'On Intellectual Craftsmanship'

"I recognized that insofar as I might become a scholar, I would have the exceptional opportunity of designing a way of living which would encourage the habits of good workmanship. It was a choice of how to live as well as a choice of a career, for whether he knows it or not, the intellectual workman forms his own self as he works towards the perfection of his craft."

- C. Wright Mills

Ancient Bible on Display at the Smithsonian in D.C.

"The world's third oldest Bible, transcribed in the late fourth or early fifth century, and an ancient parchment volume of Deuteronomy and Joshua, are on public display at the Smithsonian's Freer Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C.

The Codex Washingtonianus, also called the Washington Manuscript of the Gospels and The Freer Gospel and which contains the four biblical gospels, and the Old Testament gospels transcribed during the same period are on display in the Freer Gallery's Victorian Peacock Room until Feb. 16, 2014.

...

The Washingtonianus was written in Greek on parchment in the 4th or 5th century. Freer purchased the manuscripts in 1906 in Giza, Egypt, and later organized and underwrote significant early biblical scholarship, the gallery said."

source

Comparison of Christmas Gift Spending

"Overall, Christmas spending correlates with national wealth, with the Netherlands being a noticeable outlier (spending less than we’d expect) and Luxembourg in a spending league of its own."
source

Calvin and Hobbes - Christmas Acquittal

Calvin and Hobbes on Ethics II

Credibility

"The legitimacy of a political order is measured by the credibility that it enjoys among those who are subjected to its domination." 

- Jurgen Habermas, Apres Marx (1985), p. 283

Brian Leiter: 'Why Tolerate Religion?'

review

Walter Kaufmann: Kierkegaard and the Crisis of Religion

Walter Kaufmann: Nietzsche and the Crisis of Philosophy

Stanley Fish on 'Scholarship and Politics'

Stanley Fish:
(1) The academy is a world of its own, complete with rules, protocols, systems of evaluation, recognized achievements, agreed-on goals, a roster of heroes and a list of tasks yet to be done.

(2) Academic work proceeds within the confines of that world, within, that is, a professional, not a public, space, although its performance may be, and often is, public. Accordingly,

(3) academic work is only tangentially, not essentially, political; politics may attend the formation of academic units and the selection of academic personnel, but political concerns and pressures have no place in the unfolding of academic argument, except as objects of its distinctive forms of attention. (If academic work had no distinctive forms of attention, it would be shapeless and would not be a thing.)

(4) The academic views of a professor are independent of his or her real-world political views; academic disputes don’t track partisan disputes or vice versa; you can’t reason from an academic’s disciplinary views to the positions he or she would take in the public sphere; they are independent variables.

Fish discusses the case of Noam Chomsky as an example here

*The Genetic Fallacy, Religion and the Public Sphere

This is a segment from the radio show 'Philosophy Talk' almost decade ago, in which Prof. Brian Leiter (now at Univ. of Chicago) discusses Nietzsche. I want to highlight the beginning few minutes that discusses the 'genetic fallacy' and how it could be useful to think about the public sphere and religion.

***

Prior to this segment they discuss the popularization of Nietzsche's idea of the 'Ubermensch' or 'superman' that fueled a lot of controversy about morality and spurred ideas of moral superiority in some movies as well as the misappropriation of Nietzsche's ideas into Nazi Fascism. We should be clear that Nietzsche was against such fascism and against what he called 'slave morality' or what Freud called 'herd mentality'.

Leiter clarifies that the idea of the ubermensch was only mentioned in 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra'. If you are aware of Nietzsche's work, you will know that he was quite prolific. He did have a strong critique against slave morality - and the pervasive forms of morality promulgated by Christianity. The idea of the 'superman' while, perhaps, what he is best known for it is not his best thinking as a philosopher.

Leiter takes the interpretation that Nietzsche was a 'naturalist' and believed that the dominant forms of popular morality - in Nietzsche's case: Christianity - was not conducive for human flourishing. Nietzsche's most commonly used example, according to Leiter, was Goethe whom he has praised for creative brilliance. So Nietzsche was fundamentally interested in the individual as opposed to the collective and any inference to the collective - for Leiter - would be reading too much into Nietzsche's work simply because Nietzsche didn't present a view for society. His critique was primarily aimed at how the collective morality effected the individual into certain forms of complacency and submission to the master morality of bigger institutions. And Nietzsche was certainly a major critic of Judeo-Christian morality, which he thought was anti-thetical to human flourishing and creativity. Today, this is no longer represented by the institution of the Church but perhaps the institutions of politics and economics and the seams between them that contain the habits/culture of power and discourse. But this dives into another area of discussion. What I want to make note of is the 'genetic fallacy': simply because the origins of X is ill-conceived does not entail that X is true or false. 

Leiter explains:

"The genetic fallacy is the thought that you've shown something about the truth of a belief by showing us something about its origin. And Nietzsche is very keen to say that the origin of a belief is one thing, its truth or value is another."

 Leiter gives the following example:
"if you learn that your beliefs were arrived at the wrong kind of way that ought to make you suspicious about them. If it turns out that I recommend a particular restaurant to you and then it turns out that I'm part owner of the restaurant. That raises a question about whether my recommendation of the great food at this restaurant is really credible." 

 He goes on to say that this is what Nietzsche is doing:
"Look where morality came from, and where it came from isn't so wonderful, maybe you ought to rethink your commitment to it. But that leaves open the question of whether it's really true, whether we ought to accept it and so on."

***

 I think this is quite useful (I must admit that I am a big fan of Nietzsche and Hume, and am inclined to agree with Leiter and consider them as "naturalists" although that is also a loaded term). I find it useful particularly when we begin to think about the public sphere and the emerging paradigm of multiple religions within any given society. I do understand that the interpretation of the historical Jesus is important for many in theology but for me it ultimately loses ground in the space of multiple religions. While determining the historicity and what he was preaching or advocating is an important endeavor in and of itself, I think any determination of historicity will not swoon or convince all religions to place Christianity, or whatever religion, over others and give it central importance in how society should be governed. Too many religions claim to have the "Ultimate Truth" and resorting to science does not quell such convictions.

So if science is unable to stand as the moderator of "truth" and we can acknowledge that each religion has its own set of values and beliefs (that may be more akin to Rappaport's 'Ultimate Sacred Postulates' or 'cosmological axioms' - beliefs that cannot be proven or disproven but ratified in ritual, which is also supported by Norenzayan and Atran, Ernesto de Martino's crisis of presence, and other social scientists) then this raises the question of what and how to moderate the public sphere without operating on the perception of favouritism, privilege, colonialism, discrimination, and bias.

Leiter tackles this issue of religion in the public sphere in his book: 'Why Tolerate Religion'. His discussion is primarily within the legal sphere and the privilieges religious institutions have over others. (He gives a talk on this subject here)

On one hand, taking Leiter's reasoning of Nietzsche above, if the origins of contemporary law are dubious shouldn't we rethink our commitment to the law? Especially today, considering the injustice happening in western societies and the veneer of justice that operates so well on the basis of affordability? But this is another area of inquiry and discussion.

The other hand involves the practical concern in societies with multiple religions and demand for mutual respectability without prejudicing one over the other. Nietzsche's contention of re-examining commitment is an individual's project that also coincides with the Kierkegaardian relationship between doubt and faith as well as the Socratic mantra: the unexamined life is not worth living. These projects are indeed for one's own existential examination. On a societal level, one project is the examination of the law as I just mentioned above. The second project is determining the neutral vehicle that can respect the values of multiple religions, as well as those with no religion, that expands the area of civil liberties such that all may practice life in the way they may flourish how they see fit without hindering the flourishing of others. In some ways this is a utilitarian perspective but it has also been framed as 'the morality of aspiration' in the philosophy of law, namely in the discourse on the morality of law. An additional layer to the expansion of civil liberties and definitions of flourishing is the necessity of regulating economics such that wealth is not the dictator of power/government/society or the force that privileges one group over another. There is a danger in promoting the affiliation of one religious group with the accumulation of wealth. This is an overlapping project that is more suited for economists. So the primary question, apart from the technical logistics, is how do we go about constructing a neutral vehicle? Or perhaps a better question yet is, is a neutral vehicle even possible? 

Within this issue of the public sphere, many have presented a dialectic between Christain values and secular values. I think this is a mistaken dialectic. For one, what are "Christian values" and can all the denominations of Christianity agree on a single set of "values'? Secondly, placing everything else as "Secular" undermines other religions. Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, Hinduism, etc. etc. do not necessarily fall into the category of the "secular" within western societies. In this regard, there will be similar issues of reaching consensus. Can all forms of Islam agree on a singular set of "Muslim values"? Can all forms of Buddhism, or any other religion for that matter, agree on a singular set of values?  

Perhaps this is the subproject? For each respective denomination to agree on a set of values? If this is the case, then shouldn't we also prepare for a discourse of how to mediate conflicting values? That is, what happens when Catholic values or Methodist or whatever values conflict with Pure Land Buddhist values or Zen, Tibetan or conflict with Sunni Muslims, or what have you. Does Habermasian discourse allow for this kind of deliberation and mediation? Or does Catholic social thought allow for this kind of mediation? And will a neutral discourse be enough to subvert discourse that perpetuates a particular culture of power; will it quell the tensions between groups within social life? That is, even if we have a neutral discourse will it assist in the day to day discriminations people face on the ground level? This then returns to a question of embodiment, implicit bias, and how religious cultures influence that process. That is, how religions - fully understanding that religion isn't the only source of creating bias but history has certainly provided ample evidence - create biases against women, color, other religions, sexualities, lifestyles and so on.

In a way, this brings us back to Nietzsche. The origins of our impression and perception of religious folk, other religious folk or non-religious persons, may not have began at a positive place. But this does not entail that we cannot value religious persons, or non-religious persons, in society. At the individual level we should not be committing the 'genetic fallacy' about others. The origins or background of an individual does not determine the value or character of that person (echo Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.). Just because one labels one's self as 'Christian' with Christian origins - in this case family upbringing - does not entail that he or she is a good or bad person. Similarly just because some one is of  a particular cultural background or skin color does not entail that he or she is a good or bad person.

The genetic fallacy is used all too often and it relates to a prior post on 'implicit bias', stereotypes, cognitive shortcuts, as well as critiques against essentialism. It further relates to ingroup dynamics, as if somehow declaring affiliation with one group automatically entails that you hold the same values.      

Calvin and Hobbes on "Belief" in Santa Claus

*Just for fun:
The global population is roughly 6.8 billion. This means that Santa would have to get presents to
4, 722, 222 individuals a minute.

6, 800, 000, 000 persons/24 hr  x  1 hr/60 min. = 4, 722, 222.22222 persons / min

4, 722, 222 persons/minute, which includes going down the chimney, placing presents, and snacking on some milk and cookies.

*On Belief; the discussion between Harris and Atran

I've commented on these two briefly before (here) in which I raise the question about the anthropological attitude when conducting an ethnography on a group (e.g. KKK, Neo-Nazi, etc.) that perpetuates a certain kind of stigma, bigotry, stereotype, which many anthropologists today seek to clarify, negate, and further understanding. Towards the end of that post I invoke a past debate between Sam Harris and Scott Atran.   

I wanted to walk through this discussion between Sam Harris and Scott Atran that happened at the 'Beyond Belief' conference where a lot of big names came together to talk about religion, science, belief and so on. Sam Harris tries to use a comparative approach to specifically target Islam as particularly violent than other religions. More specifically, Harris wants to point to "beliefs" and dogma as the primary cause of the violence we have seen so willingly displayed, relatively recently, in media.

I think Harris is mistaken and carries a few misguided assumptions about the history of violence and religion, which is also to say that I think he is incorrect to point to "beliefs" and dogma in and of themselves as opposed to their appropriation in certain contexts to mobilize people for certain agendas. So here, I will briefly summarize each exchange in the videos followed by my own supplement to this dialogue at the end and why I think Harris' concept of 'belief' is misleading and misconstrues the relationship between 'belief' and behaviour. I also add a little point that Tibetan Buddhism has also had its violent moments in history.




Sam Harris doesn't want to discount kinship and other elements that go into social cohesion, but is concerned about forms of dogmatism. In particular, he raises the example of Islam being the "most pungent". Harris wants to blame "Muslim beliefs" (paradise, infidels, etc.) as the cause and reason for seemingly irrational behaviour like suicide bombing. Given that "beliefs" are one variable within an array of things that may cause people to do acts of violence, Harris asks Scott Atran where the Palestinian Christian "suicide bombers" who suffer similar, if not the same, forms of scrutiny and oppression. His second example is Tibetan Buddhism, who have also suffered torture, but lack suicide bombers. Harris wants to attribute the lack of a "death cult" in Christianity and Tibetan Buddhism to the beliefs, values, and metaphysical system of meaning. Harris goes on to state that Islam allows Muslims to do take an aggressive stance.

Scott Atran presents a graph of scapegoating, violence and dogmatism. In which he presents a broad array of religions. The tendency to scapegoat is highest for Catholics, Orthodox, and Atheists. I'm not sure how he defines 'scapegoating' (he states that it is correlated with dogmatism, flexibility of beliefs and commitment to violence) but if we go by a typical understanding, then he is discussing the tendency to single out a particular group for blame and negative treatment. This is lowest for Buddhists, Hindus and Muslims. Atran states that the trends are similar for violence and flexibility of belief. He states that the study involved over 10,000 people from 10 countries around the world. Atran then go into the example of Japanese Buddhists who participated in Kamikaze actions and the Sri Lankan Army (Buddhists) threatening the Tamil Tigers (Hindus). Atran states that there are Christian suicide bombers from the region PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) who are primarily a Christian and Marxist organization. Atran makes parallels for the mobilization of people between Hitler's rise to power and bin Laden's rise to power. He goes on to state that Al Qaeda is really a constructed group by the U.S. to track certain people. 



Harris agrees with Atran about the red herring with the "affiliation of Al Qaeda". Harris returns to his initial concern about belief. He acknowledges Christian suicide bombers in Palestine and states that Christians and Buddhists would have to work harder to get to the point of being suicide bombers. With the Japanese Kamikaze, Harris states that one can easily see the ideology behind the Kamikaze movement with the mixture of Shinto, Buddhism, and Japanese "military chauvenism". According to Harris, Zen Buddhism doesn't include the values of compassion, which also gives justification for the Samurai (this is actually false - Zen and Pure Land Buddhism does discuss the value of compassion). So he returns to the issue of belief and ideology and the consequences of those ideas for action. Harris then goes on to emphasize the violent text of the Quran and the emphasis of infidels.

Atran states that the Kamikazes were not really military chauvenists but rather German romantics.

Neil DeGrasse Tyson also jumps in really quick to emphasize that the Japanese Kamikaze movement didn't happen until there was a shift in mood of the war when the Japanese were getting desperate and used the strategy as a last resort. Similarly he asks whether there would be Muslim suicide bombers if they had their own air force or tanks. Tyson doesn't think so and Atran states that that is what they have told him - during his fieldwork (culminating in the book 'Talking to the Enemy').  

Harris returns to the propositional emphasis that you either believe in martyrdom or you don't.



In this last part, Krauss steps in and points out Harris' empathy with the Tibetan Buddhists without calling out their metaphysics. Krauss returns to the issue of evidence and beliefs which cannot be proven or disproven by science, which many have placed (incorrectly in my view) into the boxes of rationality vs. irrationality. This is a common attack that atheists will make against those who are religious and declare them as irrational. Krauss goes on to say how offensive this stance is to those who are religious, which is often interpreted as a position of atheism rather than transferring a more accurate understanding of biology and evolution. Arguing against the propositional content of the text and calling them irrational because contradictory statements are held as true creates further division and polarization in politics, which I think is what Krauss is pointing to. Arguing for evolution or using a basis in science does not deter people in their religious beliefs and name-calling doesn't progress the debate in any way. 

The discussion digresses a bit into a broader discussion of science and religion (which is a separate post that involves a certain discussion about epistemic insulation and cognitive dissonance).


***


What I want to address is the problem with discussing this kind of concept of belief. That is, belief in terms of a set propositions that people adhere to and act congruently. This view has been criticized immensely in various fields, namely anthropology and psychology.

If Harris is correct, then the actions of Christians can be explained by referencing the Bible and the "beliefs" contained within them. Slavery, colonialism, and racism all happened because of Christian beliefs. And if that was the case, then these things would still be rampant. Christians would still have slaves. They wouldn't be eating pork or have clothes of two different kinds of fabric, Christians would be following the sermon on the mount more, etc. etc. There are many do's and dont's in the Bible just as there are in other religious texts. If beliefs were particularly laid out and you either believe in them or you don't then there should be further behavioural consequences for lay persons believing in the Bible. And as many will recognize, not all behaviours of Christians can be explained by pointing to a passage in the Bible.

Furthermore, this kind of reasoning is limiting "religion" to what Harvey Whitehouse has called "doctrinal modes" of religiosity. This is contrasted with "imagistic modes", which do not have a particular religious text. This creates problems for Harris. What then is the source by which Harris refers to for beliefs in this kind of religion? In the past, scholars have explained rituals in terms of a particular mythology and labeling them as beliefs. This excludes other forms of behaviour when beliefs are particularly associated with a myth and a ritual.  Harris' notion of belief and dogma fail in these settings and cultures. Not only is there a problem of language and context but there are further issues with isolating rituals or myths to discuss "their beliefs". There is no one single mental state that directly corresponds and maps onto behaviour, let alone conceiving another person's belief solely in terms of an explicit proposition stated in a religious text.

Harris wants to state that Muslims are violent because of their religious text. This would also entail that Christians were violent because of their text. Buddhists were violent because of their text. Or Native Americans were violent because of their oral traditions. This is simply not true and grossly misleading. I'm not arguing that there is no relationship between beliefs and behaviours, but that considering belief in terms of propositional content derived from a particular text, myth, or oral tradition and using that to explain behaviour is misguided.  

On another note, Harris appears to be inclined to have a favourable view of Tibetan Buddhists. Relatively recently, Tibetan Buddhists have been very willing to participate in neurological studies that investigate religious experiences and how meditation affects neuroplasticity. The Dalai Lama has taken an active interest in how religion and science can exchange in mutual dialogue on the topic of consciousness and other things. I know there have been plenty of work done at Emory University. What Harris misses is Tibetan Buddhism's own history of violence.Would this entail that Tibetan Buddhism explicitly teaches violence and dismisses compassion? No, there were external pressures from China and Mongolia and an array of additional factors that led to violence. In contemporary society, we see acts of self-immolation. These acts are not because Tibetan Buddhism teaches this kind of protest or that self-immolation is congruent with teachings of reincarnation. There are other reasons and beliefs for this type of protest. Such actions are not specifically born out of the religious texts and ideologies they espouse.

So I think Harris needs to think his argument out further and supplement it with more homework. There is a lot he is missing. And I don't expect him to be an expert in religious studies given that his background is in neuroscience. But if he is going to launch this kind of attack then he should at least do his part of due diligence on what he is actually attacking. In sum, Harris misconstrues the relationship between 'belief' and behaviour. And secondly he is missing a lot of nuanced history and social contexts of many religions.

*Jennifer Saul on Implicit Bias

In this podcast at Philosophy Bites, Jennifer Saul from the University of Sheffield discusses 'implicit bias'.  She is currently taking this research further to develop an epistemology of scepticism.

For Saul, 'implicit bias' refers to "a collection of largely unconscious associations ...  all humans are prone to" that "affect how we perceive, interact with, and evaluate members of social groups." She draws largely on social psychological evidence to indicate that certain associations pervade societies and that even members of the same social groups will carry out these "unconscious associations" against their own groups. 

From what I understand, 'implicit bias' refers to cognitive shortcuts and the way in which stereotypes are formulated in society. There is an abundance of literature on these topics and it is not necessarily the case that these are negative associations. Implicit biases or cognitive shortcuts can certainly assist us in our daily lives. They are expectations (built upon certain social ethos and habits of social functions) that we have of other persons, services, and things we anticipate by living in a particular society. The implicit bias that Jennifer Saul is particularly interested in are the biases, expectations, cognitive shortcuts a society instills in its members about a stigmatized group. 

She uses the example of the job market: two identical CVs, one with a male name, and the other with a female name. She states that the CV with the male name received more calls for interviews than the CV with female names. This points to the bias of male workers over female workers - by whatever criteria a business may judge, whether it is based on competence, sociability, etc. One related discussion is about the profession of philosophy and why there are more male philosophers than female philosophers in University departments. Hanah Arendt discusses this question in her interview here, on the common association of philosopher with male, Arendt denounces the label of 'philosopher' and considers herself as a 'political theorist'. In a similar study with CVs, instead of males and females, the researchers contrasted names that sounded particularly black e.g. "Lakisha" and names that did not e.g. "Emily". The study found that names that sounded "black" returned significantly less calls than those that sounded "white". In other words, despite all CVs having the same information, Emily and Greg received more calls for employment than Jamal and Lakisha. In another study when participants were shown faces, African-Americans were perceived to be more criminal than non-African-American faces. This finding is also discussed by Joshua Greene in his book 'Moral Tribes' and discussed here on a panel about the 'Biology and Psychology of Ethical Behaviour'. Jennifer Saul points out that these stereotypes also influence members of the same social group. She provided the example of Jesse Jackson who negatively stereotyped another black man. During the late 80s and 90s in the U.S. the television show 'Cops' had an overwhelming amount of episodes showing black criminals. Later on, the show was called out for perpetuating racism and instilling this association into the minds of the American people. Similarly, there is Disney and the princess movie mold that provide certain examples of how girls should look, behave, and so on (this is also the case with male characters in these movies as well). Television and movies can perpetuate unconscious associations in the minds of viewers. We have also seen the development of such implicit bias with the media blitz on Muslims over the past decade. Similar biases exist regarding the poor and the homeless. Each of these biases function within the minds of persons and influence our actions to one degree or another (although this is contingent, not deterministic).  Implicit biases - shaped by a social culture - contingently influence our thoughts about other persons regardless of the social group we belong and that these biases may be positive or negative or seemingly neutral. 

The discussion of 'implicit biases' draws strong parallels with the social sciences. Namely, we can discuss unconscious associations in terms of knowledge of other bodies and knowledge as a particular body, without consciously reflecting on our 'techniques of the body' (habitus). This can also be considered largely in terms of embodiment as well. That we learn and embody certain ways of behaving and operating within society. Good examples are reactions of disgust. What foods are acceptable and what is not. What social events do we find abhorrent. Or what social events induce sympathy. For example, when we hear about a divorce or a death. The first reaction is sympathy and consolation. This is an embodied reaction and evidence of a social habitus. I only raise this example after watching a clip by comedian Louis CK who didn't like the "awww" reactions when he told people of his divorce. Louis CK states that he was happy that a bad marriage ended. Without diving into the ethics of marriage, this kind of reaction serves as one example of how we have embodied social reactions to certain events and kinds of information.

Another way of discussing 'implicit biases' is through Daniel Kahneman's System 1 and System 2. Expounded for a broader audience in his book, Thinking Fast and Slow. The biases that Saul refers to is System 1.While I don't think it was Saul's intention but she left the impression that these biases are inevitable and uncorrectable, which I disagree with here. One of the methods we can begin to correct these biases is to engage System 2 and slowly change the habits (implicit biases) of System 1. This entails, at times, confronting particular biases in certain ways to prompt thought and reflection such that one can recognize the System 1 bias when it occurs. In other words, creating cognitive dissonance can bring unconscious associations into conscious consideration. Although, how the dissonance is reduced is another set of issues on its own; it's not always for the better. 

One of Jennifer Saul's projects is to take this evidence into developing an epistemology of scepticism. Not only would such a scepticism question many of the assumptions by which we operate with respect to stigmatized groups - gender, sexuality, race, religion, etc - but it also serves to question other habits as we go up the social hierarchy. I find this to be an interesting move by Jennifer Saul, one that I can appreciate, and certainly applaud. Epistemology, in my opinion, should take into account the findings from psychology rather than relying on the intuitions of philosophers alone. This is a project that also coincides with the Experimental Philosophy movement. One caveat, however, is the danger in presupposing that the findings from psychology are generalizable across cultures. Heine and Norenzayan noted the phenomena of W.E.I.R.D. in social psychology. They point out that most psychological studies have been conducted on persons from White, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic societies. In this regard there is a danger in developing an epistemology that is infused with an implicit bias towards the WEIRD perspective. That is, a scepticism based on the awareness of 'implicit bias' may fall into an 'implicit bias' blindspot of its own.     

Nevertheless, I am willing to agree that 'implicit biases' exist in all societies and cultures. But would add that the particularities of such biases will vary from culture to culture. And although there may be structural similarities (e.g. sexism) in 'implicit biases', the cultural bases for them will also vary. At any rate, I look forward to how she develops her scepticism and epistemology as well as what can be established as "knowledge" or "belief". 

animal morality?

more on this topic here

Calvin and Hobbes on argument and affinity

Desmond Tutu's Tribute to Nelson Mandela

 
Here

*Reflections - from identity to nature and culture

The distinctions between that which we present to the internet, that which we hold to ourselves, and that which we present/express in other settings are guided by different parameters of attention, presence of mind, and presumably unconscious forms of behavioural habit all of which is unified by some form of singularity we understand and identify as ourselves.

In other words, different attitudes are taken to participate and act in the various "realities" we have access to. What is presented ultimately shape the impressions we give to others who (un)intentionally become audiences. This burdens our expressions and forms of action with a degree of responsibility that is correlated with the various degrees of gravity in various contexts - we can take some things seriously and others not seriously. Such degrees of responsibility attached to actions are not always considered and unwittingly impressions are given without intentionally making them out to be as such. In other words, we do not always take into account the responsibility attached to actions and this makes for chaotic relations. One's perceived identity may not coincide with another's idea of you - and perhaps one question is one of relevance: does it matter?

Beliefs have often been claimed to be dispositional and the dispositions we create for ourselves are in one sense a matter of preference and discrimination (based on whatever criteria we have come to understand as our affinity for things). In another sense, complementary to our preferences just mentioned, there are the perception of things (guided/limited by attention) that perpetuate and formulate new dispositions. Beliefs are both perpetuated and created as we navigate the world. What we accept - without committing to its "truth claim" - are then supplementary which either contribute to such dispositions or abandoned in light of various forms of evidence. The subtlety within this dynamic is the emotional response which compose much of right or wrong and the derivations thereof. The magnitude by which we experience our emotions, moods, feelings, passions, or what have you, are subject to our own understanding of them which in effect guid what is accepted and unaccepted - what contributes with prior understanding and what does not contribute.

The discussion of morality and concepts of human nature is then not one of rational discourse, although we can certainly discuss it in that manner (contingent upon what one understands as "anthropology", "ontology", "biology", or "natural"), but the particularities fall within the realm of experience and how things are nurtured - which also falls within how one understands the categories just mentioned in the parentheses. We can talk about an animal's nature but those who have raised dogs understand that a "well-behaved" dog is owed much to the training it has received, i.e. experience. The constructed system ultimately influences the perspective and attitudes one takes. Perhaps in this sense, the interest one has in a social-political-economic system is an interest in human nature.

It becomes implausible to separate nature from the impresses of culture. The recent study about brain connectivity does not show fundamental differences between men and women but rather reflects how society influences the minds/brains of men and women. The study finds that the differences begin to emerge most during the time of puberty when gender differences and socialization is reaching another stage of awareness. Adolescents are conscious of what their peers are doing and what they think. Values and norms become "normalized" and the differences in brain connectivity would naturally reflect the differences spheres of influence carved out for males and females. This is also to say that different cultures will influence brain connectivity in different ways as well. Many cross-cultural studies in psychology have reflected this - talking about cultural psychological differences between "East" and "West". Joel Cooper has found differences in what he has called "vicarious dissonance" and many will talk about "relational" psychology with respect to the "east". This difference has been typified in studies that simply look at "I am ..." research where persons from the east and persons from the west will complete that sentence in different ways.

In my view, all of this relates to the intersections of anthropology and psychology - namely the interface between collective and individual or culture and nature. The type of society and world that we make will ultimately depend on the degree of interest a collective (and its representative forms of power) takes in how it wishes to shape the culture that will influence the nature of persons.

Miroslav Volf and Jose Casanova on Secularization

Miroslav Volf and David Martin on Secularization

Zygmunt Bauman: A Natural History of Evil

Monica Miller: 'I Got 99 Problems and God Ain't One'

Dr. Monica Miller is the author of 'Religion and Hip Hop', which I note in a previous post: here

Dec. 3,1999: 'Black Flag Over Seattle'

“After more than three decades of experience with a corporate-led model of globalization, it is clear that this particular model of globalization has failed workers, farmers, and the environment, while facilitating the vast enrichment of a privileged few. The emergence of the global financial and economic crises of the last five years have exposed many negative impacts of policies, such as: deregulation of the financial sector resulting in financial collapse and job loss; commodification of the agricultural markets resulting in food price volatility and hunger; ’race to the bottom’ liberalization policies for production leading to deadly calamites, such as the collapse of the factory in Bangladesh where more than 1000 textile workers perished; intellectual property monopolies limiting global access to life-saving medicines; and corporate-trade-expansion (rather than trade-for-development) policies exacerbating the climate crisis. Despite this incredible harm, these liberalization, deregulation, and corporate monopolization policies form the backbone of the current global trade system, consolidated by the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1995.”

image and quote from: source

Calvin and Hobbes on Integrity v. Marketability

"What About Holy Hip Hop?"

...cloaked in piety



http://www.christianpost.com/news/holy-hip-hop-and-errors-in-judgement-109764/

'Why Is Religion Controversial?'