*Janus, Bacchus, and the Red Monkey

As the hours build up to crescendo, the turn of the new year is marked by the celebratory ritual of libation, song and the custom of reflection. One that simultaneously looks back into the past and onwards into the future. It is the tradition of the double-headed Janus coupled with the body of Bacchus. 

The ordinary ethics places a value on reflection and celebration. Although we can question the psychology of it all and ask the extent in which people do in fact think about the past year, remember the good, the bad, and the extent to which meaning is created by the act of reconstructing and projecting into the future: creating goals, "resolutions," and anticipating what life will be like in what is to come. In this sense, new years is, cognitively, an individualist tradition engaged with actively skiming one's recollected history within the parameters of what is memorable (accurate or not) and simultaneously constructing a fantasy predicated on the former. It is no surprise that the heads of Janus are connected rather than separated by two necks. The blood that goes into the heads are of the same source, pumped from a single heart.

Ironically, the value of reflection is intensified or negated by the act of celebration ('Bacchus'). The consumption of alcohol can sharpen or dull our thinking. It is a paradox that sustains the perennial ritual. Depending on one's perspective, meaning is enhanced or made hollow (especially in the light of systemic injustices, poverty - it is useful to keep in mind that the celebrating the holidays is an act of privilege - and violence around the world). Bacchus thereby becomes a form of ritual intensification, positively or negatively, in the creation of meaning (of course, Bacchus is not a necessary component for the act of meaning-making and the act of not participating may simply be a form of apathy to it all).

The actions symbolized by Janus and Bacchus are thereby instigators of meaning and mood, intensified by perennial social conventions. By contrast to the western custom, which now spreads across much of the modern world, the turn of the new year is marked by a different clout of meaning in the (far) eastern traditions. For many, 2016 is the year of the monkey - more specifically the red monkey - as the 12 animals cycle over. Just as the western zodiac interprets one's birthday in terms of constellations, the eastern zodiac takes the year, time and date of one's birth into a form of fortune telling by looking at the interaction of your birth animal and the overarching animal of the year. At the most basic level, it is an interaction between two animals. But if one dives deeper, one's birth is also associated with the elements (water, metal, wood, fire). This makes for an interesting comparative structuralist study of meaning and value between eastern and western forms of divination or fortune telling. I would be interested to see how many aim to have a child during this year because of its associations and meaning embedded in the red monkey. A practice that is not really seen in the west (but perhaps this is my ignorance - I have yet to meet anybody who says they will have a baby this year because their star zodiac and their partners' aligns well with the year of whichever constellation).

In the academic realm of discussing "lived religion," we can trace the western roots of celebration and reflection (which probably exists somewhere) and situate the perennial new years ritual within the context of Christianity and Paganism and its influence on the customs of "society." In Korea, the turn of the new year is marked by the ritual of visiting one's relatives (more ostensibly on the lunar new year in February) and if we cannot visit, we exchange communications by phone, email, social media platforms, chat applications etc. The custom is marked by the greeting: "receive many blessings/fortunes in the new year" accompanied by a big bow. An action of value that symbolizes reverence, familial relations, and prosperity. In this regard, the new years is relational. When younger generations give this greeting to the elder, we receive a few words of wisdom that take us into the new year. Moreover, these words are accompanied by the gift of money. A material symbol of prosperity and a greater symbol marking, what Keith Hart calls, the memory bank; money holds the function of remembering. 

By contrast to the quotidian uses of money, the money exchanged during the new years is not documented in any official records (i.e. bank statements) but rather recorded in memory; reminding us of our familial relationships and that we are tied to a greater structure of family and society. This is inherently a Confucian framework of filial piety and social/kinship relations. The new year is not only associated with agricultural trends but also speaks to the greater forms of relationality and distribution. The exchange of money (and gifts) within families and kinship relations contribute towards strengthening social bonds and acts directly on the distribution of wealth and the economy (the Marxist would be right to speak about the levels of social class and the circulation of wealth at similar levels of affiliation - changing the topic to 'class' instead of typical arguments around the 'modes of production' or 'consumption'. While this may be correct in general, there will be examples and cases of wealthier older generations giving to the poorer younger generations within an extended family and kinship relations).

The dynamics of gift, money, and filial relations go much deeper and are more complex than what happens on new years and we can certainly speak of the collision of "modernity" (and neoliberal capitalism) with "traditional" family values that are manifesting in Korean society today (e.g. increase in suicide rates of the elderly, increase in household debts, increase in wealth inequality, the commodification of rituals around death and birth, and the recent creation of social contracts between aging parents and their children to fulfil their filial duty, etc.). But the sustainment/reproduction of this tradition - not out of a morality of freedom but a morality of duty and aspiration - is simultaneously social and economic. This situates the discussion of religion and money in terms of its positive value and meaning-making capacities as opposed to the typical diatribe against its negative meaning-making dimensions (which are, of course, very much evident in the world today). Moreover, the Korean context (which will have subtle nuance from region to region just as they will take on variations in China and Japan) also places money and gift within dialectical discussions of tradition and modernity, private and public, household and labor; sacred and profane which becomes re-configured in very different ways (i.e. the religious-secular divide crumbles effectively delegating that discussion to a form of parochialism).

Calvin and Hobbes; Consumerism: Religion of Capital

History of Sociology of Religion (UK) by Theme

2015 Hoddesdon; Foundations and Futures (Conf)
         London; The Ethics of Representation (PG & Early Career study day)
2014  Brighton; Religion and Crisis 
          London; Achieving Gender Equality in the Academy: Intersections, Interrogations, and 
                         Practices  
2013 London; Islam and the University Curriculum: Experiences of Teaching and learning in 
                        HE
         London; Making Sense of the Census (socrel response)
         Durham; Material Religion
2012 London; Religion and Citizenship: Re-Thinking the Boundaries of Religion and the 
                        Secular
         Chester; Reliigon and (In)Equalities
2011 London; Teaching and Studying Religion: Choices and Challenges
         London; Religion and Social Action
         Birmingham; Religion and Social Theory: Developing a New Agenda for the Sociology of 
                              Religion
         Machester; Religion, Conflict and Violence in Historical and Contemporary Perspective 
2010 Oxford; Methodological Challenes in Doctoral Research on Religion
         Edinburgh; The Changing Face of Christianity
2009 Nottingham; Researching Sexuality and Spirituality
          Durham; Religion and Knowledge
2008 Brighton; Belief and Identity in Late Modernity: Transcending Disciplinary Boundaries
         Birmingham; Religion and Youth
         Bristol; Eleventh PG Conference
2007 Bristol; Religion, Spirituality and Gay Sexuality
        Oxford; Religion, Media and Culture
        Bristol; Tenth PG Conference
2006 London; God Talk - in Sociology and Theology
         Manchester; Religion and the Individual
         Bristol; Ninth PG Conference
2005 Canterbury; Religion, Film and Popular Culture
          Lancaster; Religion and Gender
         Bristol; Eighth PG Conference
2004 Oxford; The Study of Religions: Mapping the Field
         Bristol; A Sociology of Spirituality
         Bristol; Seventh PG Conference
2003 Kingston; Religion and Marginalisation
        Oxford; Text and Religious Contexts
2002 Birmingham; Religion in an Urban Ecology
2001Oxford; Materialising Religion: Expression, Performance and Ritual
2000 Exeter; Prophets and Predictions
1999 Durham; Religion and Identity
         Bristol; Teaching Sociology of Religion
1998 Edinburgh; Making Sense of the Body
1997 Bristol; Religion, Modernity and Ethics
1996 Strawberry Hill; Religion, Culture and Ideology
1995 Lincoln; The Future of Main-line Religion
1994 Preston; Religion, Sexuality and Gender
1993 Bristol; Postmodernity, Sociology and Religion
1992 Strawberry Hill; Religion in the Common European Home
1991 Lincoln
1990 Lincoln
1989 Strawberry Hill; Religion and Power
1988 Nottingham
1987 Preston
1986 Southampton
1985 Durham
1984 Birmingham
1983 Leeds
1982 Bristol
1981 Lincoln
1980 Birmingham
1979 Surrey
1978 Cambridge

Calvin and Hobbes on Tragedy

*A few thoughts on 'Emancipatory Politics'

Recently Stephen Feuchtwang and Alpa Shah edited a volume entitled Emancipatory Politics: A Critique (2015), which you can download (for free) here.

At present, there is a seminar discussion on the text over at the Open Anthropology Cooperative but I thought I'd first entertain a few preliminary thoughts here and watch that space as it unfolds before deciding whether or not I want to, or even feel capable of joining that conversation (I am no political anthropologist or an economic anthropologist but rather trained in the study of religion with a philosophy, psychology, and anthropology background). Moreover, I don't want to leave any long-winded posts in that forum as I write out my thoughts.  

So first, a definition and some themes that are laid out in that volume. By 'emancipatory politics,' Feuchtwang and Shah mean:  

"political activities that aim to end exploitation and enhance participatory democracy through which leadership can be held to account on a daily as well as periodic basis, in the workplace and beyond".

The three, inter-related, themes identified are:

1. The tension between mass organization and the party in charge of the armed force. Democratic centralism may lead to an inflexible inability to accommodate local conditions.

2. This raises the question of the relationship between democracy and emancipatory politics. The party sometimes becomes unaccountable to the people it claims to serve. 

3. Analysis of the classes, issues and alliances involved in the struggle for emancipation is essential. 

The Marxist-Leninist and Maoist movements discussed in these texts are of much intrigue and at the heart of each movement is the fight against capitalist-imperialist structures within their respective countries. This edited volume begins with the premise that violence is sometimes necessary; armed revolt as a means to end violence and oppression against the people.

However, given the next step I'll be taking as a post-doc, I want to think about these revolutionary movements in a different way. That is, are revolutionary movements not fighting against the misuse of money’s transformative power such that people are subject to oppression and violence? Is it not a fight against economic hegemony and discrimination that perpetuates the struggle?

Within this framework, I want to pick out three issues that will be of relevance to the three inter-related themes discussed above: (1) the role of money in this discussion of ‘emancipatory politics’ as a form sustaining revolutionary movements and the dominant structures they are fighting against; (2) whether it is still plausible to discuss these case studies in isolation without considering foreign influence and international relations; and (3) the political task of scholars as persons who are invariably a part of ‘world society’ (as the historian Howard Zinn says, “you can’t be neutral on a moving train”).  

To expand a bit further, with regard to the first, I understand that the focal point of the volume was on the political end of things but in many ways it is difficult to take the role of money out of this discussion. For example, in a study by Gilens & Page (2014), they show that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial impact on US govt. policy while the impact of average citizens and mass-based interest groups are minimal. In cruder terms, money has a greater influence than the people in US legislation. Democracy doesn’t dictate the terms but rather the money involved in politics holds the greater persuasive power.

In this sense, I wonder if ‘democracy’ continues to hold analytical utility and descriptive accuracy in the discussion of emancipatory politics or even politics in general. Is ‘democracy’ not a normative ideal of political philosophy rather than a descriptive practice of government and its relationship to the people? This begs the question whether there ever was (and this may simply be my own ignorance) a ‘democracy’ that we can meaningfully speak of that was successfully held accountable by the people without impunity.

In terms of the second, I’m thinking specifically about the economic interests of colonial countries, the ties between them, and their relationship to previously colonized countries. Can we talk about an emancipatory politics without discussing these international networks? In South Korea, trade agreements between Australia and the U.S. enabled the importation of rice which are priced lower than the rice from local farmers. You can imagine the consequences. If I recall correctly, this also occurred in India. I don’t think there is one country in the world that is economically isolated in terms of trade (even North Korea, arguably the most isolated country in the world).  

Lastly, before reaching the point of violence and the discussion of Fanon and Arendt (in the volume), I am keen to introduce Foucault’s proposal. In a discussion with Chomsky (1971 debate), Foucault argued that political power is also exerted by institutions that seem to be independent of the prevailing political powers. He states “the university and the whole education system is supposed to distribute knowledge, we know that the educational system maintains the power in the hands of a certain social class” and excludes other social classes from this power. I think many disciplines - more notably philosophy departments – and the student protests in South Africa are confronting the issue of social class and political power within universities. This is applicable not only with regard to the academy but also local governments, the army, police, hospitals, judicial systems, etc. Foucault then concludes by stating that the “real political task” is “to criticize the workings of institutions, that appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticize and attack them in such a manner that political violence has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight against them.” If these seemingly neutral and independent institutions are not addressed – I would also add that if we do not critique the ‘culture’ of power (the exchange of favors, the management of money, where they receive money, who they give money to and for what ends, and how deals are struck) within these neutral and independent institutions as well as governments – “there is a risk that they reconstitute themselves.”

 While the use of violence and the sacrifice of people for the solidification of sovereignty is indeed an important discussion, I wonder if this doesn't jump the gun before thinking more critically about why persons are taking up arms, the structures that perpetuate those conditions, and how to change those conditions either through structural reform or abolishing them. What would a economy and government that is truly for the people and held accountable by the people look like? How do we install a system that can provide a meanignful work economy (that doesn't concentrate wealth, which invariably leads to corruption, and doesn't advocate a hoarding of money), and provide non-discriminate healthcare, food, housing, and education for the people?

Thus far, people all around the world have been, to some extent, effective in mobilizing against injustice and discontent with government. However, there has been a lack of engagement with method after the overthrow of corrupt and ineffective government. I think this is where the concern between "democracy" and 'emancipatory politics' comes in by which the demands advocated by the uprising/revolution are thwarted by a political culture of "electoral politics." This was decidedly the case in South Korea and much more recently in Egypt (I write about it here and here). After the overthrow of Mubarak, they engaged in elections which proved a return to the same culture of governance and the demands of the revolution are unmet.

The 4.19 uprising in Korea, which brought down the first president/dictator Rhee (who was renounced by the Korean Provisional Government during the colonial era but placed in power by the U.S.; a presidency characterized by mass killings, corruption, hoarding money, and rigged elections), only placed another politician (Heo Jeong), as caretaker, of the same political camp and incompetent to move government. This was also the case for Chang Myeon, another prime minister who took the reins for a minute, as well as Yun Bo-Sun (the second President), and before a democratic system for the people could take over the 'anti-communist' dictatorship of Rhee, the military stepped in and took over government under Park Chung-hee (father of the current South Korean President). Each of these figures (Heo, Chang, Yun, and Park) continued to participate in a culture of politics that engaged with the U.S. and ignored the people. Violence against the people and armed counter-violence by the people persisted throughout this era and indeed continued under Park who would run the country from 1962 to 1979 when he was assasinated (My parents immigrated to the US in 1984 and our family would embark on a journey oscillating between the two countries, living intermittently for several years in one country and then the other).

One of the key components to the early years of South Korea was the use of pro-Japanese colonial figures in politics and police. In other words, the remnants of Japanese colonialism were still present which undermined the development of a truly Korean government on its own terms. Moreover, the rich capitalists who would spearhead the jaebol class were practically granted impunity for their roles in corruption and collusion for the sake of economic development. The trade-off, in retrospect, is South Korea's great economic development (which no one can dispute) at the consequence of a greater disparity of income across the Korean people. Inheritance is the greatest transmitter of wealth and we are now seeing the consequences of a senior class in poverty and an increased rate of suicide among them. Given the emphasis and respect for the elderly in Korean society, this is a damn shame. Our grandparents and grandmothers should not be living in poverty nor should they be committing suicide because of their self-perceived burden on society and their children. This is, arguably, the gravest offense for a highly Confucian country like Korea. But I digress. What I am arguing here is the re-constitution of a 'culture of power' and the use of money to perpetuate those systems.    

Revolt and uprising are only the beginning points. The real task is the question of what happens after bringing down those in political power such that the same forms of oppression do not re-constitute themselves. This edited volume is asking those questions and I appreciate it all the more for it. Something that I would like to see more is a discussion of money in politics and how do we change the transformative power of money towards the well-being of all people and the eradication of oppressive structures?

*Weber on Salvation

After leading several seminars on Weber's view of salvation (Ch. 10 of The Sociology of Religion trans Ephraim Fischoff. Intro by Parsons), I figured I'd summarize it here and make a few interspersed comments. 

In a brief nutshell, in this chapter, Weber aims to distinguish between ritualistic religions that don't contribute to ethical behavior and religions that do contribute to ethics; all of which is done within the purview of salvation.

First, he argues that salvation is an individual endeavor. One path to salvation is through "purely ritual activities and ceremonies: "ritualistic salvation." He states that this form of religion, which stresses the development of a particular "ephemeral subjective state" and experience, holds the effect of ex opere operato (from the work worked; emphasizing the efficacy of the ritual itself, i.e. salvation is obtained by participation): "Their typical intention is the accomplishment, by the sheer sacredness of their manipulations, of redemption from grace and the distribution of sacramental grace." Once the ritual has passed, however, Weber claims that there is a "negligible effect on behavior." He places "the Hindu and others in the Orient" and "the majority of non-Christian ancient mystery cults" into this category of "pure ritualism" (certainly problematic, to say the least). Moreover, he argues that animism focuses on this-world or 'immanence' and use the inducement of 'ecstasy' as an "instrument of salvation or self-deification." Again, for Weber, this has little to no positive effect on everyday ethical behavior. This carries several implications for the discussion of conversion and the role of religious experiences (although I don't think it contributes anything new to that discussion, at least where it stands now).    

By contrast, Weber distinguishes "pure ritualism" from Christian faiths which qualifies the efficacy of the sacrament "to bring salvation" only to those who are "ethically purified in the sight of god," which are associated with moral codes of behavior; prescriptive rules. We begin to see how Weber is setting up his view of religious "rationalization" and "systematization."  

One way by which ritual can exert an ethical effect is through education and the systematization of moral codes or a "body of law." A systematization of "good works" that can take one of two forms: an emphasis on individual actions (Weber includes: Zoroastrianism, Hinduisim, Judaism, and Roman Catholicism and the "oriental Christian churches") or an emphasis on a "underlying ethical total personality." In the case of the latter, he goes on to describe this as an "ethic of inwardness," which is developed either as a product of education - "through a training of goodness" - or as a product of "a divine gift" (but this is problematic, given the nature/nurture debate - we can wonder to what extent we can even talk about 'nature' as we are necessarily born within a specific historical, cultural, and social context). In either case, the prescribed views of "religious good works" become "instruments of self-perfection," self-deification, a process of "sanctification." 

This process of rationalization, a methodological account toward salvation, is codified in ethics; to "become his [god's] instrument or to be spiritually suffused by him." This method and rationalization in effect combats the "average habitus of the human body and the everyday world as those are given by nature." The negation of this-world, in yearning for salvation, induces the ethical behavior for this world. In other words, the end motivates the means to achieve the end.

While Weber highlights "method" over "religious experience" regarding their effect on everyday behavior, his protestant upbringing can't help but include a specific experience, an emergent "subjective condition" - the assurance of grace - that has a significant impact on consciousness and becomes a "foundation for the conduct of life." It renounces "irrational" behaviors of nature, not only from the view point of hygiene (we can branch into Freud here if we wanted) but also "sensual pleasures" which do not lead to salvation.

Rationality, for Weber, in the context of religion, is therefore intimately tied to salvation and ethical behavior, which is also to say that 'rationality' is connected and beholden to prescriptive codes of behavior and methods of thought provided/mandated by the systematized path to salvation of religious traditions (in response to much of this we could bring in Nietzsche's critique of power and morality as well as Marx's critique of social conditions that motivate religious thought, as well as post-colonial critiques in Weber's thought).