From Op-Ed by Simon Critchley and Jamieson Webster, The Gospel According to 'Me'
"here’s the rub: if one believes that there is an intimate connection
between one’s authentic self and glittering success at work, then the
experience of failure and forced unemployment is accepted as one’s own
fault. I feel shame for losing my job. I am morally culpable for the
corporation’s decision that I am excess to requirements.
To take this one step further: the failure of others is explained by
their merely partial enlightenment for which they, and they alone, are
to be held responsible. At the heart of the ethic of authenticity is a
profound selfishness and callous disregard of others. As the ever-wise
Buddha says, “You yourself, as much as anybody in the entire universe,
deserve your love and affection.”
A naïve belief in authenticity
eventually gives way to a deep cynicism. A conviction in personal
success that must always hold failure at bay becomes a corrupt
stubbornness that insists on success at any cost. Cynicism, in this
mode, is not the expression of a critical stance toward authenticity but
is rather the runoff of this failure of belief. The self-help industry
itself runs the gamut in both directions — from “The Power of Now,” which teaches you the power of meditative self-sufficiency, to “The Rules,” which teaches a woman how to land a man by pretending to be self-sufficient. Profit rules the day, inside and out.
Nothing
seems more American than this forced choice between cynicism and naïve
belief. Or rather, as Herman Melville put it in his 1857 novel “The
Confidence Man,” it seems the choice is between being a fool (having to
believe what one says) or being a knave (saying things one does not
believe). For Melville, who was writing on the cusp of modern
capitalism, the search for authenticity is a white whale."
Sunday, June 30, 2013
Governments and Religious hostilities/restrictions
HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory - Issue on Value as Theory
I'm still reading this, but so far I think the contributions are brilliant and addresses important issues on value that need/should be grappled with. The contributors include some of the "superstars" of anthropology, which not only makes the issue appealing (commanding attention), but testifies to the depth, erudition, clarity, and importance of the issues addressed regarding 'value'. Great stuff here.
http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/issue/current/showToc
http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/issue/current/showToc
Saturday, June 29, 2013
Casanova on "The Secular, Secularizations, and Secularisms"
"Jose Casanova, Professor of Sociology at Georgetown University, speaks on “The Secular, Secularizations, and Secularisms,” on September 15, 2010. Professor Adam Seligman of
Boston University’s Institute for Culture, Religion & World Affairs
(CURA) responds. This lecture is co-sponsored by BU’s Institute for
Philosophy & Religion and CURA "
http://www.bu.edu/cura/calendar/video-presentations/
http://www.bu.edu/cura/calendar/video-presentations/
Changing attitudes towards religion in the U.S.: 2006 v. 2011
"PALS is a six-year national study tracking religion, morality, politics
and other social issues in the U.S. The study included a scientifically
gathered random sample of approximately 1,300 adult Americans in 2006
and 2012, interviewing the exact same people in both years.
When asked about mutual respect for all religions, one-third of PALS participants in 2006 said they respected all religions equally. By 2012, 58 percent said they did."
2006: 5 years after 9-11
2012: 11 years after 9-11
Are these indicators of the effect of the media on religion?
When asked about mutual respect for all religions, one-third of PALS participants in 2006 said they respected all religions equally. By 2012, 58 percent said they did."
2006: 5 years after 9-11
2012: 11 years after 9-11
Are these indicators of the effect of the media on religion?
Friday, June 28, 2013
Vatican cleric arrested for smuggling
"Monsignor Nunzio Scarano, 61, and others were accused of trying to smuggle 20 million euros ($26m) in cash into the country from Switzerland by private jet."
"Scarano, who was being held at a prison in capital Rome, was already under investigation in a purported money-laundering plot involving the Vatican bank."
"The arrests came just two days after Pope Francis created a commission of inquiry into the Vatican bank to get to the bottom of the problems that have plagued it for decades and contributed to the impression that it is an unregulated, offshore tax haven."
I don't believe I've ever read about a member of the Vatican being arrested. NY Times reports three have been arrested.
BBC: here
"Scarano, who was being held at a prison in capital Rome, was already under investigation in a purported money-laundering plot involving the Vatican bank."
"The arrests came just two days after Pope Francis created a commission of inquiry into the Vatican bank to get to the bottom of the problems that have plagued it for decades and contributed to the impression that it is an unregulated, offshore tax haven."
I don't believe I've ever read about a member of the Vatican being arrested. NY Times reports three have been arrested.
BBC: here
Thursday, June 27, 2013
Art and Religion VI: "Imagination can change what we see and hear"
Having just wrote on Tanya Luhrmann and the role of the imagination in religion, I just noticed that Science Daily came out with an article on how the "imagination"can influence what we hear and what we see. Now, just by reading this, it is vague in what sense they are using the term imagination. And how they actually got participants to "imagine" something from creating an illusion.
"In the first experiment, participants experienced the illusion that two passing objects collided rather than passed by one-another when they imagined a sound at the moment the two objects met. In a second experiment, the participants' spatial perception of a sound was biased towards a location where they imagined seeing the brief appearance of a white circle. In the third experiment, the participants' perception of what a person was saying was changed by their imagination of a particular sound."
Without reading the actual paper, I would be interested in how they actually measured and induced the "imagination". But I don't think the claim is new but rather reinforces that our imagination can influence our perceptions of reality. Imaginary friends, Schizophrenics, Hallucinations, hearing the wrong thing, phantom sounds, etc. etc. all of these things can affect our experience of reality.
"In the first experiment, participants experienced the illusion that two passing objects collided rather than passed by one-another when they imagined a sound at the moment the two objects met. In a second experiment, the participants' spatial perception of a sound was biased towards a location where they imagined seeing the brief appearance of a white circle. In the third experiment, the participants' perception of what a person was saying was changed by their imagination of a particular sound."
Without reading the actual paper, I would be interested in how they actually measured and induced the "imagination". But I don't think the claim is new but rather reinforces that our imagination can influence our perceptions of reality. Imaginary friends, Schizophrenics, Hallucinations, hearing the wrong thing, phantom sounds, etc. etc. all of these things can affect our experience of reality.
Thomas Scanlon on "What is Morality?"
Thomas Scanlon is the Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity at Harvard University's philosophy department.
Embodied Cognition: effects of posture on recklessness and honesty?
Interesting...
haven't read it but there seems to be several variables that come up with this kind of thesis
haven't read it but there seems to be several variables that come up with this kind of thesis
Reactions to ruling on DOMA
In case you missed some of the news, legaltimes gives a recap (as does many other websites)
Tweets re-posted on CNN's belief blog: here
From some of Utah's other religious traditions: here
And the Mormon Church responds
I would be curious to see if there is a U.S. Muslim, U.S. Jewish response...or even if there are some U.S. Buddhist monks willing to give their opinion...
Even the news is Christian-centered in garnering responses to the Supreme Court's decision as if gay marriage was only sensitive to them, although it is true that the Christian sects were the primary wielders of the bigotry sword. The news in this way perpetuates a false line between Christians and non-Christians in the U.S. This is implicit propaganda creating and divding a cultural identity. And it further enforces the idea of "religious liberty" being a discussion of "christian liberty", this is bogus because it shrouds a bigoted christian discourse under a term in a multi-religious secular discourse.
Tweets re-posted on CNN's belief blog: here
From some of Utah's other religious traditions: here
And the Mormon Church responds
I would be curious to see if there is a U.S. Muslim, U.S. Jewish response...or even if there are some U.S. Buddhist monks willing to give their opinion...
Even the news is Christian-centered in garnering responses to the Supreme Court's decision as if gay marriage was only sensitive to them, although it is true that the Christian sects were the primary wielders of the bigotry sword. The news in this way perpetuates a false line between Christians and non-Christians in the U.S. This is implicit propaganda creating and divding a cultural identity. And it further enforces the idea of "religious liberty" being a discussion of "christian liberty", this is bogus because it shrouds a bigoted christian discourse under a term in a multi-religious secular discourse.
*Tanya Luhrmann and the role of imagination in Religion
Anthropologist Tanya Luhrmann has been making the case for the role of the imagination in religion. She has posted several articles in the NY Times about this position and explicates it much further in her book, When God Talks Back - much more successful than her initial book on Witchcraft in England where she argues for the "interpretive drift", something that is noticeably absent in her work on Evangelicals in the U.S.
In a recent NY Times article she talks a bit more of the place of fiction here and the role that C.S. Lewis has taken as a medium of theology. I've noticed that many students here in the UK, at least those who are theologically inclined with a firm belief in a Christian God, has taken favorably to C.S. Lewis. I tend to chuckle a bit when I remember the context between J.R.R. Tolkien and Lewis. If my memory serves correctly, despite their friendship, Tolkien didn't think Lewis was a very good fantasy writer. Tickles me to think that perhaps the Godfather of fantasy who, in a way, has provided the blueprint for fantasy writing didn't like the world of Narnia - something that has become, in some circles, theologically significant apparently, perhaps moreso for the lay person, but then again I'm not entirely sure how seriously scholarly theologians consider Lewis in comparison to say Barth or Aquinas.
At any rate, Luhrmann talks about how big Lewis is with his "Evangelical Rock Star" and the significance of Aslan, the great and noble lion of the Narnia series, which symbolizes the transcendence and immanence of God. By focusing on the imagination, Luhrmann is talking about meaning-making within the context of the sociology of knowledge. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann has spoken about this quite extensively in terms of construction and projection. Not without criticism (see Ninian Smart's The Science of Religion and the Sociology of Knowledge) but it certainly has a place within that history - as seen in a previous post that marked the top 10 books of the century from the International Sociological Association. While I would not particularly disagree with Luhrmann's focus on the place of the imagination, it might serve her well to read up on that context of meaning-making in the sociology of knowledge.
What is actually missing from this account is the position Terrence Deacon and many in the Evolutionary Psychology camp have advocated. That is, the natural occuring concept of God. Apart from the argument that religion is a by-product, the idea that everything can be tied together under a unifying concept is not new. Many in the past have discussed how formulating a concept of God is a natural phenomena (Boyer, Atran, Barrett, etc.). Not to say that not forming a concept of God is unnatural but that putting pieces together into a form of coherence and giving meaning and significance to causal factors is not an irrational phenomena as so many would have it. Studies have been done in developmental psychology that discusses the folk physics of infants and the attribution of agency. Babies can sense when something is amiss in terms of expectations of what physical objects do. One billiard ball hitting another and continuing in that trajectory, or an object falling down, are expected results. When these things do not occur, there is perplexity. Attributing meaning to these observances to a concept of God does not advocate any particular position on the existence of God but rather it emphasizes that we have biological and cognitive mechanisms that allow us to create meaning and have an imagination.
While to some degree the biological, cognitive, and evolutionary argument levels the playing field of religion and science in terms of systems of meaning and making sense of the world around us, there are qualitative differences as well as differences of verifiability in science as opposed to the methods of religion. Here I would argue the importance of method, the fallability and perpetual state of correction, reproducability, and the importance of peer-review in the domains of science. Anthropology becomes somewhat problematic in the area of reproducability. Given the scenario of two independent anthropologists going to the same region and reporting dramatically different representations of the same region. Much controversy has come from Napoleon Chagnon - not to say that all anthropologists fit in this ilk - and the research done on the Yanomamo. This is just one example. There have been problems with ethnographies on Native Americans and other cultures as well. However, it is important to say that none of this really dismisses anthropology. It is one type of mistake that must be learned from. Sociology, with its heavy emphasis on statistics, is also wrought with its own issues. The lack of qualitative sensability and the possibility of misinterpreting quantitative data and making causal inferences carries its own concerns. Psychology also has its issues. In my opinion too many focus on psychoanalytic theory, which I think is too metaphorical and at times quite bogus. It is useful for making money and helping people feel good or bad about themselves, but I don't see a whole lot of scientific merit and testability in what it proposes. Although to be fair, Freud has inspired a search for the unconscious and defense mechanisms that have actually gained merit in neurologically oriented sciences. Other fields of psychology have fared better. Neuropsychology and cognitive psychology have taken a reductionist approach and have focused specifically on the brain and the potential phenomenology that stems from it. This grounds these areas in something that can be measured. But as I mentioned, these areas if not careful can lead to mistaken conclusions and misintrepretation. Social psychology and developmental psychology have constructed measures and hypotheses that can be tested from social observation as well as neuroimaging techniques. One of the major things that have come out of this is our Theory of Mind capabilities, which is the idea that we can place ourselves in the state of others. The study of junior mints is a good example. But like any other budding form of science, the social sciences are still maturing, testing, and investigating theories and methodology. A science of religion is far from stable. Chemistry, physics, and biology have been around much longer and the systems of method they have employed have gone through paradigm shifts that have stood the test of time and rigor.
At one point, Luhrmann will have to deal with the place of imagination, meaning-making, and why religion's use of the imagination makes it religious or spiritual or mystical. There are also issues of how the imagination translates into behavior as well as imagination in relation to the discussion about belief. Furthermore, the place of the imagination will have to be placed into the context of formulating conviction, and how this all configures in the place of embodiment. There are a slew of further questions that arise from imagination and its place in religion as opposed to other areas. Focusing on imagination isn't particularly new. While I enjoy Luhrmann's work and find parts of it insightful and fascinating, to me a further step needs to be taken. It seems problematic to focus too much on the imagination. In a way, this is a return to the question of meaning and how biological and social systems contribute.
In a recent NY Times article she talks a bit more of the place of fiction here and the role that C.S. Lewis has taken as a medium of theology. I've noticed that many students here in the UK, at least those who are theologically inclined with a firm belief in a Christian God, has taken favorably to C.S. Lewis. I tend to chuckle a bit when I remember the context between J.R.R. Tolkien and Lewis. If my memory serves correctly, despite their friendship, Tolkien didn't think Lewis was a very good fantasy writer. Tickles me to think that perhaps the Godfather of fantasy who, in a way, has provided the blueprint for fantasy writing didn't like the world of Narnia - something that has become, in some circles, theologically significant apparently, perhaps moreso for the lay person, but then again I'm not entirely sure how seriously scholarly theologians consider Lewis in comparison to say Barth or Aquinas.
At any rate, Luhrmann talks about how big Lewis is with his "Evangelical Rock Star" and the significance of Aslan, the great and noble lion of the Narnia series, which symbolizes the transcendence and immanence of God. By focusing on the imagination, Luhrmann is talking about meaning-making within the context of the sociology of knowledge. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann has spoken about this quite extensively in terms of construction and projection. Not without criticism (see Ninian Smart's The Science of Religion and the Sociology of Knowledge) but it certainly has a place within that history - as seen in a previous post that marked the top 10 books of the century from the International Sociological Association. While I would not particularly disagree with Luhrmann's focus on the place of the imagination, it might serve her well to read up on that context of meaning-making in the sociology of knowledge.
What is actually missing from this account is the position Terrence Deacon and many in the Evolutionary Psychology camp have advocated. That is, the natural occuring concept of God. Apart from the argument that religion is a by-product, the idea that everything can be tied together under a unifying concept is not new. Many in the past have discussed how formulating a concept of God is a natural phenomena (Boyer, Atran, Barrett, etc.). Not to say that not forming a concept of God is unnatural but that putting pieces together into a form of coherence and giving meaning and significance to causal factors is not an irrational phenomena as so many would have it. Studies have been done in developmental psychology that discusses the folk physics of infants and the attribution of agency. Babies can sense when something is amiss in terms of expectations of what physical objects do. One billiard ball hitting another and continuing in that trajectory, or an object falling down, are expected results. When these things do not occur, there is perplexity. Attributing meaning to these observances to a concept of God does not advocate any particular position on the existence of God but rather it emphasizes that we have biological and cognitive mechanisms that allow us to create meaning and have an imagination.
While to some degree the biological, cognitive, and evolutionary argument levels the playing field of religion and science in terms of systems of meaning and making sense of the world around us, there are qualitative differences as well as differences of verifiability in science as opposed to the methods of religion. Here I would argue the importance of method, the fallability and perpetual state of correction, reproducability, and the importance of peer-review in the domains of science. Anthropology becomes somewhat problematic in the area of reproducability. Given the scenario of two independent anthropologists going to the same region and reporting dramatically different representations of the same region. Much controversy has come from Napoleon Chagnon - not to say that all anthropologists fit in this ilk - and the research done on the Yanomamo. This is just one example. There have been problems with ethnographies on Native Americans and other cultures as well. However, it is important to say that none of this really dismisses anthropology. It is one type of mistake that must be learned from. Sociology, with its heavy emphasis on statistics, is also wrought with its own issues. The lack of qualitative sensability and the possibility of misinterpreting quantitative data and making causal inferences carries its own concerns. Psychology also has its issues. In my opinion too many focus on psychoanalytic theory, which I think is too metaphorical and at times quite bogus. It is useful for making money and helping people feel good or bad about themselves, but I don't see a whole lot of scientific merit and testability in what it proposes. Although to be fair, Freud has inspired a search for the unconscious and defense mechanisms that have actually gained merit in neurologically oriented sciences. Other fields of psychology have fared better. Neuropsychology and cognitive psychology have taken a reductionist approach and have focused specifically on the brain and the potential phenomenology that stems from it. This grounds these areas in something that can be measured. But as I mentioned, these areas if not careful can lead to mistaken conclusions and misintrepretation. Social psychology and developmental psychology have constructed measures and hypotheses that can be tested from social observation as well as neuroimaging techniques. One of the major things that have come out of this is our Theory of Mind capabilities, which is the idea that we can place ourselves in the state of others. The study of junior mints is a good example. But like any other budding form of science, the social sciences are still maturing, testing, and investigating theories and methodology. A science of religion is far from stable. Chemistry, physics, and biology have been around much longer and the systems of method they have employed have gone through paradigm shifts that have stood the test of time and rigor.
At one point, Luhrmann will have to deal with the place of imagination, meaning-making, and why religion's use of the imagination makes it religious or spiritual or mystical. There are also issues of how the imagination translates into behavior as well as imagination in relation to the discussion about belief. Furthermore, the place of the imagination will have to be placed into the context of formulating conviction, and how this all configures in the place of embodiment. There are a slew of further questions that arise from imagination and its place in religion as opposed to other areas. Focusing on imagination isn't particularly new. While I enjoy Luhrmann's work and find parts of it insightful and fascinating, to me a further step needs to be taken. It seems problematic to focus too much on the imagination. In a way, this is a return to the question of meaning and how biological and social systems contribute.
*Twitter and Facebook as a means of gathering data
Computer analysis has changed the way some social scientists gather data. In the journal Social Psychological & Personality Science. Psych Prof. Jesse Preston and associates published, 'Happy Tweets: Christians Are Happier, More Socially Connected, and Less
Analytical Than Atheists on Twitter'.
By comparing those who have declared themselves as 'Christian' and those who have declared themselves as 'Atheist', using their tweets and facebook updates as people tweet or update their facebooks on what happened in their lives, what emotions they are feeling, what kind of content they post, it is possible to analyse tons and tons of data just by being an online "friend" or "follower". Granted that there are some concerns but in general, the assumption is that people will post about themselves or things that are interesting to them, or things that are happening to them and etc. Of course there are occassional mishaps instances but the magnitude of data may render such things insignificant.
Allowing these social network sites to work for the social scientist allows for greater data collection than it ever has. Longitudinal studies conducted over years and years manage to collect from a couple hundred participants. However, with computer analysis and these social networking sites, the data can be gathered in tremendous amounts. What the methodological implications are and theoretical limitations may be is yet to be seen or discussed. But the idea is exciting.
Preston et al., found that Christians tend to tweet happier while Atheists tweet more analytically. (Here) The claim that religious folk are happier seems to be a superficial claim. The factors and variables are much more rich than simply social support, risk-aversive behavior, and statements of well-being. The term "happier" is elusive and hard to pin down. This is further complicated by subjective interpretations of what "happiness" is and even more complicated by the possibility of people claiming happiness but not really - what some have called "false consciousness" or "delusional beliefs" or what have you. Nor can we discount the possibility of persons simply ignoring the ugly things in their life and fail to recognize the possibilities of things that may not make them happy. So they flat out deny its occurrence (clergy and sexual abuse is one). So while much data suggests that religion is directly associated with well-being and happiness and all that feel-good warm-hearted stuff, the actualities are quite complicated and only now are we scratching the surface. The surface seems to suggest that there is a positive correlation. But the rabbit hole needs to go deeper and the layers peeled back further.
By comparing those who have declared themselves as 'Christian' and those who have declared themselves as 'Atheist', using their tweets and facebook updates as people tweet or update their facebooks on what happened in their lives, what emotions they are feeling, what kind of content they post, it is possible to analyse tons and tons of data just by being an online "friend" or "follower". Granted that there are some concerns but in general, the assumption is that people will post about themselves or things that are interesting to them, or things that are happening to them and etc. Of course there are occassional mishaps instances but the magnitude of data may render such things insignificant.
Allowing these social network sites to work for the social scientist allows for greater data collection than it ever has. Longitudinal studies conducted over years and years manage to collect from a couple hundred participants. However, with computer analysis and these social networking sites, the data can be gathered in tremendous amounts. What the methodological implications are and theoretical limitations may be is yet to be seen or discussed. But the idea is exciting.
Preston et al., found that Christians tend to tweet happier while Atheists tweet more analytically. (Here) The claim that religious folk are happier seems to be a superficial claim. The factors and variables are much more rich than simply social support, risk-aversive behavior, and statements of well-being. The term "happier" is elusive and hard to pin down. This is further complicated by subjective interpretations of what "happiness" is and even more complicated by the possibility of people claiming happiness but not really - what some have called "false consciousness" or "delusional beliefs" or what have you. Nor can we discount the possibility of persons simply ignoring the ugly things in their life and fail to recognize the possibilities of things that may not make them happy. So they flat out deny its occurrence (clergy and sexual abuse is one). So while much data suggests that religion is directly associated with well-being and happiness and all that feel-good warm-hearted stuff, the actualities are quite complicated and only now are we scratching the surface. The surface seems to suggest that there is a positive correlation. But the rabbit hole needs to go deeper and the layers peeled back further.
Wednesday, June 26, 2013
"What do most philosopher's believe?"
Found this here, apparently philosophers David Chalmers and David Bourget have been conducting surveys on the views of other philosophers and what they think. Their website is philpapers and the method, data as well as the analysis are all included there. Looking at the views of other philosophers and other scholars seems to be a trend as well. Philosopher Joshua Knobe has been conducting similar studies. Knobe in a way launched the 'Experimental Philosophy' movement by which they dismiss many of the intuition-based theories philosophers have done and suggest that psychology and other social sciences, as well as the cognitive sciences can better inform philosophy.
These are a few of Chalmers and Bourget's findings.
Metaphysics:
The issues that fall under this heading broadly involve questions about what exists, and why and how it does. Here’s a breakdown of some of the biggies:
In this general category, we deal with questions about what it means to be a person and how we can exist as seemingly coherent individuals over time in a world in constant flux. Let’s take two fun examples that deal with these quandaries, shall we?
These are a few of Chalmers and Bourget's findings.
Metaphysics:
The issues that fall under this heading broadly involve questions about what exists, and why and how it does. Here’s a breakdown of some of the biggies:
- God: atheism 72.8%; theism 14.6%; other 12.6%
Granted, this is an oversimplification.
Popular notions of these categories don’t necessarily correspond to more
subtle distinctions among philosophers, who may be strong or weak atheists (or theists), or hold some version of deism, agnosticism, or none of the above.
- Free will: compatibilism 59.1%; libertarianism 13.7%; no free will 12.2%; other 14.9%
Compatibilism,
the majority view here, is the theory that we can choose our actions to
some degree, and to some degree they are determined by prior events.
Libertarianism (related to, but not synonymous with, the political
philosophy) claims that all of our actions are freely chosen.
- Metaphilosophy: naturalism 49.8%; non-naturalism 25.9%; other 24.3%
Naturalism,
according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is “the idea or belief that
only natural (as opposed to supernatural or spiritual) laws and forces
operate in the world,” or “the belief that nothing exists beyond the
natural world.” Note that metaphysical naturalism needs to be
distinguished from methodological naturalism, which nearly all scholars and scientists embrace.
- Abstract objects: Platonism 39.3%; nominalism 37.7%; other 23.0%
This distinction gets at whether
abstractions like geometry or the laws of logic exist in some immutable
form “out there” in the universe (as Platonic ideas) or whether they are
“nominal,” no more than convenient formulas we create and apply to our
observations. It’s a debate at least as old as the ancient Greeks.
Personal Identity:In this general category, we deal with questions about what it means to be a person and how we can exist as seemingly coherent individuals over time in a world in constant flux. Let’s take two fun examples that deal with these quandaries, shall we?
- Teletransporter: survival 36.2%; death 31.1%; other 32.7%
Here, we’re dealing with a thought experiment proposed by Derek Parfit (one of the participants in the survey) that pretty much takes the Star Trek transporter technology (or the horror version in The Fly)
and asks whether the transported individual—completely disintegrated
and reconstituted somewhere else—is the same person as the original. In
other words, can a “person” survive this process or does the individual
die and a new one take its place? The question hinges on ideas about a
“soul” or “spirit” that exists apart from the material body and asks
whether or not we are nothing more than very specific arrangements of
matter and energy.
- Zombies: conceivable but not metaphysically possible 35.6%; metaphysically possible 23.3%; inconceivable 16.0%; other 25.1%
Zombies are everywhere. Try to escape them! You can’t. Their prevalence in popular culture is mirrored in the philosophy world,
where zombies have long served as metaphors for the possibility of a
pure (and ravenous) bodily existence, devoid of conscious
self-awareness. The prospect may be as frightening as the zombies of the
Walking Dead, but is it a real possibility? A significant number of philosophers seem to think so.
"Top 10 Books of the Century" from the International Sociological Association
| 1 | Weber, Max | Economy and Society | |
| 2 | Mills, Charles Wright | The Sociological Imagination | |
| 3 | Merton, Robert K. | Social Theory and Social Structure | |
| 4 | Weber, Max | The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism | |
| 5 | Berger, P.L. and Luckmann, T. | The Social Construction of Reality | |
| 6 | Bourdieu, Pierre | Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste | |
| 7 | Elias, Norbert | The Civilizing Process | |
| 8 | Habermas, Jürgen | The Theory of Communicative Action | |
| 9 | Parsons, Talcott | The Structure of Social Action | |
| 10 | Goffman, Erving | The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life |
http://www.isa-sociology.org/books/books10.htm
Tuesday, June 25, 2013
A "new theory of emotions"
Philosophers from the Institute of Philosophy II at the Ruhr-Universität Bochum have presented what they call a "new theory of emtions", what they call the 'Integrative embodiment theory of emotions'. A full paper is published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. I don't quite think that this is particularly new...it may be for the field of philosophy but I think emotions and emodiment research has been going on for some time in the social sciences.
They begin with what many have been doing for years, that is begin with the body and the premise that knowledge begins with the body. They then integrate aspects of the James-Lange theory of emotions and the 'cognitive' rationalized approach in terms of intentionality but also account for the times when there is an absence of an object behind the intention.
Talked about a bit more here
They begin with what many have been doing for years, that is begin with the body and the premise that knowledge begins with the body. They then integrate aspects of the James-Lange theory of emotions and the 'cognitive' rationalized approach in terms of intentionality but also account for the times when there is an absence of an object behind the intention.
Talked about a bit more here
*An example of a Culture of Power: Mea Maxima Culpa
The code of silence and the protection of priests from the nucleus of Catholic power propogates a culture of power. If the culture is not dealt with, the culture that is instantiated by canon law, the corruption and habits of power do not change. The tale of priests molesting and abusing children goes deeper than what the media presented in the early 2000s. It is not simply a tale of U.S. priests and not simply something that was outside of the authorities in the Vatican. Ratzinger's resignation is shrouded in further mystery and his position prior to his papacy is telling about his involvement. The fact that there is an actual paper trail and a blatant "turn of the cheek" is revealing of a culture and the habits of power. Not only can we talk about cognitive dissonance in terms of individuals but for institutions and the authorities that allow those institutions to function can also be equally applied to the theory of cognitive dissonance. The tensions involved pronounce the methods of discourse and avenues by which rationalization and justification can happen to reduce dissonance as well as perpetuate the culture of power.
On a broader scale, any discussion about religion in the public sphere must also deal with the relationship between international law and canon law. Not just whether we can use religiously specific terminology in a multi-religious environment but rather how major religious institutions and traditions are going to cooperate and function within the boundaries of law. The separation between church and state has created separate spheres of law, practically indemnifying those who bear the cloth from criminal and civil laws of a society and leaving those who do abuse reigious power and trust to a separate court without accountability to the victims.
The documentary (embedded below) Mea Maxima Culpa: Silence in the House of God (which aired on the BBC Storyville) is a good example of what I am referring. I remember reserving judgment on many things about these scandals, not about the abuse but where the responsibility should lie, but it seems that what the press presented was not even half the story. The paper trail, the Vatican's history, and the role of Benedict is much more damning than I thought. And I think it is fair to say that Ratzinger was both responsible for the silence and, at the same time, helpless to the silence. Whether Francis will be able to deal with the hypocrisy of the Church on these issues is yet to be seen.
*Update: Benedict emerges from silence, defends his abuse record in letter to prominent Italian atheist
On a broader scale, any discussion about religion in the public sphere must also deal with the relationship between international law and canon law. Not just whether we can use religiously specific terminology in a multi-religious environment but rather how major religious institutions and traditions are going to cooperate and function within the boundaries of law. The separation between church and state has created separate spheres of law, practically indemnifying those who bear the cloth from criminal and civil laws of a society and leaving those who do abuse reigious power and trust to a separate court without accountability to the victims.
The documentary (embedded below) Mea Maxima Culpa: Silence in the House of God (which aired on the BBC Storyville) is a good example of what I am referring. I remember reserving judgment on many things about these scandals, not about the abuse but where the responsibility should lie, but it seems that what the press presented was not even half the story. The paper trail, the Vatican's history, and the role of Benedict is much more damning than I thought. And I think it is fair to say that Ratzinger was both responsible for the silence and, at the same time, helpless to the silence. Whether Francis will be able to deal with the hypocrisy of the Church on these issues is yet to be seen.
*Update: Benedict emerges from silence, defends his abuse record in letter to prominent Italian atheist
Buddhist Extremism
Islamophobia hits Burma...led by a Buddhist monk
The New York Times
BBC
It would be interesting to see the extent to which there has been Buddhist-Muslim tension and violence or if this kind of tension is relatively new by which the Islamophobia from 9/11 and the U.S. has transfused into other countries. The news has certainly perpetuated more negative, than positive, images and impressions of Muslims over the past decade or so.
*Update: more news on this here
The New York Times
BBC
It would be interesting to see the extent to which there has been Buddhist-Muslim tension and violence or if this kind of tension is relatively new by which the Islamophobia from 9/11 and the U.S. has transfused into other countries. The news has certainly perpetuated more negative, than positive, images and impressions of Muslims over the past decade or so.
*Update: more news on this here
Kauppinen reviews Audi's book on 'Moral Perception'
"In everyday parlance, we sometimes report having seen that an audience member's standing up to a sexist keynote speaker was morally good or having heard how
a husband wronged his wife. In philosophy, the idea that we can
literally perceive moral facts has not exactly been popular, but it has
had its proponents.[1] In
this volume, Robert Audi, who can lay claim to being the leading
contemporary moral epistemologist in the intuitionist tradition,
develops what is perhaps the most comprehensive defence of the
possibility of moral perception to date.
What is moral perception? Suppose I see a teenager drowning a reluctant hamster. I may form the moral belief that the action is wrong straight away, without any conscious inference. This much is common ground between proponents of moral perception and sceptics about it. But where sceptics think that the quick belief is based on non-conscious inference or association or perhaps emotional response, those who believe in moral perception take it to be based on a distinct moral perceptual experience, which can justify the belief in the same way perception in general does."
Read the rest here
What is moral perception? Suppose I see a teenager drowning a reluctant hamster. I may form the moral belief that the action is wrong straight away, without any conscious inference. This much is common ground between proponents of moral perception and sceptics about it. But where sceptics think that the quick belief is based on non-conscious inference or association or perhaps emotional response, those who believe in moral perception take it to be based on a distinct moral perceptual experience, which can justify the belief in the same way perception in general does."
Read the rest here
Physicians v. Non-physicians preference for death
" The graph below shows the answers that physicians give when asked if they would want various interventions at the bitter end. The only intervention that doctors overwhelmingly want is pain medication. In no other case do even 20% of the physicians say “yes.” "
Image from 'Sociological Images' article: "How Do Physicians and Non-Physicians Want to Die?"
Are atheists better at coping with death?
"A growing body of evidence seems to support the idea that the
nonreligious have an easier time coping with death than do the
religious, at least with their own mortality. Religious people appear to
be more afraid of death than are nonreligious people. Nonreligious
people are less likely to use aggressive means to extend their lives and
exhibit less anxiety about dying than do religious people. That seems
remarkably counterintuitive since the nonreligious are much less likely
to believe in an afterlife, which is supposed to help people cope with
death. But factor in that religious people are contemplating their
eternal fate and it begins to make more sense. Even if they have done
everything their religion says they are supposed to do, there is always a
bit of uncertainty about where they might end up. As a result,
religious people appear to have a greater fear of dying than do
nonreligious people."
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/friendlyatheist/2013/06/17/are-atheists-better-at-dying-than-the-religious/
Podcast interview with Ryan Cragun can be found here as well as more information on the book, What You Don't Know about Religion (But Should)
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/friendlyatheist/2013/06/17/are-atheists-better-at-dying-than-the-religious/
Podcast interview with Ryan Cragun can be found here as well as more information on the book, What You Don't Know about Religion (But Should)
Sunday, June 23, 2013
*Dan Dennett on the 'Wholeism' of belief
Dennett suggests on 'big think' that we should consider not as singular propositional items of cognition but rather in terms of systems or networks - what has been called "wholeism".
He begins with the assumption, it seems, that beliefs are propositional:
"An eternally appealing idea is that the brain writes sentences that store the beliefs so that when you learn that giraffes are mammals, there’s someplace in your brain where the mental word "giraffe" and the word "mammal" are tied together with an "is" or something like that. So we have a big library of sentences. Those are our beliefs."
While I think this is somewhat misleading in that beliefs can go beyond a "linguistic dogma" in terms of what we understand tacitly and believe tacitly that evades linguistic expression. Whether beliefs are stored as propositional content is also up for debate. My inclination is to suggest that beliefs are stored primarily in terms of memory. As much work in the neurosciences (neuropsychology, cognitive psychology, cognitive science, etc.) has documented and investigated extensively, we know that the hippocampus is critical in the function of memory and the category of memory has been divided in various ways. There is the semantic and episodic memory distinction, the declarative and working memory distinction, as well as a short-term and long-term distinction and there are also notes about spatial and other kinds of memory as well. Much of the investigations on memory would, in my opinion, suggest that the beliefs we have about the world are not simply in the form of propositions or simply limited to the scope of linguistic expression. While it may be the case that because we can most easily recognize beliefs through linguistic expression, and even then it is not so clear-cut in discerning which expression is one of belief or an expression of something else, such basic observation may have lead the conception of belief to be strictly propositional. However, belief can be construed in terms of bodily knowledge as well as tacit knowledge. Many of us can infer and often do infer the states of other persons by observing their actions. In other words we can formulate beliefs based on what we observe others doing. That is, we have the ability to form a theory of mind for another person. None of which is necessarily formed in propositional content or inferred from propositional content. Another example is when interacting with another person in another society where you do not know the language. And yet, we can pick up on instances of suffering, compassion, and malaise.
The second assumption that Dennet makes, which is in a way widely agreed is the stability and consistency of beliefs. What has been widely characterized as the "involuntariness" of belief. It does not change and it is consistent across contexts, i.e. "context-independent". And one of the arguments is that if it changes then it was never really belief, which is one of the arguments from John Henry Newman's An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. But many contemporary philosophers have suggested that there is an involuntary character to belief. It can be based on feelings and it is dispositional. Jonathan Cohen gives the example of observing a swerving car in front of you. By observing this, one comes to the natural inference that the car is going to crash. This is an involuntary occurrence of the belief that the car is going to crash. There are other examples of the involuntariness but I'll leave it here.
One of the contentions that can be made against the involuntary character of belief is from the anthropology literature that widely suggests that beliefs are mutable. They change over time and that a basic observance of ritual does not entail that the participants of the ritual believe in the symbolism, narrative, or meaning given to the ritual (see prior post). However, I think there is still room for debate. While anthropology hasn't made any further distinctions beyond belief to look at the various textures cognitions can have, which limits meaningful discourse about cognition and behavior, philosophy has made further distinctions such as acceptance that distinguishes itself from belief. So the issue of whether belief is involuntary or not involuntary, or whether belief is mutable or not mutable is up to debate (which in my view can be informed from some of the literature in psychology) it is not definitively resolved. Nonetheless, we can acknowledge there are beliefs with strong conviction that do not change and there are those with strong conviction that do eventually change.
However, these assumptions about belief does not discount the idea of "wholeism". What "wholeism" does suggest is that our beliefs are situated within our understanding of ourselves and the worlds we occupy. In this sense, our beliefs cannot be singularly picked out but that all beliefs are within a network or system of understanding and that beliefs "come in systems. They cohere in large clumps." This goes right to the tradition of the 'sociology of knowledge' which has sought to uncover the complexities of embodiment, habitus, and social epistemology. We are beings situated within a society from which we learn how to navigate and live in the world. So any belief that we may have is necessarily tied to other beliefs and pieces of information we hold about the world. In this regard, I would agree that "wholeism" is something that needs to be accounted for while still holding reservations about whether beliefs are propositional and involuntary.
He begins with the assumption, it seems, that beliefs are propositional:
"An eternally appealing idea is that the brain writes sentences that store the beliefs so that when you learn that giraffes are mammals, there’s someplace in your brain where the mental word "giraffe" and the word "mammal" are tied together with an "is" or something like that. So we have a big library of sentences. Those are our beliefs."
While I think this is somewhat misleading in that beliefs can go beyond a "linguistic dogma" in terms of what we understand tacitly and believe tacitly that evades linguistic expression. Whether beliefs are stored as propositional content is also up for debate. My inclination is to suggest that beliefs are stored primarily in terms of memory. As much work in the neurosciences (neuropsychology, cognitive psychology, cognitive science, etc.) has documented and investigated extensively, we know that the hippocampus is critical in the function of memory and the category of memory has been divided in various ways. There is the semantic and episodic memory distinction, the declarative and working memory distinction, as well as a short-term and long-term distinction and there are also notes about spatial and other kinds of memory as well. Much of the investigations on memory would, in my opinion, suggest that the beliefs we have about the world are not simply in the form of propositions or simply limited to the scope of linguistic expression. While it may be the case that because we can most easily recognize beliefs through linguistic expression, and even then it is not so clear-cut in discerning which expression is one of belief or an expression of something else, such basic observation may have lead the conception of belief to be strictly propositional. However, belief can be construed in terms of bodily knowledge as well as tacit knowledge. Many of us can infer and often do infer the states of other persons by observing their actions. In other words we can formulate beliefs based on what we observe others doing. That is, we have the ability to form a theory of mind for another person. None of which is necessarily formed in propositional content or inferred from propositional content. Another example is when interacting with another person in another society where you do not know the language. And yet, we can pick up on instances of suffering, compassion, and malaise.
The second assumption that Dennet makes, which is in a way widely agreed is the stability and consistency of beliefs. What has been widely characterized as the "involuntariness" of belief. It does not change and it is consistent across contexts, i.e. "context-independent". And one of the arguments is that if it changes then it was never really belief, which is one of the arguments from John Henry Newman's An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. But many contemporary philosophers have suggested that there is an involuntary character to belief. It can be based on feelings and it is dispositional. Jonathan Cohen gives the example of observing a swerving car in front of you. By observing this, one comes to the natural inference that the car is going to crash. This is an involuntary occurrence of the belief that the car is going to crash. There are other examples of the involuntariness but I'll leave it here.
One of the contentions that can be made against the involuntary character of belief is from the anthropology literature that widely suggests that beliefs are mutable. They change over time and that a basic observance of ritual does not entail that the participants of the ritual believe in the symbolism, narrative, or meaning given to the ritual (see prior post). However, I think there is still room for debate. While anthropology hasn't made any further distinctions beyond belief to look at the various textures cognitions can have, which limits meaningful discourse about cognition and behavior, philosophy has made further distinctions such as acceptance that distinguishes itself from belief. So the issue of whether belief is involuntary or not involuntary, or whether belief is mutable or not mutable is up to debate (which in my view can be informed from some of the literature in psychology) it is not definitively resolved. Nonetheless, we can acknowledge there are beliefs with strong conviction that do not change and there are those with strong conviction that do eventually change.
However, these assumptions about belief does not discount the idea of "wholeism". What "wholeism" does suggest is that our beliefs are situated within our understanding of ourselves and the worlds we occupy. In this sense, our beliefs cannot be singularly picked out but that all beliefs are within a network or system of understanding and that beliefs "come in systems. They cohere in large clumps." This goes right to the tradition of the 'sociology of knowledge' which has sought to uncover the complexities of embodiment, habitus, and social epistemology. We are beings situated within a society from which we learn how to navigate and live in the world. So any belief that we may have is necessarily tied to other beliefs and pieces of information we hold about the world. In this regard, I would agree that "wholeism" is something that needs to be accounted for while still holding reservations about whether beliefs are propositional and involuntary.
Ritual as symbol of social dependency
"Throughout most of our species’ history, ritual behavior has been far
more critical than belief. Ritual solidified the group and the group
was essential to everyone’s survival. In the past, a solitary human was a
dead human. Our ancestors understood that brute fact. Believe what you
want, but you will sing and dance with the tribe because
without the tribe your life is worthless. And without you, the tribe is
weakened. The Andes’ survivors were violently and shockingly transported
back to that ancient calculus and they responded accordingly.
Fretting over correct belief is a recent and rather Christian obsession. In traditional Judaism, theological commitments take a back seat to behavior. A good Jew follows God’s laws. Whether he or she actually believes in God is secondary (not irrelevant or unimportant, but secondary). The same is true with ritual participation. While the beliefs behind ritual are not trivial, they are not the most important thing. What’s most important is that ritual is an acknowledgement of our communal dependency. No one is an island. Ritual reminds us that we are part of something larger than ourselves and that makes us stronger – doubts and all."
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/mortal-rituals/201306/behavior-over-belief
Fretting over correct belief is a recent and rather Christian obsession. In traditional Judaism, theological commitments take a back seat to behavior. A good Jew follows God’s laws. Whether he or she actually believes in God is secondary (not irrelevant or unimportant, but secondary). The same is true with ritual participation. While the beliefs behind ritual are not trivial, they are not the most important thing. What’s most important is that ritual is an acknowledgement of our communal dependency. No one is an island. Ritual reminds us that we are part of something larger than ourselves and that makes us stronger – doubts and all."
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/mortal-rituals/201306/behavior-over-belief
Friday, June 21, 2013
Interview with Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir
More videos related to Sartre and de Beauvoir on youtube
Wednesday, June 19, 2013
About Grief
Paul Thagard gives "5 facts" about grief he learned from Ruth Davis Konigsberg's The Truth about Grief.
"1. The five-stage model of grief is dubious. Many people have heard of Elisabeth Kübler-Ross's account of the stages of grief: denial, anger, bargaining, depression and acceptance. But she never had more than a few stories to provide evidence that grief develops in these stages. More careful research has found that acceptance commonly occurs early in the process of recovery from grief.
2. Repressing emotions can be good. Konigsberg describes the important research of George Bonanno, who found that "repressive coping" works well for many people.
3. Men suffer at least as much from bereavement as women. Contrary to the popular stereotype of women as more dependent and emotional, widowers often suffer more grief than widows.
4. People recover from grief. Despite the huge pain of major losses, most people no longer have major problems dealing with life by 18 months afterward.
5. Counseling may not be beneficial. When a graduate student in my department was murdered in 2003, the university brought in counselors to talk to the faculty and students. Such counseling has become a common part of responses to disasters, but it is an empirical question whether it actually helps people recover faster and better. An extensive review of relevant studies found no evidence that counseling was more effective for most people than the simple passing of time."
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/hot-thought/201109/facts-about-grief
"1. The five-stage model of grief is dubious. Many people have heard of Elisabeth Kübler-Ross's account of the stages of grief: denial, anger, bargaining, depression and acceptance. But she never had more than a few stories to provide evidence that grief develops in these stages. More careful research has found that acceptance commonly occurs early in the process of recovery from grief.
2. Repressing emotions can be good. Konigsberg describes the important research of George Bonanno, who found that "repressive coping" works well for many people.
3. Men suffer at least as much from bereavement as women. Contrary to the popular stereotype of women as more dependent and emotional, widowers often suffer more grief than widows.
4. People recover from grief. Despite the huge pain of major losses, most people no longer have major problems dealing with life by 18 months afterward.
5. Counseling may not be beneficial. When a graduate student in my department was murdered in 2003, the university brought in counselors to talk to the faculty and students. Such counseling has become a common part of responses to disasters, but it is an empirical question whether it actually helps people recover faster and better. An extensive review of relevant studies found no evidence that counseling was more effective for most people than the simple passing of time."
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/hot-thought/201109/facts-about-grief
Impact of [Childhood] Trauma on Emotional Well-Being
by: Dan Edmunds
"Whereas I find the various disorders in the DSM IV to be highly subjective, they are mainly a listing of certain behavioral traits manifested by certain individuals. It is my proposition that behind all of these behavioral traits lies traumatic experience, and that based on age of the time of trauma, the nature of the trauma, and environmental factors will have a role in what reaction occurs and what behaviors are displayed.
"Trauma which occurs that is less intense and can be more readily resolved would fall into the classification of what is labeled, "Adjustment Disorders". Lochner, et. al (2002) in the study, "Childhood trauma and obsessive compulsive disorders' found a significant higher level of childhood trauma, particularly emotional neglect in adults who later manifested obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). In OCD, the trauma occurs in childhood and the environment is one that is chaotic, and the child begins to feel the need to have a semblance of control. It is through the obsessive-compulsive rituals that the child then begins to feel that they are able to take control over some aspect of their lives. Anxiety and panic concerns can also be seen to be trauma related. Exposure to a fear invoking event or 'flashbacks' to a traumatic event through a new precipitating trigger can evoke the panic response. Being that the various psychological 'disorders' are connected to trauma, it is logical that this is the factor that must be addressed and the use of psychotropic drugs in 'treatment' would only be subduing behaviors and numbing the impact of the trauma without truly ever addressing the core issue which has led to the psychological distress. Therefore, it is important that clinician's begin to truly examine the experience of children and adolescents and begin to understand the role and impact of traumatic experience in their lives. It is necessary for the adults in the life of the child to begin to address the factors in the environment which may perpetuate distress and to aid the child in development of adaptive coping responses and the ability to resolve the inner conflicts arising from the traumatic experiences.
A society can be judged by how it treats its children, even those most troubled and disturbed. Many choose to 'throw away' those children who are deemed delinquent. But how did they become that way? It is not just their choices but it is also the failure of adults in their lives to truly reach out and guide these children. Court systems, Child Protective services, and our educational systems fail these children time and time again. They are shuffled off to placements and through psychiatric ceremonials only to become more bitter, more hardened, more distressed, and more disturbed. We should be investing our time to teach new skills, to change the frame of reference, to show compassion and wisdom. We must have patience and journey with these children, to know that someone truly cares and that their pains and hurts need not be self-destructive. But the issue remains greed. It is profitable to keep the status quo, the psychiatric establishment profits and so do others. No one wants to take the time to bother with these children, few are interested in social justice, and few want to give the things that would truly rehabilitate."
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/extreme-states-mind/201306/the-impact-trauma-emotional-well-being
"Whereas I find the various disorders in the DSM IV to be highly subjective, they are mainly a listing of certain behavioral traits manifested by certain individuals. It is my proposition that behind all of these behavioral traits lies traumatic experience, and that based on age of the time of trauma, the nature of the trauma, and environmental factors will have a role in what reaction occurs and what behaviors are displayed.
"Trauma which occurs that is less intense and can be more readily resolved would fall into the classification of what is labeled, "Adjustment Disorders". Lochner, et. al (2002) in the study, "Childhood trauma and obsessive compulsive disorders' found a significant higher level of childhood trauma, particularly emotional neglect in adults who later manifested obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). In OCD, the trauma occurs in childhood and the environment is one that is chaotic, and the child begins to feel the need to have a semblance of control. It is through the obsessive-compulsive rituals that the child then begins to feel that they are able to take control over some aspect of their lives. Anxiety and panic concerns can also be seen to be trauma related. Exposure to a fear invoking event or 'flashbacks' to a traumatic event through a new precipitating trigger can evoke the panic response. Being that the various psychological 'disorders' are connected to trauma, it is logical that this is the factor that must be addressed and the use of psychotropic drugs in 'treatment' would only be subduing behaviors and numbing the impact of the trauma without truly ever addressing the core issue which has led to the psychological distress. Therefore, it is important that clinician's begin to truly examine the experience of children and adolescents and begin to understand the role and impact of traumatic experience in their lives. It is necessary for the adults in the life of the child to begin to address the factors in the environment which may perpetuate distress and to aid the child in development of adaptive coping responses and the ability to resolve the inner conflicts arising from the traumatic experiences.
A society can be judged by how it treats its children, even those most troubled and disturbed. Many choose to 'throw away' those children who are deemed delinquent. But how did they become that way? It is not just their choices but it is also the failure of adults in their lives to truly reach out and guide these children. Court systems, Child Protective services, and our educational systems fail these children time and time again. They are shuffled off to placements and through psychiatric ceremonials only to become more bitter, more hardened, more distressed, and more disturbed. We should be investing our time to teach new skills, to change the frame of reference, to show compassion and wisdom. We must have patience and journey with these children, to know that someone truly cares and that their pains and hurts need not be self-destructive. But the issue remains greed. It is profitable to keep the status quo, the psychiatric establishment profits and so do others. No one wants to take the time to bother with these children, few are interested in social justice, and few want to give the things that would truly rehabilitate."
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/extreme-states-mind/201306/the-impact-trauma-emotional-well-being
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death
Published 2012, Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman, and Jens Johansson (eds.)
book can be found here
A review can be found here in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
First paragraph of the review:
"The editors have chosen to emphasize work on death from an analytical and metaphysical perspective. Not all of the 21 articles in this 500-page collection reflect this approach to the same degree. As we shall see, the editors' methodological orientation brings out some distinctive and interesting work. This volume will be of particular interest to philosophers who want to explore the way death challenges our commitments to concepts and theories of personal identity, time, and harm, as well as the way in which metaphysical possibility can help us explore some of the questions we want to ask about death. The latter include "When do things die?" (also the title of the first article) and "Is there anything about me that could survive death?". Questions about the kinds of harm that death causes or can cause arise in a number of articles, including Steven Luper's, "Retroactive Harms and Wrongs." Another theme in the text, which reflects the continuing importance of Epicurean thought to a philosophy of death, is Epicurus' challenging thesis that "Death is nothing to us." A very interesting article by Alastair Norcross near the end of the collection asks whether death has the same significance for animals and humans."
book can be found here
A review can be found here in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
First paragraph of the review:
"The editors have chosen to emphasize work on death from an analytical and metaphysical perspective. Not all of the 21 articles in this 500-page collection reflect this approach to the same degree. As we shall see, the editors' methodological orientation brings out some distinctive and interesting work. This volume will be of particular interest to philosophers who want to explore the way death challenges our commitments to concepts and theories of personal identity, time, and harm, as well as the way in which metaphysical possibility can help us explore some of the questions we want to ask about death. The latter include "When do things die?" (also the title of the first article) and "Is there anything about me that could survive death?". Questions about the kinds of harm that death causes or can cause arise in a number of articles, including Steven Luper's, "Retroactive Harms and Wrongs." Another theme in the text, which reflects the continuing importance of Epicurean thought to a philosophy of death, is Epicurus' challenging thesis that "Death is nothing to us." A very interesting article by Alastair Norcross near the end of the collection asks whether death has the same significance for animals and humans."
Monday, June 17, 2013
Sunday, June 16, 2013
Negotiating between empathy and disgust
"Rats don't usually come out into daylight, especially not on a busy
morning in New York City. But there it was, head awkwardly jutting out
in front of its body, swinging from side to side. What injured the
creature, I have no idea, but its hind legs could no longer support its
weight. The rat dragged them like a kid drags a garbage bag that parents
have asked be taken out–reluctantly. The muscles in the front legs
rippled as they propelled the body forward along the sidewalk. The
rodent was surprisingly quick considering the injury. But its
aimlessness suggested distress."
more here
more here
New appointed prelate for the Vatican bank
The Vatican Bank has had troubles in the past with accusations of money-laundering, scandals, and corruption.
Pope Francis backed the decision and "The Vatican said Monsignor Battista Mario Salvatore Ricca had been approved as interim prelate of the Institute for Religious Works, as the bank is known."
Pope Francis backed the decision and "The Vatican said Monsignor Battista Mario Salvatore Ricca had been approved as interim prelate of the Institute for Religious Works, as the bank is known."
Michael Perry on 'The Morality of Human Rights'
Michael Perry is one of the major figures in religion and law, he is a Prof. at Emory University's Center for the Study of Law and Religion.
I've copied the abstract of his paper, 'The Morality of Human Rights' (full paper can be found here at SSRN):
I begin, in the first section of this essay, by explaining what the term “human right” means in the context of the internationalization of human rights. I also explain both the sense in which some human rights are, in some legal systems, “legal” rights and the sense in which all human rights are “moral” rights.
Then, in the longer second section, I turn to the inquiry that is my principal concern in this essay: Why should one take seriously the imperative that serves, in the morality of human rights, as the normative ground of human rights? That is, what reason or reasons does one have, if any, to live one’s life in accord with the imperative to “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood”?
This essay, the final draft of which will be published in a symposium issue of the San Diego Law Review, was my contribution to the conference on “The Status of International Law and International Human Rights” that was held at the University of San Diego School of Law on May 3-4, 2013, under the auspices of the School’s Institute of Law and Philosophy. Some of the material in this essay is drawn from my new book, Human Rights in the Constitutional Law of the United States (2013). Most of the material here that is not drawn from my book was first presented in a lecture I was honored to deliver at Santa Clara University in March 2013, under the auspices of the Bannon Institute of the Ignatian Center for Jesuit Education.
http://www.religiousleftlaw.com/2013/06/the-morality-of-human-rights.html
I've copied the abstract of his paper, 'The Morality of Human Rights' (full paper can be found here at SSRN):
In
the period since the end of the Second World War, there has emerged what never
before existed: a truly global morality. That morality — which I call “the
morality of human rights” — consists not only of various rights recognized by
the great majority of the countries of the world as human rights, but also of a
fundamental imperative that directs “all human beings” to “act towards one
another in a spirit of brotherhood.” The imperative — articulated in the very
first article of the foundational human rights document of our time, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights — is fundamental in the sense that it
serves, in the morality of human rights, as the normative ground of human
rights.
I begin, in the first section of this essay, by explaining what the term “human right” means in the context of the internationalization of human rights. I also explain both the sense in which some human rights are, in some legal systems, “legal” rights and the sense in which all human rights are “moral” rights.
Then, in the longer second section, I turn to the inquiry that is my principal concern in this essay: Why should one take seriously the imperative that serves, in the morality of human rights, as the normative ground of human rights? That is, what reason or reasons does one have, if any, to live one’s life in accord with the imperative to “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood”?
This essay, the final draft of which will be published in a symposium issue of the San Diego Law Review, was my contribution to the conference on “The Status of International Law and International Human Rights” that was held at the University of San Diego School of Law on May 3-4, 2013, under the auspices of the School’s Institute of Law and Philosophy. Some of the material in this essay is drawn from my new book, Human Rights in the Constitutional Law of the United States (2013). Most of the material here that is not drawn from my book was first presented in a lecture I was honored to deliver at Santa Clara University in March 2013, under the auspices of the Bannon Institute of the Ignatian Center for Jesuit Education. - See more at: http://www.religiousleftlaw.com/2013/06/the-morality-of-human-rights.html?utm_source=feedly&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Religiousleftlawcom+(ReligiousLeftLaw.com)#sthash.2Ifrksfl.dpuf
In the
period since the end of the Second World War, there has emerged what
never before existed: a truly global morality. That morality — which I
call “the morality of human rights” — consists not only of various
rights recognized by the great majority of the countries of the world as
human rights, but also of a fundamental imperative that directs “all
human beings” to “act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”
The imperative — articulated in the very first article of the
foundational human rights document of our time, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights — is fundamental in the sense that it
serves, in the morality of human rights, as the normative ground of
human rights. I begin, in the first section of this essay, by explaining what the term “human right” means in the context of the internationalization of human rights. I also explain both the sense in which some human rights are, in some legal systems, “legal” rights and the sense in which all human rights are “moral” rights.
Then, in the longer second section, I turn to the inquiry that is my principal concern in this essay: Why should one take seriously the imperative that serves, in the morality of human rights, as the normative ground of human rights? That is, what reason or reasons does one have, if any, to live one’s life in accord with the imperative to “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood”?
This essay, the final draft of which will be published in a symposium issue of the San Diego Law Review, was my contribution to the conference on “The Status of International Law and International Human Rights” that was held at the University of San Diego School of Law on May 3-4, 2013, under the auspices of the School’s Institute of Law and Philosophy. Some of the material in this essay is drawn from my new book, Human Rights in the Constitutional Law of the United States (2013). Most of the material here that is not drawn from my book was first presented in a lecture I was honored to deliver at Santa Clara University in March 2013, under the auspices of the Bannon Institute of the Ignatian Center for Jesuit Education. - See more at: http://www.religiousleftlaw.com/2013/06/the-morality-of-human-rights.html?utm_source=feedly&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Religiousleftlawcom+(ReligiousLeftLaw.com)#sthash.2Ifrksfl.dpuf
I begin, in the first section of this essay, by explaining what the term “human right” means in the context of the internationalization of human rights. I also explain both the sense in which some human rights are, in some legal systems, “legal” rights and the sense in which all human rights are “moral” rights.
Then, in the longer second section, I turn to the inquiry that is my principal concern in this essay: Why should one take seriously the imperative that serves, in the morality of human rights, as the normative ground of human rights? That is, what reason or reasons does one have, if any, to live one’s life in accord with the imperative to “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood”?
This essay, the final draft of which will be published in a symposium issue of the San Diego Law Review, was my contribution to the conference on “The Status of International Law and International Human Rights” that was held at the University of San Diego School of Law on May 3-4, 2013, under the auspices of the School’s Institute of Law and Philosophy. Some of the material in this essay is drawn from my new book, Human Rights in the Constitutional Law of the United States (2013). Most of the material here that is not drawn from my book was first presented in a lecture I was honored to deliver at Santa Clara University in March 2013, under the auspices of the Bannon Institute of the Ignatian Center for Jesuit Education.
http://www.religiousleftlaw.com/2013/06/the-morality-of-human-rights.html
In
the period since the end of the Second World War, there has emerged what never
before existed: a truly global morality. That morality — which I call “the
morality of human rights” — consists not only of various rights recognized by
the great majority of the countries of the world as human rights, but also of a
fundamental imperative that directs “all human beings” to “act towards one
another in a spirit of brotherhood.” The imperative — articulated in the very
first article of the foundational human rights document of our time, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights — is fundamental in the sense that it
serves, in the morality of human rights, as the normative ground of human
rights.
I begin, in the first section of this essay, by explaining what the term “human right” means in the context of the internationalization of human rights. I also explain both the sense in which some human rights are, in some legal systems, “legal” rights and the sense in which all human rights are “moral” rights.
Then, in the longer second section, I turn to the inquiry that is my principal concern in this essay: Why should one take seriously the imperative that serves, in the morality of human rights, as the normative ground of human rights? That is, what reason or reasons does one have, if any, to live one’s life in accord with the imperative to “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood”?
This essay, the final draft of which will be published in a symposium issue of the San Diego Law Review, was my contribution to the conference on “The Status of International Law and International Human Rights” that was held at the University of San Diego School of Law on May 3-4, 2013, under the auspices of the School’s Institute of Law and Philosophy. Some of the material in this essay is drawn from my new book, Human Rights in the Constitutional Law of the United States (2013). Most of the material here that is not drawn from my book was first presented in a lecture I was honored to deliver at Santa Clara University in March 2013, under the auspices of the Bannon Institute of the Ignatian Center for Jesuit Education. - See more at: http://www.religiousleftlaw.com/2013/06/the-morality-of-human-rights.html?utm_source=feedly&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Religiousleftlawcom+(ReligiousLeftLaw.com)#sthash.2Ifrksfl.dpuf
I begin, in the first section of this essay, by explaining what the term “human right” means in the context of the internationalization of human rights. I also explain both the sense in which some human rights are, in some legal systems, “legal” rights and the sense in which all human rights are “moral” rights.
Then, in the longer second section, I turn to the inquiry that is my principal concern in this essay: Why should one take seriously the imperative that serves, in the morality of human rights, as the normative ground of human rights? That is, what reason or reasons does one have, if any, to live one’s life in accord with the imperative to “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood”?
This essay, the final draft of which will be published in a symposium issue of the San Diego Law Review, was my contribution to the conference on “The Status of International Law and International Human Rights” that was held at the University of San Diego School of Law on May 3-4, 2013, under the auspices of the School’s Institute of Law and Philosophy. Some of the material in this essay is drawn from my new book, Human Rights in the Constitutional Law of the United States (2013). Most of the material here that is not drawn from my book was first presented in a lecture I was honored to deliver at Santa Clara University in March 2013, under the auspices of the Bannon Institute of the Ignatian Center for Jesuit Education. - See more at: http://www.religiousleftlaw.com/2013/06/the-morality-of-human-rights.html?utm_source=feedly&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Religiousleftlawcom+(ReligiousLeftLaw.com)#sthash.2Ifrksfl.dpuf
Taoism (Daoism) and Martial Arts
New documentary film, 'Opening Dao', trailer here:
Full movie here: http://www.lifeartsmedia.com/opening-dao-taoism-martial-arts-documentary
Full movie here: http://www.lifeartsmedia.com/opening-dao-taoism-martial-arts-documentary
Wednesday, June 12, 2013
study on Suicide risk factors by team in Sweden and Stanford
"This shows that many had contact with the health service a
relatively short time before committing suicide. The results have
clinical significance for those working in both primary care and other
out-patient and in-patient care, including psychiatry. Besides the
health service, social support services may need to be involved in the
work to reduce the number of suicides in society," concludes Jan
Sundquist.
Results:
Depression (32-fold risk for suicide), anxiety (15-fold risk), COPD (3.05-fold risk), asthma (2.25-fold risk), stroke (1.67-fold risk) and cancer (1.72-fold risk). Those who have poor social networks are also at higher risk of suicide (e.g. divorced 2.25-fold risk).
About the study:
The researchers used the Swedish population and health register and were therefore able to follow over seven million adults between 2001 and 2008. Of these, 8,721 committed suicide.
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/06/130610084132.htm
Results:
Depression (32-fold risk for suicide), anxiety (15-fold risk), COPD (3.05-fold risk), asthma (2.25-fold risk), stroke (1.67-fold risk) and cancer (1.72-fold risk). Those who have poor social networks are also at higher risk of suicide (e.g. divorced 2.25-fold risk).
About the study:
The researchers used the Swedish population and health register and were therefore able to follow over seven million adults between 2001 and 2008. Of these, 8,721 committed suicide.
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/06/130610084132.htm
Negative emotions help achieve well-being
"In the midst of a culture that appraises positivity far above
negativity, or even a balanced view of reality, psychologists say now is
an equally important time to accept the trials of life for what they
are. "In fact, anger and sadness are an important part of life,
and new research shows that experiencing and accepting such emotions are
vital to our mental health. Attempting to suppress thoughts can backfire and even diminish our sense of contentment. 'Acknowledging the complexity of life may be an especially fruitful path to psychological well-being,' says psychologist Jonathan M. Adler." "
Sunday, June 9, 2013
Friday, June 7, 2013
Cree nation win right to go to trial
Sad when it's considered a victory for a 'right' to go to trial for treaty violations...
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/alberta-first-nations-band-wins-right-to-trial-over-oil-sands-effect-on-treaty-rights/article12353571/
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/alberta-first-nations-band-wins-right-to-trial-over-oil-sands-effect-on-treaty-rights/article12353571/
The Catholics these days
Pretty cool. Is this a return to liberation theology?
Pope Francis criticizes the "throwaway culture" (how much food we waste and how much we hurt the environment-creation) and US Catholic bishops write to the G8 to do more for the poor.
'President of USCCB Joins Other Bishops' Conferences in Letter to Leaders of G8 Nations; Urges Them to Protect the Poor, Address Fair Trade, Transparency': http://www.usccb.org/news/2013/13-104.cfm
Pope Francis criticizes the "throwaway culture" (how much food we waste and how much we hurt the environment-creation) and US Catholic bishops write to the G8 to do more for the poor.
'President of USCCB Joins Other Bishops' Conferences in Letter to Leaders of G8 Nations; Urges Them to Protect the Poor, Address Fair Trade, Transparency': http://www.usccb.org/news/2013/13-104.cfm
*Religious leaders and mental health
White house brought in religious leaders to discuss mental health issues
"Religious leaders were among those attending a special White House meeting this week on mental illness. President Obama hosted the group saying he wanted a more robust national discussion about mental health. He said mental illness left untreated could lead to tragedies like the Newtown school shooting. The president called on houses of worship and other religious institutions to help people recognize mental health problems and get the treatment they need."
I wonder to what extent can religious leaders accurately identify those with a "mental illness". I can see some religious organizations want to identify homosexuality or atheism as a mental illness. While this is purely speculative in what they could or could not do, it seems ironic to ask religious leaders to help with mental illness. Some religious traditions talk about the power of God, which have prompted some to pray for God to cure a loved one instead of seeking medical help. It is widely known that spirituality and religion has been acknowledged to help with mental health but religion as a social force can also increase the domain of what the marginal is; an expanding inclusion to the "other". I am for the increased awareness of religious leaders on mental health issues and have no qualm against religious organizations seeking to help with therapeutic administration of treatment methods to patients. But it should stop there. Religious leaders are not qualified to make the judgments of a psychologist or a psychiatrist - I mean shit, even they have problems in how to categorize and qualify. Even still, there are dangers when a religious leader of credibility and merit in a society recommends somebody to a mental health facility. It is not uncommon for such institutions to take patients on the recommendation of a respected social figure of the community and place them in their "care". I don't recall the name of the study, but there were a few researchers who admitted themselves to a mental health instution and acted as they would under normal circumstances and the only persons who could identify them as not having a mental health concern were the other patients. The nurses and the doctors were not able to recognize that there was nothing particularly "wrong" with them in their mental health (might have to go look up the study but it exists).
This video seems like a religious twist on Foucault (oddly he keeps coming back). Instead of sending the marginalized to a mental health facility, send 'em to church....
"Religious leaders were among those attending a special White House meeting this week on mental illness. President Obama hosted the group saying he wanted a more robust national discussion about mental health. He said mental illness left untreated could lead to tragedies like the Newtown school shooting. The president called on houses of worship and other religious institutions to help people recognize mental health problems and get the treatment they need."
I wonder to what extent can religious leaders accurately identify those with a "mental illness". I can see some religious organizations want to identify homosexuality or atheism as a mental illness. While this is purely speculative in what they could or could not do, it seems ironic to ask religious leaders to help with mental illness. Some religious traditions talk about the power of God, which have prompted some to pray for God to cure a loved one instead of seeking medical help. It is widely known that spirituality and religion has been acknowledged to help with mental health but religion as a social force can also increase the domain of what the marginal is; an expanding inclusion to the "other". I am for the increased awareness of religious leaders on mental health issues and have no qualm against religious organizations seeking to help with therapeutic administration of treatment methods to patients. But it should stop there. Religious leaders are not qualified to make the judgments of a psychologist or a psychiatrist - I mean shit, even they have problems in how to categorize and qualify. Even still, there are dangers when a religious leader of credibility and merit in a society recommends somebody to a mental health facility. It is not uncommon for such institutions to take patients on the recommendation of a respected social figure of the community and place them in their "care". I don't recall the name of the study, but there were a few researchers who admitted themselves to a mental health instution and acted as they would under normal circumstances and the only persons who could identify them as not having a mental health concern were the other patients. The nurses and the doctors were not able to recognize that there was nothing particularly "wrong" with them in their mental health (might have to go look up the study but it exists).
Watch Churches and the Mentally Ill on PBS. See more from Religion & Ethics NewsWeekly.
This video seems like a religious twist on Foucault (oddly he keeps coming back). Instead of sending the marginalized to a mental health facility, send 'em to church....
Thursday, June 6, 2013
Boards of Canada - Reach for the Dead
From their upcoming album 'Tomorrow's Harvest'
http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/2013/jun/06/boards-of-canada-become-more-nihilistic
http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/2013/jun/06/boards-of-canada-become-more-nihilistic
Scientism as effective as Religion in stressful situations
The distinction between scientisim and science should be drawn here - where scientism is a dogmatic view of science as the answer to all and the normative standard for value and how people should live their lives. Science itself, is much aware of its limitations and extends no further than the method and the theories that drive the investigation. It does not purport to make any further value claims. For example, science can investigate the relationship between fast food and cholesterol. But it does not extend so far as to state that people should or should not eat fast food. Scientism would pronounce the latter by making a value judgment based on what they think the sciene is.
Having said this, scientism and a belief in the value of science as the normative source of knowledge and morality can function in the same capacity as religious beliefs in stressful situations - or so a study by a group of Oxford Experimental Psychologists say
Having said this, scientism and a belief in the value of science as the normative source of knowledge and morality can function in the same capacity as religious beliefs in stressful situations - or so a study by a group of Oxford Experimental Psychologists say
Wednesday, June 5, 2013
Jennifer Lackey interviewed by 3AM: On Testimony
Here she discusses the distinctions between summative and non-summative accounts of social epistemology; this is basically an epistemology regarding the individual grains of sand and the collective pile of sand. She also discusses her views on the epistemology of testimony and whether it is justified or not (this is ultimately a normative account of whether one is justified in accepting or not justified in accepting another's testimony). She later transitions into a descriptive account of knowledge and its generativity via testimony and memory. Good stuff here, though she somewhat seemingly binds herself to a linguistic dogma of knowledge and testimony...while she wants to incorporate the reductionist views of accepting testimony based on one's own prior 'knowledge'...
Seems worth reading more of her work:
"The book that ignited my interest in testimony is C.A.J. Coady’s Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). While I disagree with much of what Coady argues in this book, it was the first book-length treatment of the topic of testimony, and it is really a fabulous introduction to the key issues in this area.
Alvin Goldman is arguably the father of social epistemology, and his Knowledge in a Social World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) contains articles addressing many of the central topics in this area of philosophy, showing both the breadth and depth of social epistemology.
Sanford Goldberg’s Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) develops the extent to which we are epistemically dependent on others, further cementing the importance of testimony in epistemology.
My current work in collective epistemology has benefited enormously from Margaret Gilbert’s On Social Facts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), which is impressively comprehensive in its consideration of issues in this area. It is an absolute must-read for anyone interested in groups and related phenomena.
The collection of essays edited by Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield, Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) inspired much of the recent interest in the epistemology of disagreement, including my own, and contains many of the articles at the center of the debates in this area."
Seems worth reading more of her work:
- Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge (2008), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- The Epistemology of Testimony (2006), co-edited with Ernest Sosa. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Volume of all new articles in the epistemology of testimony. This collection includes papers by Robert Audi, C.A.J. Coady, Elizabeth Fricker, Richard Fumerton, Sanford Goldberg, Peter Graham, Jennifer Lackey, Keith Lehrer, Richard Moran, Frederick Schmitt, Ernest Sosa, and James Van Cleve.
"The book that ignited my interest in testimony is C.A.J. Coady’s Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). While I disagree with much of what Coady argues in this book, it was the first book-length treatment of the topic of testimony, and it is really a fabulous introduction to the key issues in this area.
Alvin Goldman is arguably the father of social epistemology, and his Knowledge in a Social World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) contains articles addressing many of the central topics in this area of philosophy, showing both the breadth and depth of social epistemology.
Sanford Goldberg’s Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) develops the extent to which we are epistemically dependent on others, further cementing the importance of testimony in epistemology.
My current work in collective epistemology has benefited enormously from Margaret Gilbert’s On Social Facts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), which is impressively comprehensive in its consideration of issues in this area. It is an absolute must-read for anyone interested in groups and related phenomena.
The collection of essays edited by Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield, Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) inspired much of the recent interest in the epistemology of disagreement, including my own, and contains many of the articles at the center of the debates in this area."
*Science can cure religious fundamentalism?
Kathleen Taylor from the University of Oxford is suggesting that 'one day' religious fundamentalism may be classified as a mental disorder and treated as a curable mental disorder...
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/31/kathleen-taylor-religious-fundamentalism-mental-illness_n_3365896.html?utm_hp_ref=mostpopular
I find this dangerous and misleading...the first bells that go off in my mind are Foucault's critique of mental health and power. By doing this we marginalize and cast away those we do not want in our society. One easy way to do it outside of the criminal justice system is the mental health system. They are the abnormals of our society.
Secondly, Taylor's vision fails to recognize those who effectively leave fundamentalist groups or whatever radical abusive "belief systems" they adopt. Granted that there must be neural activity in relation to the way persons think about certain things including those that are considered to be most radical. It does not extend that they are necessarily "mental disorders." This is folly and falls into an elusive domain of how to categorize mental disorders. Talking about 'down's syndrome' or some other neurodegenerative disorder like parkinson's is not quite the same as talking about fundamental Christians or fundamental Muslims.
I haven't read her book, The Brain Supremacy, so I can't formulate a complete opinion of her views but I am weary of this idea of hers equating "brainwashed" individuals as a mental disorder. The criteria of "brainwashed" is problematic and...if we wanted to we could include any number of those persons with dogmatic beliefs in what is correct and incorrect or right and wrong. Hell, we could label those who love Ayn Rand as brainwashed and in need of treatment for their mental disorder...
A thought-provoking suggestion nonetheless...
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/31/kathleen-taylor-religious-fundamentalism-mental-illness_n_3365896.html?utm_hp_ref=mostpopular
I find this dangerous and misleading...the first bells that go off in my mind are Foucault's critique of mental health and power. By doing this we marginalize and cast away those we do not want in our society. One easy way to do it outside of the criminal justice system is the mental health system. They are the abnormals of our society.
Secondly, Taylor's vision fails to recognize those who effectively leave fundamentalist groups or whatever radical abusive "belief systems" they adopt. Granted that there must be neural activity in relation to the way persons think about certain things including those that are considered to be most radical. It does not extend that they are necessarily "mental disorders." This is folly and falls into an elusive domain of how to categorize mental disorders. Talking about 'down's syndrome' or some other neurodegenerative disorder like parkinson's is not quite the same as talking about fundamental Christians or fundamental Muslims.
I haven't read her book, The Brain Supremacy, so I can't formulate a complete opinion of her views but I am weary of this idea of hers equating "brainwashed" individuals as a mental disorder. The criteria of "brainwashed" is problematic and...if we wanted to we could include any number of those persons with dogmatic beliefs in what is correct and incorrect or right and wrong. Hell, we could label those who love Ayn Rand as brainwashed and in need of treatment for their mental disorder...
A thought-provoking suggestion nonetheless...
Tuesday, June 4, 2013
Buddhist-Muslim Violence in Myanmar
Apparently what began as a local dispute between a Muslim man and a Buddhist woman has escalated into level of mob violence between what is characterised as Muslims and Buddhists.
I've been wondering for some time now whether it is accurate to call these disputes and forms of violence as something that occurs between Muslims and Buddhists. In Nigeria there are similar claims of Christians and Muslims. But are these the best way to characterize this kind of group violence? Are the two groups strictly drawn between religious affiliations or is there something else at work here and the media just finds it easy to characterize the violence in terms of religious group association.
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/headlines/buddhist-muslim-violence-escalates-in-burma/16763/?utm_source=feedly
I've been wondering for some time now whether it is accurate to call these disputes and forms of violence as something that occurs between Muslims and Buddhists. In Nigeria there are similar claims of Christians and Muslims. But are these the best way to characterize this kind of group violence? Are the two groups strictly drawn between religious affiliations or is there something else at work here and the media just finds it easy to characterize the violence in terms of religious group association.
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/headlines/buddhist-muslim-violence-escalates-in-burma/16763/?utm_source=feedly
Catholic Nuns for Immigration Reform
Catholic Nuns begin their "Nuns on a Bus" campaign across the U.S. for immigration reform
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/headlines/%E2%80%9Cnuns-on-the-bus%E2%80%9D-press-for-immigration-reform/16773/?utm_source=feedly
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/headlines/%E2%80%9Cnuns-on-the-bus%E2%80%9D-press-for-immigration-reform/16773/?utm_source=feedly
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