate change, ‘gridlock’
increasingly characterises international negotiations and organisations.
This lecture grapples with the causes and consequences of gridlock
across leading areas of global concern: security, the economy, and the
environment. As things stand, the global order is drifting into a highly
uncertain territory which may well involve cataclysmic moments
affecting the life chances and life expectancy of people across the
world."
source
source
Michael Cox - Power Shifts, Economic Change, and the Decline of the West?
"It has become the new truth of the early 21st century that the Western
world we have known is fast losing its pre-eminence to be replaced by a
new international system shaped either by the so-called BRICs, the
‘rest’ or, more popularly by that very broadly defined geographical
entity known as Asia. This at least is how many economists, historians
and students of world politics are now viewing the future of the larger
international system. This essay does not dispute some self-evident
economic facts. Nor does it assume that the world will look the same in
fifty years time as it does now. It does however question the idea that
there is an irresistible “power shift” in the making and that the West
and the United States are in steep decline. Specifically it makes a
number of critical arguments concerning the new narrative."
source
source
Conor Gearty - Liberty and Security - For All?
"We all aspire to liberty and security in our lives but few of us truly
enjoy them. In this lecture Conor Gearty describes how this has come to
be the case. Drawing on the insights set out in his latest book,
Liberty and Security (Polity 2013) he describes our world as
'neodemocratic', a place where the proclamation of universal liberty and
security is mocked by facts on the ground: the vast inequalities in
supposedly free societies, the authoritarian regimes with regular
elections, and the terrible socio-economic deprivation that is
camouflaged by cynically proclaimed commitments to human rights.
Gearty's lecture offers an explanation of how this situation has come
about how we can all think we enjoy freedom while so few of us do. The
lecture also provides a criticism of the present age which tolerates it.
At the end of the lecture Gearty sets out a manifesto for a better
future, a place where liberty and security can exist in truth and not
just in camouflage for servitude."
source
source
David Re - To the Hague - From Nuremberg to the ICC: The International Criminal Court Today
"Today, frequent calls are made to send someone or something “to The
Hague”. But between Nuremberg and Tokyo, in the late 1940s, to 1993 when
the Security Council created the Yugoslav Tribunal (ICTY), there were
no international trials of the international crimes of genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity. Today, a permanent international
criminal court, two United Nations ad hoc tribunals
(ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda), and two hybrid or internationalized courts
(for Sierra Leone and in Cambodia) investigate and try these crimes.
Another hybrid tribunal (for Lebanon) uses international criminal
procedures. Judge David Reexplores the progression from what, after the
Second World War was sometimes termed “victor’s justice”, to today’s
sophisticated system of international criminal law and asks, “how and
why have we come so far in the last 19 years?”"
source
source
Thursday, January 23, 2014
*Gayatri Spivak - Humanities and Development
Having just returned from Spivak's lecture at Durham University's Castle Lecture Series (which has produced an exciting lineup for this year - Pogge and Chomsky, two that I look forward to. I'll post a few of the recorded videos from last year's lineup as well), the talk is still very much on my mind. The lecture hall was at max capacity and I'm going to guess at least 300 were in attendance. Students sat on tables that lined the walls and people were actually denied entrance to the lecture. The room buzzed with chatter. But when Gayatri Spivak entered, the room immediately fell silent. Like a classroom going quiet when the teacher walks in.
Spivak touched on a great deal of things but I'ld like to key in on a few that stood out for me (*I have to add the caveat that I might have misheard or misinterpreted her lecture but will post the video of her lecture once it is up.)
In many respects, I thought her lecture could easily have come from a cultural anthropologist, who has done fieldwork with the marginalized and the illiterate, and is critiquing the neoliberal agenda of implementing resources or buildings that do not actually help the society; how NGOs and certain Human Rights campaigns fail because they fail to consider the embodied habits of mind that make up the epistemology of a culture. Many campaigns go and create a superficial change and the well-intentioned volunteers witness a song and dance about how the people have changed their ways but after the well-intentioned first-world people leave, cultural habits return; these well-intentioned people only go to enjoy themselves than create any meaningful change in structure. In this sense, her talk was very much about the utility of the humanities and its ability to foster critical thought - something that anthropology also does when thinking about other cultures. She was quite critical of the abandonment of education and life span as criterion for the Human Development Index. She argued that the humanities were not only valuable in critiquing statisticians but also in deconstructing new and old paradigms of thinking. For Spivak, she likes to think things through "other people's children" and those who are illiterate and speak in an 'uncoded' language in India (I can't remember the exact name or where); a community she has been engaged with for more than thirty years (I think...). By "uncoded" I think she was referring to languages that have not been translated into a world language - English or French.
The value Spivak placed on first languages and "mother tongues" is also, in part, the reason why anthropologists learn local dialects and conduct fieldwork (although I have my criticisms of those who only spend several months as opposed to years). Language and culture provide the "mature content" that has developed over centuries into the "ethical trajectory" of cultures. This emphasis is also quite important because the emphasis on the "first language" we learn is also an emphasis on the habits of mind and body. The mental furniture we begin to equip ourselves with and the behavioural habits (postures, gestures, etc) we begin to learn through the interaction between the structures of our biology and socialization.
I interpreted her talk primarily through, a phrase I like to use, a critique on the culture and habits of power. I've discussed this as the next step from Foucault's critique that we should be focusing on "seemingly neutral institutions". For me, not only should we be looking critically at non-neutral and neutral institutions but the habits of power within them that create their own culture i.e. a habitus of structured power. Spivak states that she is convinced the current culture of global policy is "sustainable underdevelopment" and too many accept the idea that the State is not accountable (here's looking at you colonial countries of the past). She spoke about changing the minds of policy makers and rearranging their desires. That is, changing the hierarchy of priorities. Building up to this point, she talked about the folded complicit nature of the present top-down system in which the world operates. Too much of the discussion is focused on the bottom. How do we change the bottom, the global poor? But change is never unidirectional and the top must change as well. Something I agree with as well. By 'complicit' she seemed to be pointing at the inevitability of working within the system. That protesting for more welfare is still complicit within the state's system of providing welfare. Protesting change for whatever policy is complicit within the state's system of laws on changing policy. Spivak acknowledges that she too is complicit within the human rights paradigm. All action seems to be caught in one or more of the many folds of the whole. We are always working within some kind of system. Because of this, Spivak says, we should acknowledge limits.
If the humanities becomes an imaginitive activism, it must take this into account and critique the conditionals by which unconditionals operate. If I understood her correctly, unconditionals are abstract concepts like 'justice', 'peace', 'love', 'development', 'humanities' and so on. However in reality, these unconditionals are always bound by conditions. They are bound by the way these concepts are appropriated and utilized. Bound by conceptual tool-kits of how to frame and re-package the same problems for superficial solutions. Bound by to-do lists and not to-do lists. They are bound by the English language, by translation and finding synonyms (something reminiscent of Rodney Needham's critique of 'belief' in anthropology). The task of critical thought is to problematize these conditionals and carefully read what those conditionals are actually doing to these unconditional concepts. In other words, critique the culture and habits of power. This is the "imaginative training" that students must engage in "for epistemological performance" that Spivak talked about. That we should not self-trivialize the humanities; that we should not accept 'powerlessness' as normal. We should not accept futility and the trivializing language of us v. them because then we fall into another complicit fold of simply pointing the finger without actual access to the tools of power (this last point is a bit hard to swallow considering Oxfam's recent report that 85 persons have more wealth than 3 billion of the global poor and that most companies are conglomerated under a few major corporations).
*Oh yea, she did make reference to a film at the recent Sundance Film Festival:
'Concerning Violence'
Spivak touched on a great deal of things but I'ld like to key in on a few that stood out for me (*I have to add the caveat that I might have misheard or misinterpreted her lecture but will post the video of her lecture once it is up.)
In many respects, I thought her lecture could easily have come from a cultural anthropologist, who has done fieldwork with the marginalized and the illiterate, and is critiquing the neoliberal agenda of implementing resources or buildings that do not actually help the society; how NGOs and certain Human Rights campaigns fail because they fail to consider the embodied habits of mind that make up the epistemology of a culture. Many campaigns go and create a superficial change and the well-intentioned volunteers witness a song and dance about how the people have changed their ways but after the well-intentioned first-world people leave, cultural habits return; these well-intentioned people only go to enjoy themselves than create any meaningful change in structure. In this sense, her talk was very much about the utility of the humanities and its ability to foster critical thought - something that anthropology also does when thinking about other cultures. She was quite critical of the abandonment of education and life span as criterion for the Human Development Index. She argued that the humanities were not only valuable in critiquing statisticians but also in deconstructing new and old paradigms of thinking. For Spivak, she likes to think things through "other people's children" and those who are illiterate and speak in an 'uncoded' language in India (I can't remember the exact name or where); a community she has been engaged with for more than thirty years (I think...). By "uncoded" I think she was referring to languages that have not been translated into a world language - English or French.
The value Spivak placed on first languages and "mother tongues" is also, in part, the reason why anthropologists learn local dialects and conduct fieldwork (although I have my criticisms of those who only spend several months as opposed to years). Language and culture provide the "mature content" that has developed over centuries into the "ethical trajectory" of cultures. This emphasis is also quite important because the emphasis on the "first language" we learn is also an emphasis on the habits of mind and body. The mental furniture we begin to equip ourselves with and the behavioural habits (postures, gestures, etc) we begin to learn through the interaction between the structures of our biology and socialization.
I interpreted her talk primarily through, a phrase I like to use, a critique on the culture and habits of power. I've discussed this as the next step from Foucault's critique that we should be focusing on "seemingly neutral institutions". For me, not only should we be looking critically at non-neutral and neutral institutions but the habits of power within them that create their own culture i.e. a habitus of structured power. Spivak states that she is convinced the current culture of global policy is "sustainable underdevelopment" and too many accept the idea that the State is not accountable (here's looking at you colonial countries of the past). She spoke about changing the minds of policy makers and rearranging their desires. That is, changing the hierarchy of priorities. Building up to this point, she talked about the folded complicit nature of the present top-down system in which the world operates. Too much of the discussion is focused on the bottom. How do we change the bottom, the global poor? But change is never unidirectional and the top must change as well. Something I agree with as well. By 'complicit' she seemed to be pointing at the inevitability of working within the system. That protesting for more welfare is still complicit within the state's system of providing welfare. Protesting change for whatever policy is complicit within the state's system of laws on changing policy. Spivak acknowledges that she too is complicit within the human rights paradigm. All action seems to be caught in one or more of the many folds of the whole. We are always working within some kind of system. Because of this, Spivak says, we should acknowledge limits.
If the humanities becomes an imaginitive activism, it must take this into account and critique the conditionals by which unconditionals operate. If I understood her correctly, unconditionals are abstract concepts like 'justice', 'peace', 'love', 'development', 'humanities' and so on. However in reality, these unconditionals are always bound by conditions. They are bound by the way these concepts are appropriated and utilized. Bound by conceptual tool-kits of how to frame and re-package the same problems for superficial solutions. Bound by to-do lists and not to-do lists. They are bound by the English language, by translation and finding synonyms (something reminiscent of Rodney Needham's critique of 'belief' in anthropology). The task of critical thought is to problematize these conditionals and carefully read what those conditionals are actually doing to these unconditional concepts. In other words, critique the culture and habits of power. This is the "imaginative training" that students must engage in "for epistemological performance" that Spivak talked about. That we should not self-trivialize the humanities; that we should not accept 'powerlessness' as normal. We should not accept futility and the trivializing language of us v. them because then we fall into another complicit fold of simply pointing the finger without actual access to the tools of power (this last point is a bit hard to swallow considering Oxfam's recent report that 85 persons have more wealth than 3 billion of the global poor and that most companies are conglomerated under a few major corporations).
*Oh yea, she did make reference to a film at the recent Sundance Film Festival:
'Concerning Violence'
Wednesday, January 22, 2014
Conservative Protestant Americans and Divorce Rate
"Why are divorce rates higher in religiously conservative “red” states and lower in less religiously conservative “blue” states?
After all, most conservatives frown upon divorce, and religious
commitment is believed to strengthen marriage, not erode it. Even so,
religiously conservative states Alabama and Arkansas have the second and
third highest divorce rates in the U.S., at 13 per 1000 people per year
while New Jersey and Massachusetts, more liberal states, are two of the
lowest at 6 and 7 per 1000 people per year.
Evangelicals and divorce. For a new study appearing later this month in the American Journal of Sociology, Demographers Jennifer Glass at the University of Texas and Philip Levchak at the University of Iowa looked at the entire map of the United States, going county by county, to examine where divorces occurred in 2000 and what the characteristics of those counties were. Their work confirms that one of the strongest factors predicting divorce rates (per 1000 married couples) is the concentration of conservative or evangelical Protestants in that county."
read more on the study here
Evangelicals and divorce. For a new study appearing later this month in the American Journal of Sociology, Demographers Jennifer Glass at the University of Texas and Philip Levchak at the University of Iowa looked at the entire map of the United States, going county by county, to examine where divorces occurred in 2000 and what the characteristics of those counties were. Their work confirms that one of the strongest factors predicting divorce rates (per 1000 married couples) is the concentration of conservative or evangelical Protestants in that county."
read more on the study here
Tuesday, January 21, 2014
Bloggingheads: Wilkinson v. Prinz
Will Wilkinson (The Fly Bottle, The Economist) and Jesse Prinz (UNC-Chapel Hill, The Emotional Construction of Morals)
Jesse's latest book, "The Emotional Construction of Morals" 13:55
Can a sincere moral judgment be emotionless? 10:48
Jesse contends that morality isn't innate 5:02
Why so much cruelty is permitted in so many societies 9:17
How humans cobble together their moral systems 10:56
Relativist avenues to moral progress -1:-53:-10
William James on Drugs and Religious Experience
"Normal walking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different"
"Nitrous oxide and ether, especially nitrous oxide, when sufficiently dilutd with air, simulate the mystical consciousness in an extraordinary degree. Depth beyond depth of truth seems revealed to the inhaler. This truth fades out, however, or escapes, at the moments of coming to; and if any words remain over in which it seemed to clothe itself, they prove to be the veriest nonsense. Nevertheless, the sense of a profound meaning having been there persists; and I know more than one person who is persuaded that in the nitrous oxide trance we have a genuine metaphysical revelation. . . .
Looking back on my own experiences, they all converge towards a kind of insight to which I cannot help ascribing some metaphysical significance. The keynote of it is invariably a reconciliation. It is as if the opposites of the world, whose contradictoriness and conflict make all our difficulties and troubles, were melted into unity. Not only do they, as contrasted species, belong to one and the same genus, but one of the species, the nobler and better one, is itself the genus, and so soaks up and absorbs its opposite into itself. This is a dark saying, I know, when thus expressed in terms of common logic, but I cannot wholly escape from its authority."
"Nitrous oxide and ether, especially nitrous oxide, when sufficiently dilutd with air, simulate the mystical consciousness in an extraordinary degree. Depth beyond depth of truth seems revealed to the inhaler. This truth fades out, however, or escapes, at the moments of coming to; and if any words remain over in which it seemed to clothe itself, they prove to be the veriest nonsense. Nevertheless, the sense of a profound meaning having been there persists; and I know more than one person who is persuaded that in the nitrous oxide trance we have a genuine metaphysical revelation. . . .
Looking back on my own experiences, they all converge towards a kind of insight to which I cannot help ascribing some metaphysical significance. The keynote of it is invariably a reconciliation. It is as if the opposites of the world, whose contradictoriness and conflict make all our difficulties and troubles, were melted into unity. Not only do they, as contrasted species, belong to one and the same genus, but one of the species, the nobler and better one, is itself the genus, and so soaks up and absorbs its opposite into itself. This is a dark saying, I know, when thus expressed in terms of common logic, but I cannot wholly escape from its authority."
-William James, Varieties of Religious Experience, 1902
p. 298 (italics original)
LSD and Religious Experience
1950s Housewife on LSD
Allan Watts (former Episcopal priest and spearhead of American Zen), participated in similar experiments after he published his Way of Zen in 1957, he states:
"When I was first invited to test the mystical qualities of LSD-25 by Dr. Keith Dirman of the Neuropsychiatric Clinic at UCLA Medical School, I was unwilling to believe that any mere chemical could induce a genuine mystical experience. At most, it might being about a state of spiritual insight analogous to swimming with water wings. Indeed, my first experiment with LSD-25 was not mystical. It was an intensely aesthetic and intellectual experience that challenged my powers of analysis and careful description to the utmost.
Some months later, in 1959, I tried LSD-25 again with Drs. Sterling Bunnell and Michael Agron, who were then associated with the Langley-Porter Clinic, in San Francisco. In the course of two experiments I was amazed and somewhat embarrassed to find myself going through states of consciousness that corresponded precisely with every description of major mystical experiences that I had ever read. Furthermore, they exceeded both in depth and in particular quality of unexpectedness of three 'natural and spontaneous' experiences of this kind that had happened to me in previous years.
Through subsequent experimentation with LSD-25 and the other chemicals ..., I found I could move with ease and less dependent on the chemicals themselves for 'tuning in' to this particular wavelength of experience. Of the five psychedelics tried, I found that LSD-25 and cannabis suited my purposes best. Of these two, the latter - cannabis - which I had to use abroad in countries where it is not outlawed, proved to be the better. It does not induce bizarre alterations of sensory perception, and medical studies indicate that it may not, save in great excess, have the dangerous side effects of LSD."
Allan Watts (former Episcopal priest and spearhead of American Zen), participated in similar experiments after he published his Way of Zen in 1957, he states:
"When I was first invited to test the mystical qualities of LSD-25 by Dr. Keith Dirman of the Neuropsychiatric Clinic at UCLA Medical School, I was unwilling to believe that any mere chemical could induce a genuine mystical experience. At most, it might being about a state of spiritual insight analogous to swimming with water wings. Indeed, my first experiment with LSD-25 was not mystical. It was an intensely aesthetic and intellectual experience that challenged my powers of analysis and careful description to the utmost.
Some months later, in 1959, I tried LSD-25 again with Drs. Sterling Bunnell and Michael Agron, who were then associated with the Langley-Porter Clinic, in San Francisco. In the course of two experiments I was amazed and somewhat embarrassed to find myself going through states of consciousness that corresponded precisely with every description of major mystical experiences that I had ever read. Furthermore, they exceeded both in depth and in particular quality of unexpectedness of three 'natural and spontaneous' experiences of this kind that had happened to me in previous years.
Through subsequent experimentation with LSD-25 and the other chemicals ..., I found I could move with ease and less dependent on the chemicals themselves for 'tuning in' to this particular wavelength of experience. Of the five psychedelics tried, I found that LSD-25 and cannabis suited my purposes best. Of these two, the latter - cannabis - which I had to use abroad in countries where it is not outlawed, proved to be the better. It does not induce bizarre alterations of sensory perception, and medical studies indicate that it may not, save in great excess, have the dangerous side effects of LSD."
-Allan Watts (1968)
'Psychedelics and religious experience'
California Law Review
Justice in the U.S. today
"A teenager in Fort Worth, Texas was given probation after driving drunk
and killing four pedestrians. Prosecutors pushed for a jail sentence of
20 years for 16-year-old Ethan Couch, whose blood alcohol content at
the time of the accident was 0.24 - three times the legal limit for
someone of drinking age - and also contained traces of Valium. Couch's
attorney argued that his client was too rich and privileged to know
right from wrong, as he had never been punished for previous
transgressions. RT's Sam Sacks looks into this case of "affluenza.""
As opposed to Weldon Angelos who is serving a 55 year minimum sentence for selling marijuana...
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/12/10/want-to-learn-criminal-law-and-procedure-watch-the-wire/
As opposed to Weldon Angelos who is serving a 55 year minimum sentence for selling marijuana...
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/12/10/want-to-learn-criminal-law-and-procedure-watch-the-wire/
Saturday, January 18, 2014
*Anthropology and Cognitive Science
Here, James Laidlaw provides a review of Maurice Bloch's new book: 'Anthropology and the cognitive challenge.'
According to Laidlaw, the book is a summary of Bloch's position on the necessary co-operation between the cognitive sciences and anthropology as well as other social sciences. He challenges both anthropologists and cognitive scientists to revise and rethink their positions. The stand-off between the two disciplines have largely, according to Bloch, stemmed from a misunderstanding of each other and the assumption that the cognitive sciences side on the 'nature' end of things while anthropology and other social sciences stand on the 'nurture' end. And while this is an age-old debate, the advances of both disciplines have made up tremendous ground and there is, in my opinion, a general view that both are necessary. Social environments are necessary for certain genes to find their expression and naturally without biology the social side of our personhood would not manifest. Furthermore, with the advancement of research in 'epigenetics' we are learning more and more about the interaction between biology and society. Research on the brain has been critical in furthering our understanding of personality and language. The brain of phineas gage has shown the importance of the orbitofrontal cortex and the ventromedial cortex for personality. H.M has shown the significance of the hippocampus and the amygdala for memory. Those with Wernicke's and Broca's aphasia have given a tremendous amount of information on understanding language. Anthropologists have contributed significantly about the various ways in which language manifests and how different systems of counting and labelling 'colour' or measuring 'time' challenge the presuppositions we have about language capacities in general. Not only have anthropologists noted the variability of language and semiotics, but they have also highlighted the ways in which language and cultural "things" can be incorporated and assimilated. In this regard, Laidlaw states, although Bloch denounces "Boasian anthropology, he is equally eloquent about the indispensability of ethnographic research based on participant-observation for any serious study of human social life, and about the richness of the ethnographic record anthropologists have progressively compiled."
One of the areas in which I am particularly excited about in bridging the gap between the social sciences and the cognitive sciences is in the area of 'embodiment' and 'habitus'. Sam Whimster notes that Weber utilized 'habitus' as "a disposition to behave and view the world in a particular and distinctive manner" and Charles Camic notes that Weber's Eingestelltheit means "disposition" (109). Bourdieu's famously put the term as a "system of durable dispositions" and Mauss simply put it as "the ways in which from society to society" persons know how to use their bodies. This becomes particularly interesting as the term invokes the function of memory. Not only memories in the sense of past autobiographical memories that tend to be what cognitive scientists call 'episodic memory' but the ways in which we know and function within society also entails 'semantic memory' which contains the basic information of our social surrounding and the conventional facts of history e.g. the capital of England is London. In other cognitive science circles 'episodic' and 'semantic' memory have been called 'declarative memory', which is often juxtaposed to 'procedural' memory. 'Procedural' memory are habits of the body. The memory that allows us to type without thinking about where our fingers are going. The memory that allows us to ride a bike without consciously thinking about how we are maintaining balance and propelling ourselves forward by pedalling. In other words, it is the memory that allows us to be doing what we are doing without consciously thinking about how we are doing. It is in this varied sense of the term 'memory' that, in my view, bridges the gap between 'habitus', 'embodiment', and 'belief'. And in between we have 'emotion'. For the sake of a blog post, these topics are a bit too rich and require more thoughtful analysis and exposition. But I think this is where the cognitive sciences and the social sciences can come together and be at their best.
The concept of dispositions can be considered within these veins of memory and more poignantly in terms of, another distinction, short-term and long-term memory. What we learn and embody must be considered within the domain of long-term memory such that they become "durable dispositions" and ways to "behave and the view the world in a particular and distinctive manner". This not only requires that our biological capacity for memory to function properly but it also requires the societal inputs and our experiences. In this regard as Bloch, via Laidlaw, puts it:
"There can be no such division of labour, Bloch insists, because everything that humans think and do is part of a complex set of processes that are equally expressions of our biological nature and of the fact that unlike all other species we are the subjects of history (p. 20). As Bloch sees it, the unique aspects of human life that Boasian anthropologists seek to capture with the label ‘culture’ do not constitute an extra layer added to our biological nature, and nor do they mean, as some seem to suggest, that our biology has somehow been transcended and may be safely ignored, but rather they mean that our biology expresses itself only but also pervasively through our being as historical agents. There is not some range of things we think or do because of ‘nature’ and a separate set that is shaped by ‘culture’, and therefore there is no possible separation between what varies between societies and what is universal: all of human thought and action is shaped by history just as it is by the substance and functioning of our bodies, including our brains. As Bloch summarizes pithily: ‘There are no non-cultural bits of us as there are no non-natural bits’ (p. 76)"
source
According to Laidlaw, the book is a summary of Bloch's position on the necessary co-operation between the cognitive sciences and anthropology as well as other social sciences. He challenges both anthropologists and cognitive scientists to revise and rethink their positions. The stand-off between the two disciplines have largely, according to Bloch, stemmed from a misunderstanding of each other and the assumption that the cognitive sciences side on the 'nature' end of things while anthropology and other social sciences stand on the 'nurture' end. And while this is an age-old debate, the advances of both disciplines have made up tremendous ground and there is, in my opinion, a general view that both are necessary. Social environments are necessary for certain genes to find their expression and naturally without biology the social side of our personhood would not manifest. Furthermore, with the advancement of research in 'epigenetics' we are learning more and more about the interaction between biology and society. Research on the brain has been critical in furthering our understanding of personality and language. The brain of phineas gage has shown the importance of the orbitofrontal cortex and the ventromedial cortex for personality. H.M has shown the significance of the hippocampus and the amygdala for memory. Those with Wernicke's and Broca's aphasia have given a tremendous amount of information on understanding language. Anthropologists have contributed significantly about the various ways in which language manifests and how different systems of counting and labelling 'colour' or measuring 'time' challenge the presuppositions we have about language capacities in general. Not only have anthropologists noted the variability of language and semiotics, but they have also highlighted the ways in which language and cultural "things" can be incorporated and assimilated. In this regard, Laidlaw states, although Bloch denounces "Boasian anthropology, he is equally eloquent about the indispensability of ethnographic research based on participant-observation for any serious study of human social life, and about the richness of the ethnographic record anthropologists have progressively compiled."
One of the areas in which I am particularly excited about in bridging the gap between the social sciences and the cognitive sciences is in the area of 'embodiment' and 'habitus'. Sam Whimster notes that Weber utilized 'habitus' as "a disposition to behave and view the world in a particular and distinctive manner" and Charles Camic notes that Weber's Eingestelltheit means "disposition" (109). Bourdieu's famously put the term as a "system of durable dispositions" and Mauss simply put it as "the ways in which from society to society" persons know how to use their bodies. This becomes particularly interesting as the term invokes the function of memory. Not only memories in the sense of past autobiographical memories that tend to be what cognitive scientists call 'episodic memory' but the ways in which we know and function within society also entails 'semantic memory' which contains the basic information of our social surrounding and the conventional facts of history e.g. the capital of England is London. In other cognitive science circles 'episodic' and 'semantic' memory have been called 'declarative memory', which is often juxtaposed to 'procedural' memory. 'Procedural' memory are habits of the body. The memory that allows us to type without thinking about where our fingers are going. The memory that allows us to ride a bike without consciously thinking about how we are maintaining balance and propelling ourselves forward by pedalling. In other words, it is the memory that allows us to be doing what we are doing without consciously thinking about how we are doing. It is in this varied sense of the term 'memory' that, in my view, bridges the gap between 'habitus', 'embodiment', and 'belief'. And in between we have 'emotion'. For the sake of a blog post, these topics are a bit too rich and require more thoughtful analysis and exposition. But I think this is where the cognitive sciences and the social sciences can come together and be at their best.
The concept of dispositions can be considered within these veins of memory and more poignantly in terms of, another distinction, short-term and long-term memory. What we learn and embody must be considered within the domain of long-term memory such that they become "durable dispositions" and ways to "behave and the view the world in a particular and distinctive manner". This not only requires that our biological capacity for memory to function properly but it also requires the societal inputs and our experiences. In this regard as Bloch, via Laidlaw, puts it:
"There can be no such division of labour, Bloch insists, because everything that humans think and do is part of a complex set of processes that are equally expressions of our biological nature and of the fact that unlike all other species we are the subjects of history (p. 20). As Bloch sees it, the unique aspects of human life that Boasian anthropologists seek to capture with the label ‘culture’ do not constitute an extra layer added to our biological nature, and nor do they mean, as some seem to suggest, that our biology has somehow been transcended and may be safely ignored, but rather they mean that our biology expresses itself only but also pervasively through our being as historical agents. There is not some range of things we think or do because of ‘nature’ and a separate set that is shaped by ‘culture’, and therefore there is no possible separation between what varies between societies and what is universal: all of human thought and action is shaped by history just as it is by the substance and functioning of our bodies, including our brains. As Bloch summarizes pithily: ‘There are no non-cultural bits of us as there are no non-natural bits’ (p. 76)"
source
Tuesday, January 14, 2014
Saturday, January 11, 2014
Let them know...
"There may be humane masters, as there certainly are inhumane ones - there may be slaves well-clothed, well-fed, and happy, as there surely are those half-clad, half-starved and miserable; nevertheless, the institution that tolerates such wrong and inhumanity as I have witnessed, is a cruel, unjust, and barbarous one. Men may write fictions portraying lowly life as it is, or as it is not - may expatiate with owlish gravity upon the bliss of ignorance - discourse flippantly from arm chairs of the pleasures of slave life; but let them toil with him in the field - sleep with him in the cabin - feed with him on the husks; let them behold him scourged, hunted, trampled on, and they will come back with another story in their mouths. Let them know the heart of the poor slave - learn his secret thoughts - thoughts he dare not utter in the hearing of the white man; let them sit by him in the silent watches of the night - converse with him in trustful confidence, of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," and they will find that ninety-nine out of every hundred are intelligent enough to understand their situation, and to cherish in their bosoms the love of freedom, as passionately as themselves."
-Solomon Northup, Twelve Years a Slave, end of Chapter 14.
Christmas and Marriage during Slavery
"During the remaining holidays succeeding Christmas, they are provided with passes, and permitted to go where they please within a limited distance, or they may remain and labor on the plantation, in which case they are paid for it. It is very rarely, however, that the latter alternative is accepted. They may be seen at these times hurrying in all directions, as happy looking mortals as can be found on the face of the earth. They are different beings from what they are in the field; the temporary relaxation, the brief deliverance from fear, and from the lash, producing an entire metamorphosis in their appearance and demeanor. In visiting, riding, renewing old friendships, or perchance, reviving some old attachment, or pursuing whatever pleasure may suggest itself; the time is occupied. Such is "southern life as it is" three days in the year, as I found it - the other three hundred and sixty-two being days of weariness, and fear, and suffering, and unremitting labor.
Marriage is frequently contracted during the holidays, if such an institution may be said to exist among them. The only ceremony required before entering into that "holy estate," is to obtain the consent of the respective owners. It is usually encouraged by the masters of female slaves. Either party can have as many husbands or wives as the owners will permit, and either is at liberty to discard the other at pleasure. The law in relation to divorce, or to bigamy, and so forth, is not applicable to property, of course. If the wife does not belong on the same plantation with the husband, the latter is permitted to visit her on Saturday nights, if the distance is not too far."
Marriage is frequently contracted during the holidays, if such an institution may be said to exist among them. The only ceremony required before entering into that "holy estate," is to obtain the consent of the respective owners. It is usually encouraged by the masters of female slaves. Either party can have as many husbands or wives as the owners will permit, and either is at liberty to discard the other at pleasure. The law in relation to divorce, or to bigamy, and so forth, is not applicable to property, of course. If the wife does not belong on the same plantation with the husband, the latter is permitted to visit her on Saturday nights, if the distance is not too far."
-Solomon Northup, Twelve Years a Slave, end of chapter 15
According to Solomon Northup, Christian masters allowed their slaves to engage in polyamorous marriages...
Friday, January 10, 2014
'Underpaid Secretary'
When Karma meets St. Peter meets Income inequality, Socioeconomic Status, and Privilege.
*Studies on Race: learned beliefs and implicit biases; parallels with religion
The following is a series of studies on color differences and the beginning stages of "implicit bias". While I am interested in these issues of "race", I'm particularly concerned with their parallel phenomena in religion. I vaguely remember reading somewhere that "religion" is the new "race", undoubtedly much of which is owed to the tensions regarding Muslims post 9-11. However, these divisions between social groups along religious lines have been relatively constant in many societies. For contemporary examples, we need only look at India, Nigeria, Uganda, Sri Lanka, Burma, etc. and indeed violence between groups separated along religious lines will emerge wherever we look. A glimpse into history provides even further evidence of sectarian violence and aggression not only in the U.S. but many countries over.
My question is how do these developed beliefs perpetuate biases and prejudices that we see today? In other words, how do we bridge the discourse between embodiment and belief?
I think the research done on social associations regarding color can be insightful. Primarily because the differences in skin tone is a similar superficial qualifier to distinguishing groups across religious lines. That is, both are founded on a particular social constructivism. And indeed, we see much critical thinking on deconstructing "race" in a similar way we can deconstruct "religion". Both are not clear-cut categories of difference and many scholars have called for the abandonment of these terms due to their frailty as conceptual tools for analysis. In this sense, I think there is a parallel between "race" and "religion" as social "folk psychological" methods of differentiating groups and creating notions of the "other".
In this post, I'll discuss a few studies on "race" and the learned beliefs involved with differences of color. After which I'll try to tie it back together as to how it can relate to beliefs about religious differences.
***
source
This is a study by Harvard Business Prof. Michael Norton which engages participants in a game where they pick a face and the other participant had to guess which one they picked. It's almost exactly like the game 'Guess Who?' You ask a yes/no question and the other responds.
The research found that 57% of the participants didn't mention color, although that would eliminate half of the possible faces. If the other participant was African-American, 79% didn't ask if the chosen face was black or white. In other words, if a non-black participant was playing the game with a black participant then there was a high chance that the color of the face was not mentioned.
When they reproduced the study with children, white children did ask about color but when the age range reached 9 or 10 the question was no longer asked.
The study suggests that "the people who didn’t mention race were probably trying to appear not racist, but their decision had the opposite effect. The partners of people who didn’t mention race rated them as more racist than the partners of people who did. Bringing up race was, in fact, a way to signal comfort with racial difference." (source)
***
The finding reports that not mentioning color in the game created the perception of racism. While it is often common to take the position of being "color-blind" and "non-racist", this stance in effect created the opposite impression.
The finding with children suggests that kids are implicitly taught about racism and color. By 9 or 10, children learn that referencing color is taboo, or that it creates the impression of racism, and thereby learn that one should not ask about color. In other words, children learn to embody a particular disposition towards race. This phenomena gives the space to embody a disposition of being "color-blind", how to talk about color, and formulate the disposition (belief) that one is not racist while actually being (or at least giving the impression of being) racist in other areas of social interaction.
I find this area of learned dispositions particularly interesting as it pertains to how we learn the beliefs that we do have. There are many parallels for this kind of research finding that is applicable to other areas of social life regarding the labels we ascribe to people. Given my area of interest, namely within religion, this relates to how persons formulate beliefs about Christians, Atheists, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, "nones", "spiritual but not religious", or "more spiritual than religious", and the beliefs about religions and nations. In other areas we can talk about social class. The attitudes people may have about "private" and "public" school. Who is "cool" or not "cool". This dives into the area of social acceptability; inclusion v. exclusion.
Much of the research on these types of beliefs, implicit biases, stereotypes, and so on, have been done on "racial differences", beliefs surrounding skin tone and associated content. Back in the 40s, Kenneth and Mamie Clark (social psychologists) devised what has been called the "Doll Test". Their work was very influential and had an impact on Brown v. The Board of Education to end segregation in schools. The "Doll Test" investigated children's attitudes to color when asked questions of character about two identical dolls with different skin color. This study was refined and replicated for contemporary U.S. society and aired on CNN. While the predominant demographic was white and black children, there is a section where they also conducted the same study with Latin-American children (4:30 mark in the video below). The answers, in all demographics (white, black, latino children), overwhelmingly associate negative attributes with the black doll and positive attributes with the white doll.
There are some questions about their methodology when filming some of these - the color of the researcher may have had an effect on the children's judgment. However, this seems to become a minimal issue - or even negated - when the person asking questions range from white, black, and latino (this may not be apparent in the video above but it is shown in the videos below) and children giving the same answers.
The doll test also presents a dichotomy in which the children select one or the other - although they do have the option to say neither or both. Presenting this kind of choice seemingly forces them to make a decision that reflects a value-judgment. This issue is mitigated by the poster that presents a range of skin tones in which they select one.The findings are similar.
Another concern is asking questions of character when all they have to draw on are differences of color. This also forces a selection to associate skin color with a particular adjective (mean, ugly, bad, dumb vs. nice, pretty, good, smart). In other words, without the children's own use of imagination, the only visible reason they can provide for their selection is skin color. This creates the impression of a more severe kind of racism that may or may not reflect what the children learn in social and family settings. In other words, there is the possibility that it reflects a faux racism because of the design of the study.
To investigate this issue of forced selection and association with a particular adjective (that may give the impression of a faux racism), the following video shows an additional study where children are presented with an ambiguous picture (of a white and black child) in which they create their own narrative of what is happening. This allows room for children to create a story of what is happening and ascribe their own adjectives to the characters, which extends into attribution theory. The results are still similar to the study above.
These studies highlight the issue of children learning to associate skin color with negative or positive adjectives (black-bad, white-nice), which was also represented and indicated by doll preference. As the video shows, not all of them make these association. This further indicates that these associations are socially learned.
Some other questions delve into development and how they may be associating themselves into their decisions. If the child considers him/her self as a bad child then it would be likely to associate his/her skin color with that adjective. All of the children represented are above 2 years of age, which means that they have developed a sense of ongoing autobiographical memory. Some of the answers are revealing: white is associated with trust whereas black is not; black is mean and aggressive. These answers may suggest that this is associated with their own experience of others - black and white - or perception of themselves.
It is not surprising that parents are surprised or shocked at what can be perceived as "racism" by their own children. Especially when the notion of "race" and "color" has been sensitized into the public consciousness. A good example of this sensitization is the emotional connotation associated with calling someone out as "racist". If you would like to see the effect, take someone who has grown up in a primarily "white" society and advocates for the status quo despite acknowledging the systemic injustices on race. The person tends to get very offended when you call their views anglo-centric and racist as they are defending the system in which privilege is overwhelmingly afforded to those who are not of color i.e. "white". A similar reaction can be seen with the white mother above, who is surprised and justifies her daughter's response. The mother notes that they simply have not discussed race at home. A black parent noted that they do discuss the issues with their children and are preparing them for what they may encounter during social life.
***
These findings suggest that children pick up on social cues that associate a person's skin color and positive or negative characteristic. Such social cues may be derived from parents or social settings e.g. school, church, playground, etc. This raises further questions about the relationship between social structure and the extent to which we embody certain implicit ideas. There is a necessary transition that occurs between the lines of sociology, anthropology, and psychology within the investigation of persons.
In parallel, we can also discuss the extent to which people associate Christians with certain adjectives, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Atheists and etc. Similarly, we can suggest that whatever adjectives are associated with a religious group are socially derived. The prevailing association is to identify "goodness" with their own social group, despite dissonant or contradicting evidence e.g. rape, paedophilia, fraud, domestic abuse, fraud, bigotry and so on. This association also draws on the in-group v. out-group dynamic, which is the tendency to construct categories of "us" v. "them" and to construe the "other" with a particular disposition or social habits. An easy example is the way religious persons view non-religious persons or those who are "atheists". They are "hedonists", without "morals", self-centered, and capitalist. Such adjectives and methods of description are conceptual boxes in which we place others we know very little about. There are generalizations independent of individual persons. On one hand, the caution is to prevent misconceptions that generalize a group of persons while admitting the individual exceptions. On the other hand, the caution is also about the construction of misconceptions that categorize persons with particular characteristics.
There is a tension that plays on the cusp between group identity and individual identity, as they become represented through public discourse and social interactions It is generally understood that we should not generalize all persons of a particular category with a particular "essentialism". This critique has been launched across categories that are now tentative e.g. color, race, gender, sexual orientation, and so on. That is, we can not and should not generalize all persons of a certain category as possessing an essential character despite the unconscious tendency to understand certain social phenomena in a particular way. However, there is something ironic about this position when we begin to think about systemic injustices, history, and critical theory. One of the major criticisms that tend to lump social categories: white, rich, Christian, and racist. These categories come together to construct a particular view of society and power. While there is certainly nuance, it does raise the question of how many rich white men on wall street will identify as Christian and participate in studies that discern the implicit biases one has regarding color. That is, perhaps there should be a more thorough investigation into the culture and composition of the persons that run the game on wall street. But this digresses into a critique on society, power, race, and economics.
The point is that with the construction of groups and "otherness", underlying them are implicit biases of how persons are. In other words, on a folk psychological level, essentialism in the form of conceptual boxes underlie the way we place persons into certain social categories. This is the case with race and color as seen above, as well as religious denominations and groups. Christian denominations will criticize other Christian denominations just as they will criticize other religious groups. And the same happens with any other religious category i.e. Islamic denominations criticizing other Islamic denominations and other religious, Jewish denominations doing the same, Hindu denominations doing the same, and non-religious persons doing the same as well. These criticisms are far from uni-dimensional. They incorporate other social elements such as socio-economic status and attitudes towards policy in light of certain hermeneutical considerations of sacred text. The complexity is that all of these factors that create certain social constructions and implicit biases come together in the form of a judgment based solely on appearances and then imposed on behaviour. In this sense Marcel Mauss' notion of habitus is also a cognitive theory of perception and social cognition as well as one of learning about the social body and how to act/behave.
It would be interesting to construct a similar study of persons attitudes to certain images of persons (the same person) but with different religious symbolism and asked who is the kind person, who is the mean person, who is the smart person, who is the dumb person, and so on and so on. I think the results would be interesting and quite possibly not so surprising.
Perhaps it is a time to revisit the topic of 'essentialism' as discussed in the discipline of anthropology and cross-reference them with the discussion on essentialism in the discipline of psychology as investigated through the concepts of prejudice and implicit bias. The added discussion from philosophers engaged in this topic would provide an additional perspective as well. With respect to religion, I would be interested to hear the theologians' take on the issue and how it is conceptualized within a broader framework.
My question is how do these developed beliefs perpetuate biases and prejudices that we see today? In other words, how do we bridge the discourse between embodiment and belief?
I think the research done on social associations regarding color can be insightful. Primarily because the differences in skin tone is a similar superficial qualifier to distinguishing groups across religious lines. That is, both are founded on a particular social constructivism. And indeed, we see much critical thinking on deconstructing "race" in a similar way we can deconstruct "religion". Both are not clear-cut categories of difference and many scholars have called for the abandonment of these terms due to their frailty as conceptual tools for analysis. In this sense, I think there is a parallel between "race" and "religion" as social "folk psychological" methods of differentiating groups and creating notions of the "other".
In this post, I'll discuss a few studies on "race" and the learned beliefs involved with differences of color. After which I'll try to tie it back together as to how it can relate to beliefs about religious differences.
***
source
This is a study by Harvard Business Prof. Michael Norton which engages participants in a game where they pick a face and the other participant had to guess which one they picked. It's almost exactly like the game 'Guess Who?' You ask a yes/no question and the other responds.
The research found that 57% of the participants didn't mention color, although that would eliminate half of the possible faces. If the other participant was African-American, 79% didn't ask if the chosen face was black or white. In other words, if a non-black participant was playing the game with a black participant then there was a high chance that the color of the face was not mentioned.
When they reproduced the study with children, white children did ask about color but when the age range reached 9 or 10 the question was no longer asked.
The study suggests that "the people who didn’t mention race were probably trying to appear not racist, but their decision had the opposite effect. The partners of people who didn’t mention race rated them as more racist than the partners of people who did. Bringing up race was, in fact, a way to signal comfort with racial difference." (source)
***
The finding reports that not mentioning color in the game created the perception of racism. While it is often common to take the position of being "color-blind" and "non-racist", this stance in effect created the opposite impression.
The finding with children suggests that kids are implicitly taught about racism and color. By 9 or 10, children learn that referencing color is taboo, or that it creates the impression of racism, and thereby learn that one should not ask about color. In other words, children learn to embody a particular disposition towards race. This phenomena gives the space to embody a disposition of being "color-blind", how to talk about color, and formulate the disposition (belief) that one is not racist while actually being (or at least giving the impression of being) racist in other areas of social interaction.
I find this area of learned dispositions particularly interesting as it pertains to how we learn the beliefs that we do have. There are many parallels for this kind of research finding that is applicable to other areas of social life regarding the labels we ascribe to people. Given my area of interest, namely within religion, this relates to how persons formulate beliefs about Christians, Atheists, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, "nones", "spiritual but not religious", or "more spiritual than religious", and the beliefs about religions and nations. In other areas we can talk about social class. The attitudes people may have about "private" and "public" school. Who is "cool" or not "cool". This dives into the area of social acceptability; inclusion v. exclusion.
Much of the research on these types of beliefs, implicit biases, stereotypes, and so on, have been done on "racial differences", beliefs surrounding skin tone and associated content. Back in the 40s, Kenneth and Mamie Clark (social psychologists) devised what has been called the "Doll Test". Their work was very influential and had an impact on Brown v. The Board of Education to end segregation in schools. The "Doll Test" investigated children's attitudes to color when asked questions of character about two identical dolls with different skin color. This study was refined and replicated for contemporary U.S. society and aired on CNN. While the predominant demographic was white and black children, there is a section where they also conducted the same study with Latin-American children (4:30 mark in the video below). The answers, in all demographics (white, black, latino children), overwhelmingly associate negative attributes with the black doll and positive attributes with the white doll.
There are some questions about their methodology when filming some of these - the color of the researcher may have had an effect on the children's judgment. However, this seems to become a minimal issue - or even negated - when the person asking questions range from white, black, and latino (this may not be apparent in the video above but it is shown in the videos below) and children giving the same answers.
The doll test also presents a dichotomy in which the children select one or the other - although they do have the option to say neither or both. Presenting this kind of choice seemingly forces them to make a decision that reflects a value-judgment. This issue is mitigated by the poster that presents a range of skin tones in which they select one.The findings are similar.
Another concern is asking questions of character when all they have to draw on are differences of color. This also forces a selection to associate skin color with a particular adjective (mean, ugly, bad, dumb vs. nice, pretty, good, smart). In other words, without the children's own use of imagination, the only visible reason they can provide for their selection is skin color. This creates the impression of a more severe kind of racism that may or may not reflect what the children learn in social and family settings. In other words, there is the possibility that it reflects a faux racism because of the design of the study.
To investigate this issue of forced selection and association with a particular adjective (that may give the impression of a faux racism), the following video shows an additional study where children are presented with an ambiguous picture (of a white and black child) in which they create their own narrative of what is happening. This allows room for children to create a story of what is happening and ascribe their own adjectives to the characters, which extends into attribution theory. The results are still similar to the study above.
These studies highlight the issue of children learning to associate skin color with negative or positive adjectives (black-bad, white-nice), which was also represented and indicated by doll preference. As the video shows, not all of them make these association. This further indicates that these associations are socially learned.
Some other questions delve into development and how they may be associating themselves into their decisions. If the child considers him/her self as a bad child then it would be likely to associate his/her skin color with that adjective. All of the children represented are above 2 years of age, which means that they have developed a sense of ongoing autobiographical memory. Some of the answers are revealing: white is associated with trust whereas black is not; black is mean and aggressive. These answers may suggest that this is associated with their own experience of others - black and white - or perception of themselves.
It is not surprising that parents are surprised or shocked at what can be perceived as "racism" by their own children. Especially when the notion of "race" and "color" has been sensitized into the public consciousness. A good example of this sensitization is the emotional connotation associated with calling someone out as "racist". If you would like to see the effect, take someone who has grown up in a primarily "white" society and advocates for the status quo despite acknowledging the systemic injustices on race. The person tends to get very offended when you call their views anglo-centric and racist as they are defending the system in which privilege is overwhelmingly afforded to those who are not of color i.e. "white". A similar reaction can be seen with the white mother above, who is surprised and justifies her daughter's response. The mother notes that they simply have not discussed race at home. A black parent noted that they do discuss the issues with their children and are preparing them for what they may encounter during social life.
***
These findings suggest that children pick up on social cues that associate a person's skin color and positive or negative characteristic. Such social cues may be derived from parents or social settings e.g. school, church, playground, etc. This raises further questions about the relationship between social structure and the extent to which we embody certain implicit ideas. There is a necessary transition that occurs between the lines of sociology, anthropology, and psychology within the investigation of persons.
In parallel, we can also discuss the extent to which people associate Christians with certain adjectives, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Atheists and etc. Similarly, we can suggest that whatever adjectives are associated with a religious group are socially derived. The prevailing association is to identify "goodness" with their own social group, despite dissonant or contradicting evidence e.g. rape, paedophilia, fraud, domestic abuse, fraud, bigotry and so on. This association also draws on the in-group v. out-group dynamic, which is the tendency to construct categories of "us" v. "them" and to construe the "other" with a particular disposition or social habits. An easy example is the way religious persons view non-religious persons or those who are "atheists". They are "hedonists", without "morals", self-centered, and capitalist. Such adjectives and methods of description are conceptual boxes in which we place others we know very little about. There are generalizations independent of individual persons. On one hand, the caution is to prevent misconceptions that generalize a group of persons while admitting the individual exceptions. On the other hand, the caution is also about the construction of misconceptions that categorize persons with particular characteristics.
There is a tension that plays on the cusp between group identity and individual identity, as they become represented through public discourse and social interactions It is generally understood that we should not generalize all persons of a particular category with a particular "essentialism". This critique has been launched across categories that are now tentative e.g. color, race, gender, sexual orientation, and so on. That is, we can not and should not generalize all persons of a certain category as possessing an essential character despite the unconscious tendency to understand certain social phenomena in a particular way. However, there is something ironic about this position when we begin to think about systemic injustices, history, and critical theory. One of the major criticisms that tend to lump social categories: white, rich, Christian, and racist. These categories come together to construct a particular view of society and power. While there is certainly nuance, it does raise the question of how many rich white men on wall street will identify as Christian and participate in studies that discern the implicit biases one has regarding color. That is, perhaps there should be a more thorough investigation into the culture and composition of the persons that run the game on wall street. But this digresses into a critique on society, power, race, and economics.
The point is that with the construction of groups and "otherness", underlying them are implicit biases of how persons are. In other words, on a folk psychological level, essentialism in the form of conceptual boxes underlie the way we place persons into certain social categories. This is the case with race and color as seen above, as well as religious denominations and groups. Christian denominations will criticize other Christian denominations just as they will criticize other religious groups. And the same happens with any other religious category i.e. Islamic denominations criticizing other Islamic denominations and other religious, Jewish denominations doing the same, Hindu denominations doing the same, and non-religious persons doing the same as well. These criticisms are far from uni-dimensional. They incorporate other social elements such as socio-economic status and attitudes towards policy in light of certain hermeneutical considerations of sacred text. The complexity is that all of these factors that create certain social constructions and implicit biases come together in the form of a judgment based solely on appearances and then imposed on behaviour. In this sense Marcel Mauss' notion of habitus is also a cognitive theory of perception and social cognition as well as one of learning about the social body and how to act/behave.
It would be interesting to construct a similar study of persons attitudes to certain images of persons (the same person) but with different religious symbolism and asked who is the kind person, who is the mean person, who is the smart person, who is the dumb person, and so on and so on. I think the results would be interesting and quite possibly not so surprising.
Perhaps it is a time to revisit the topic of 'essentialism' as discussed in the discipline of anthropology and cross-reference them with the discussion on essentialism in the discipline of psychology as investigated through the concepts of prejudice and implicit bias. The added discussion from philosophers engaged in this topic would provide an additional perspective as well. With respect to religion, I would be interested to hear the theologians' take on the issue and how it is conceptualized within a broader framework.
Saturday, January 4, 2014
(New) Philosophy of Social Science
"Philosophers usually have a different way of approaching topics in the
sciences than working scientists, even when they follow the advice that
the philosophy of science needs to be closely intertwined with existing
scientific research practices. We tend to find a topic interesting
because of the complexities it poses in terms of the assumptions and
proto-theories we bring to understanding the external world -- whether
or not that topic is directly relevant to current research. We want to
formulate general questions and then propose logical answers to them:
What is a rational actor? What is a social structure? Do social
structures have causal powers? Can facts about social objects be
grounded in facts about individual actors? And it appears fairly clear
that these questions fall at a higher level of generality than the
questions posed by working sociologists or political scientists. So the
philosophy of social science is somewhat different from even the more
abstract reaches of sociological theory.
At the same time, we hope that the thinking we do at this more general level has some relevance for the formulation of theories, hypotheses, and explanations in the social sciences."
Here
At the same time, we hope that the thinking we do at this more general level has some relevance for the formulation of theories, hypotheses, and explanations in the social sciences."
Here
Friday, January 3, 2014
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